The Capability to Commercialize Network Products in Telecommunication by Bakkevig, Martha Kold
 
 
 
 
 
The Capability to Commercialize 
Network Products in 
Telecommunication 
  
 
 
 
 
by 
 
Martha Kold Bakkevig 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A dissertation submitted to BI Norwegian School of Management  
for the Degree of Dr. Oecon   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Series of Dissertation 6/2007 
 
 
BI Norwegian School of Management 
Department of Strategy and Logistics  
  
2 
Martha Kold Bakkevig 
The Capability to Commercialize Network Products in Telecommunication 
  
 
 
© Martha Kold Bakkevig 2007 
 
 
 
 
Series of Dissertations 6/2007 
 
ISBN: 978 82 7042 813 7 
ISSN: 1502-2099 
 
BI Norwegian School of Management 
N-0442 Oslo 
Phone: +47 4641 0000 
www.bi.no 
 
 
 
 
Printing: Nordberg  
 
 
The dissertation may be ordered from our website  
www.bi.no  (Research - BI Publications) 
  
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“It is not the strongest of the species that survive nor 
the most intelligent, but the one most responsive to 
change” 
 
CHARLES DARWIN 
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1. Introduction 
  
  
 
When we consider buying food, clothes or furniture we normally 
appraise the goods based upon our personal needs independent of the 
number of other people who have bought or use the same type of item. Some 
types of goods, however, have a quality that makes them more valuable to us 
as the number of other users’ increases. Classical examples are telephone 
and fax-machine; a more recent one is video phone. These goods were of 
little value to the first individual who acquired them. The value increased 
with the total number of items in the network, because the total number of 
people with whom you could talk to or send and receive documents to, 
increased. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  It’s hard to sell new network services (Source; Scott Adams) 
 
 
This phenomenon raises some questions relevant for the providers of 
these goods or services. Are the commercial and/or organizational 
challenges different when commercializing goods, which value depend on 
the amount of users, compared to when commercializing goods with an 
intrinsic value independent of other users? The theory of positive network 
effect has revealed that commercialization of network products can present 
difficulties that are specific for these types of products. The strong impact of 
direct network effects from inter-customer communication accentuates the 
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importance of distribution rate, i.e. a rapid rollout, and reaching critical mass 
in order for customers to experience value. The question is whether these 
challenges require peculiar capabilities. Operational capabilities enabling 
product innovation in general have been identified, but the capability to 
commercialize network products and the dynamics of resources and new 
products in telecommunication contexts have not been examined. The main 
concern of this thesis is capabilities fostering commercialization of network 
products. 
 
The remaining chapters are organized as follows. In Chapter 2 we 
present theories and concepts relevant for the investigation of 
commercialization of network products. Relevant theories with central 
concepts are network effects theory and diffusion of innovations theory. 
Moreover, the concepts of operational and dynamic capabilities, dealing with 
the firm’s routines or patterns of current practice in strategic and 
management processes relevant to achieving competitive advantages, 
enables us to identify capabilities important to successfully commercializing 
network products. From the theoretical part of chapter 2 we derive some 
research questions and a conceptual research model, proposing some 
operational capabilities enabling commercialization of network products. In 
Chapter 3, methods and research design are presented, followed by a 
discussion of the choices made to test theories and concept basis for the 
conceptual research model. The next four chapters, Chapter 4, 5, 6 and 7, 
describe the four commercialization processes, where each chapter is 
followed by a single case analysis. These four commercialization processes 
vary as regards successfulness and degree of direct network effects in the 
commercialized product. The four cases are cross-analyzed and discussed in 
Chapter 8. We conclude the work in Chapter 9 and the conceptual model, 
presented in Chapter 2, is refined based on the empirical data in the four 
cases. The theoretical and managerial implications of the findings are 
discussed in this chapter and close with a discussion of the limitations and 
makes suggestions for future research.  
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2. Central Concepts and Theories 
 
  
 
The purpose of the theory chapter is threefold. First, to present the 
theory of positive network effect relevant for introduction and 
commercialization of new network products1. Second, to present some 
central concepts related to diffusion of innovations and to 
commercialization. Third, to discuss the notion of operational capabilities 
and dynamic capabilities and its application to commercialization of network 
products. These discussions and descriptions will be used as a basis for the 
conceptual model in this study.  
 
 
 Network effects and network products 
 
When we consider buying food, clothes or furniture we normally 
appraise the goods based upon our personal needs independent of the 
number of other people who have bought or use the same type of item2. 
Some types of goods, however, have a quality that makes them more 
valuable to us as the number of other users’ increases (Rohlfs, 1974; Katz 
and Shapiro, 1985; Farrell and Saloner, 1985). Classical examples are 
telephone and fax-machine; a more recent one is electronic mail. These 
goods were of little value to the first individual who acquired them. The 
value increased with the total number of items in the network, because the 
total number of people with whom you could talk to or send and receive 
documents to, increased. This type of side effect in a transaction, as when 
one market actor affects other market actors, is known as an externality in 
economics. Externalities arising from network effect, i.e. the size of the user-
network, are known as network externalities (Katz and Shapiro, 1985). A 
market has network effects when, everything else being equal, the 
consumer’s willingness to pay increases with the number of units sold or 
expected to be sold (Economides, 1996).  
 
Economides (1996) explains network externalities with complemen-
tarities   between the components of a network. Networks are composed of 
                                                 
1 A network product, or more precisely, a networking service, is defined as a service 
for which a mediating technology is used to link customers who are, or wish to be, 
interdependent, and for which there are direct networks effects (Thompson, 1967; 
Stabell and Fjeldstad, 1998).  
2 Here, we ignore a brand effect, i.e. that people we would like to identify with have 
bought the item.   
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links that connect nodes. A service delivered over a network requires the use 
of two or more network components. Thus, network components are 
complementary to each other. A well-used example is a telephone network 
(see Figure 1). If customer A calls customer B, the service is composed of 
AS (access to the switch of customer A), BS (access to the switch of 
customer B), and switching services at S.  The service AS can then be seen 
as a complement service to BS, and vice versa (Economides, 1996). Network 
externalities arise from this dependency between the complementary 
components. A single star network as in Figure 1 can illustrate this.   
Figure 2.  Star network (Economides, 1996) 
 
 
In a network presented in Figure 1, there are n (n-1) potential goods or 
services. An additional customer provides direct externalities to all 
customers in the network by adding 2n potential new goods through the 
provision of a complementary link to the existing links. In other words, 
adding one more customer to the communication network directly affects the 
value of the service to other customers (Katz and Shapiro, 1985). The 
service or product then has a utilitarian value that to a great extent is 
dependent on whom you can reach. This characteristic of a network was first 
pointed out in telecommunication networks by Rohlfs (1974), but is also 
relevant for networks such as various transport networks and Internet where 
the purpose of the connection is largely to interact with people or businesses 
at the other end (Shy, 2001).   
 
S
G
F
E
D
C
A
B
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Networks where services AB and BA are distinct, implying that the 
service can be performed in both directions in the network, are named “two-
way” networks in Economides and White (1994). This categorizing is done 
in order to distinguish “two-way” network from “one-way” network. In a 
typical “one-way" network, there are two types of components, and 
composite goods are formed only by combining one component of each 
type. The customers are not identified as components; they are concerned 
with their own consumption of the network goods. Examples of this may be 
gas or electricity support, or radio and TV broadcasting. In “one-way” 
networks the externalities are only indirect, where a customer can experience 
consumption externalities only indirectly if increasing numbers of other 
consumers lead the network provider to increase the varieties or spatial 
availability of service at a special price.  
 
Network effects are not confined to physical networks as in “two-way” 
or “one-way” networks. They are also powerful in “virtual” networks, such 
as network of users of hardware/software products. Katz and Shapiro (1985) 
show an example where an individual purchasing a personal computer will 
be concerned with the number of other individuals purchasing similar 
hardware because the amount and variety of software that will be supplied 
for use with a given computer will be increasing as a function of the number 
of hardware units that have been sold. A virtual network can be seen as a 
collection of compatible goods that share a common technical platform 
(Shapiro and Varian, 1999). For example, all computers running Windows 
95 can be thought of as a virtual network, and correspondingly for VHS 
video players. One user adoption of compatible goods, i.e. a 
hardware/software system, will have no direct impact on other users, but 
may have lagged, indirect effects arising from increased variety of 
complementary goods produced by other firms (Katz and Shapiro, 1985).  
 
Indirect network effects are then caused by supply side user externalities 
(Shapiro and Varian, 1999). Positive indirect network effects occur from the 
realization of returns to scale, i.e. falling unit costs in mass production, 
learning by doing and learning by using. These are passed on to users in the 
form of price cuts or quality increases. In the case of products or services in 
a “two-way” network one new user will result in an immediate utility gain 
for the established users3. Direct network effects are then caused by demand 
side user externalities (Shapiro and Varian, 1999).  
 
                                                 
3 Direct network effects occur only with use, purchasing the relevant good is not 
sufficient.  
The Capability to Commercialize Network Products in Telecommunication 
 
14 
The extensive literature related to theories of positive network effects 
examines and analyzes the specific characteristics of markets for network 
goods. Much of the discussion concerns compatibility, standardization and 
its implications for governmental and policy regulations (see, for example, 
Katz and Shapiro, 1985; 1986; 1992; Farrell and Saloner, 1985; 1986; 1992; 
Economides, 1989; Matutes and Regibeau, 1992). This discussion is not 
included here. The thesis concerns commercialization and distribution of 
network products exhibiting direct network effects. Telecommunication is 
the empirical context and the service provider operates in a regulated market.   
 
 
  Commercialization and distribution of network 
products 
 
The value of a product or service exhibiting direct network effects lies in 
the connection among users and, hence, has little or no value when 
introduced to the first user. The question is then how can network services be 
commercialized and thus create value for the users and new rents for the 
service provider? Before I describe some challenges that may arise when 
commercializing network products I will specify my interpretation of what 
“commercialization” implies.  
 
 
 Commercialization process 
 
Commercialization is the process of transforming a new idea, i.e. 
innovation, from research or from other entrepreneurial activities, into a 
profitable product or service for sale in the market place. Furthermore, to 
call it a successful commercialization it must result in new profitable 
income, or, in other words, it must return the original investment in the 
innovation development process plus some additional gains (Burgelman et 
al., 2004). An innovation can be defined as new development or essential 
improvements of goods and services, and as production and distribution 
methods (processes) (Christensen, 1997). The innovation-development 
process often begins with recognition of a problem or need, which may 
stimulate research and/or development activities designed to create an 
innovation to solve the problem or need (Rogers, 2003). What remains when 
the innovation is created, is to realize the value potential embedded in the 
innovation. The innovation-development process can then, somewhat 
simplified, be divided into three phases; (1) discover; (2) create; and (3) 
realize.  
The Capability to Commercialize Network Products in Telecommunication 
 
15 
Step 1 - DISCOVER Step 2 - CREATE Step 3 – REALIZE OUTPUT
Recognition of a  
problem or a need
Research and/or 
development
Introduction to 
market
Implementation 
in organizations
New goods,  
services or 
licenses
New production 
or distributions-
methods
Figure 3. Different steps in an innovation process 
 
 
In what way an innovation creates value depends on whether it appears 
as a product or as a process4. A new product or service must be introduced to 
a market that is willing to pay for the newcomer, and the measure of value 
realization is a new income. A new production method must be implemented 
in an organization and can be measured on increased efficiency. The reason 
why it is important to separate these two realization categories is that they 
require different types of activities to be fulfilled. In this study, the focus will 
be on products and services brought to the market, i.e. commercialization 
activities.  
 
Rogers (2003) defines commercialization as the production, 
manufacturing, packaging, marketing and distribution of a product that 
embodies an innovation. Activities involved in production and in 
manufacturing can both be related to assembling components and technology 
for the product to function properly. Production and manufacturing will 
therefore be used as synonyms in this study. That leaves us with four 
                                                 
4 A process can, for that matter, be commercialized through sale or license-
agreement in a market. Typical processes here are techniques or methods for 
attaining various targets like, for example, improving business results.  
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important main activities in a commercialization process: production, 
packaging, marketing and distribution.  
 
The production, as already mentioned, deals with activities related to 
assembling components and technology. In manufacturing industries, these 
activities would deal with the transformation of raw materials into finished 
goods for sale, by means of tools and processing media. In mediating 
industries, as in telecommunication, a network product first becomes 
valuable to a customer when it can be used to communicate with other 
customers of the same product. Production related to commercialization 
processes of network products would then involve construction of a 
synchronized functionality of all components and technologies vital to the 
customer to experience its value.  
 
Packaging involves activities related to development of the product 
concept. How the “package is wrapped”, i.e. what does it comprise and what 
other potential benefits, for example other services, comes with the 
“package”, are of value to the customer. Packaging can also be seen in 
connection with some of the tasks in marketing such as how to promote the 
product and encourage potential buyers to purchase it. Important activities in 
marketing are, according to the Chartered Institute of Marketing, related to 
the “management process of anticipating, identifying and satisfying 
customer requirements profitably". Marketing is then a management tool to 
ensure that products and services are developed according to market 
requirements, and that they are profitable. Operative marketing is a wide 
concept and may involve market research, product development, product life 
cycle management, pricing, channel management, as well as promotion, 
covering almost all activities defined in a commercialization process. 
Distribution involves activities dealing with logistics: how to get the product 
or services to the customer, i.e. sales channels, methods and timing. There is, 
as described above, no watertight compartments between these 
commercialization activities. They can both be overlapping in their 
meanings and be performed partly in parallel. In this study, we divide these 
activities in two main ones: (1) production, meaning vital components and 
technology where technology is in main focus, and (2) packaging, 
marketing, and distribution where market is in the driver’s seat. 
 
 
 Distribution and the significance of critical 
mass 
 
A network service that is new for individuals or for organizations 
will be perceived as an innovation (Mahler and Rogers, 1999).  Diffusion 
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related to innovation is in diffusion literature defined as “the process in 
which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time 
among the members of a social system” (Rogers, 2003). The individual 
consumer may accept or reject to adopt the innovation. Adoption deals with 
the psychological processes an individual goes through (Rogers, 2003) and 
adoption research attempts to explain diffusion processes at the individual 
level. These micro-level analyses are used to explain the resulting pattern of 
diffusion at a macro level. The rate of diffusion or, more precisely, the rate 
of adoption is defined as the relative speed with which members in a social 
system5 adopt an innovation.  
 
Innovation can also be adopted or rejected by a social system like an 
organization or a department. The decision to adopt the innovation is then 
made by a collective or an authority decision.  In this manner, Rogers (2003) 
distinguishes among three main types of innovation-decisions: (1) optional 
innovation decisions, choices that are made by an individual independent of 
the decision of other members of the system to adopt or reject an innovation; 
(2) collective innovation-decisions, choices that are made by consensus 
among the members of a system to adopt or reject an innovation; and (3) 
authority innovation-decisions, choices that are made by relatively few 
individuals in a system who possess power, status or technical expertise to 
adopt or reject an innovation. A fourth category consists of a sequential 
combination of two or more of these three types of innovation-decisions. 
 
A few individuals called early adopters, with an adoption threshold 
of almost zero, may adopt a new idea or technology before anyone else in 
their system has. Adoption threshold is the number of other individuals who 
must have adopted before a given individual will adopt the new idea 
(Granovetter, 1978). Thus, the threshold indicates the degree to which an 
individual or an organization/department is resistant to adopting. Positive 
messages are then spread interpersonally from satisfied adopters to potential 
adopters who are thus persuaded to adopt (Rogers, 2003). As the number of 
satisfied adopters in a system gradually increases, and as the volume of 
positive messages about the innovation being communicated increases 
accordingly, the rate of adoption takes off after an initial period of relatively 
slow diffusion. Eventually, fewer and fewer individuals with a strong 
resistance to adoption remain, and the rate of adoption gradually levels off. 
The cumulative number of adopters of an innovation over time forms an S-
shaped diffusion curve (Rogers, 2003) (see Figure 3 below). The adoption 
                                                 
5 A social system is defined as a set of interrelated units that are engaged in joint 
problem solving to accomplish a common goal. The members or units of a social 
system may be individuals, informal groups, organizations and/or subsystems.  
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rate, and by then the slope of the “S”, depend on several factors. The 
perceived attributes of an innovation are one important explanation of the 
rate of adoption of an innovation. Most of the variance in the rate of 
adoption of innovations, from 49 to 87 percent, is explained by five 
attributes: relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, “trialability” and 
observability (Rogers, 2003).   
Figure 4. The rate of adoption for an innovation Source: Based on 
Rogers (2003) 
 
The adoption rate for a network service, empirically observed for 
telecom services (Allen, 1988; Schmitz et al., 1995; Mahler and Rogers, 
1999; Schoder, 2000), has a different course than the S-shaped curve. The 
diffusion curve is characterized by an almost straight line with a long tail to 
the left for a relative long period. Figure 4 below shows the cumulative rate 
of adoption for an innovation exhibiting direct network effects. The reason 
for the late take-off phenomenon in the diffusion of communication 
technologies is, according to Williams et al. (1988), the interactive nature of 
these services. It has been verified that network effects caused this late take-
off phenomenon in diffusion of an interactive innovation such as fax (Lim et 
al., 2003). When a certain number of adopters with which prospective 
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adopters wish to communicate is achieved, a turning point arises in the 
adoption rate. This point is called critical mass6 in the diffusion literature. 
 
Figure 5. The rate of adoption for a non-interactive product (solid 
line) and for an interactive innovation (dotted line) Source: 
Based on Williams et al. (1988) 
 
 
Critical mass in diffusion of interactive innovations occurs at the point 
when enough individuals in a system have adopted so that the innovation’s 
further rate of adoption becomes self-sustaining (Rogers, 2003). The critical 
mass or the critical mass point has been interpreted as the turning point 
between positive and negative return to adoption, where a small deviation 
from this value can cause a transition from an unstable to a stable diffusion 
phase (Markus, 1990).  As long as the critical mass point is not exceeded, 
demand synergies can only develop to a limited extent (Schoder, 2000), but 
after reaching critical mass demand pushes itself to maturity, which can be 
defined as a saturation point. The network effect that acts to slow the rate of 
                                                 
6 The idea of this critical mass originated in nuclear physics, where it referred to the 
amount of radioactive material needed for a pile to “go critical” in a self-sustaining 
reaction. 
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adoption of an interactive innovation before the critical mass is reached, 
serves to speed the adoption rate after the critical mass is attained (Liebowitz 
and Margolis, 1994). This way the network effect acts as a catalyst for the 
diffusion given that the critical mass is reached (Allen, 1988).  
 
However, whether critical mass is crucial for commercialization of 
telecommunication services depends on the degree of externalities (Mahler 
and Rogers, 1999). Past literature on the diffusion of telecommunications 
innovation has not clearly distinguished between new services that are 
highly interactive in nature and have a high degree of direct network effects, 
versus those that are not interactive. The critical mass is more directly 
involved in the former and less in the latter. Fax, e-mail and video 
conferencing seem to have been characterized by a critical mass in their rate 
of adoption, while voice-mail was not (Mahler and Rogers, 1999). 
Nevertheless, for some new interactive services achieving critical mass is not 
crucial. This was the case when mobile telephones were introduced because 
of their compatibility with the installed base of telephone subscribers. Had 
mobile phones been designed so that each adopter could only talk with other 
mobile phone users, a critical mass would have been more important in the 
diffusion of this innovation.  
 
 
 Strategies for reaching critical mass 
 
Why would anyone in the first place adopt a network service at the 
initial roll out when they experience low benefits and high costs relative to 
those potentially obtainable? Markus (1987) argued that adopters decide to 
adopt on the basis of an anticipation that the innovation is likely to take off. 
The individuals base their choice on what they expect the others in a group 
decide to do and watch the group to discern what the group choice may be. 
Allen (1988) described this reciprocal observation as everybody “watching 
while being watched”. Eventually, when many individuals in the system 
perceive that “everybody is doing it” the general perceptions of a new 
service change, from a view that “sees novelty” to “one that sees necessity”. 
Critical mass is being linked to consumer’s expectations regarding the 
performance of a technology and the final size of the network users (Mahler 
and Rogers, 1999). Reaching critical mass may then depend less on the 
objective number of adopters of an interactive innovation than on the 
perceived number of other adopters (Allen, 1988).  
 
Getting to critical mass is not a fixed impediment to diffusion, but rather 
a special quality of interactive innovations that demands the use of particular 
strategies by the service provider. A service provider may employ several 
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means to implant such expectations. A prize incentive to early adopters is a 
well-used strategy (Rohlfs, 1974; Allen 1988; Schmitz et al., 1995). A large 
portion of the network effects in telecommunication can also be captured if 
the operator initially recruits the customers that are more connected to 
others. That means to identify communities that wish to be connected 
(Fjeldstad, 1999). Gaining initial adoption of a high-status individual in the 
community who will support the new service (Rogers, 2003) and sequential 
introductions to communities where potential users are most receptive, 
increase the likelihood of reaching critical mass (Hohn and Schneider, 
1991). When the French PTT introduced Minitel service, they used a 
strategy of sequential introduction (Allen, 1988) when they did this in 
regional steps and started where the prospects were strongest.  This way, 
they built nationwide expectations for critical mass step-by-step.  
 
When you cannot achieve network effect within your own network, you 
can seek alliances that allow interconnection with other networks. This 
“horizontal” compatibility, which is compatibility between two comparable 
rival systems, implies that a subscriber of one network can communicate 
with those on the other network (Katz and Shapiro, 1994). Bundling, or 
combining complementary goods in one “package”, may increase the 
perception of relative advantage. Introducing a new service layer, like, for 
example, Short Message Service (SMS) text messaging, to the mobile 
telephone service complements the underlying service and thus increases the 
value of subscribing to it (Milgrom and Roberts, 1995; Farrell and Katz, 
2000). In this manner, a new network product or service on top of an 
existing network (product) will have an indirect network effect on the value 
of the underlying product. This may increase the adoption of the network 
service after the first saturation level.  
 
 
 Adoption dynamics previous to critical mass 
 
In accordance to past diffusion research on innovations, summarized by 
Rogers (2003), there are five characteristics of an innovation that affect its 
rate of adoption. The first is the relative advantage, which is the degree to 
which an innovation is perceived as better than the idea it supersedes. 
Second, compatibility: the degree to which an innovation is perceived as 
being consistent with the existing values, past experience, and needs of 
potential adopters. Third, complexity: the degree to which an innovation is 
perceived as difficult to understand and use. New ideas that are simpler to 
understand are adopted more rapidly than innovations that require the 
adopter to develop new skills and understandings. Fourth, “trialability”, 
which is the degree to which an innovation may be experimented within a 
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limited base. An innovation that is trialable represents less uncertainty to the 
individual who is considering it for adoption, as it is possible to learn by 
doing. Observability is the fifth characteristic that affects the rate of adoption 
and is connected to the degree to which the result of an innovation is visible 
to others. The easier it is for individuals to see the results of an innovation, 
the more likely they are to adopt.  
 
Network effects create utility for an individual user of a network product 
as other users adopt the product (Katz and Shapiro, 1985). Later adopters 
then influence earlier adopters and vice versa (Markus, 1987, Thompson, 
1967). Such a reciprocal interdependence increases the relative advantage of 
the network product for both past and future adopters. Because of this 
interdependency between the users in valuing the product, Weiber (1992) 
called them “experienced goods”7. However, adopters perceived that the 
relative advantage of a telecommunication service might also be influenced 
by the degree to which all of the components (such as terminal, 
infrastructure, content, etc) work together. Until they do, a potential adopter 
cannot accurately evaluate the relative advantage for the new service. 
 
Early adopters of network product, i.e. interactive innovations, require a 
lengthy period of use before the adopter can accurately perceive the 
innovation’s relative advantage (Mahler and Rogers, 1999; Markus 1987). 
Furthermore, if early users are not reinforced by reciprocity from new 
communication partners, they are very likely to discontinue using a 
communication medium (Rice, 1982). As users defect, the benefits to the 
remaining users will decrease and the cost increase, thus stimulation further 
defection (see Figure 5). Consequently, in the unsuccessful case, use of the 
communication medium will be extinguished (Rice, 1982).   
 
                                                 
7 Nelson (1970) introduced the concept of “experienced” goods when he made a 
distinction between qualities of a brand that the consumer can determine by 
inspection prior to purchase of the brand - “search qualities” - and qualities that are 
not determined prior to purchase - “experience qualities”.  
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Figure 6. Idealized successful and flop-like diffusion with network 
effects, compared to the typical S-shaped diffusion pattern. 
Adopted from Williams et al, 1988.   
 
 
Reaching critical mass of adopters where the turning point in adoption 
rate occurs, is seen the as a decisive measure or target when 
telecommunication services are commercialized (Allen, 1988; Schmitz et al., 
1995; Schoder, 2000). Allen (1988) and Schmitz et al. (1995) argue that how 
quickly the critical mass is reached is also an important success factor of 
new telecommunications services. Strategies which make the distribution 
curve at the turning point move to the left (i.e. a rapid roll-out) will increase 
the probability of adopting the service earlier. In other words, the service 
would be valuable earlier than it would otherwise be. Whether a rapid roll-
out also reduces the chance for the user to collect negative experiences with 
the service (cf. experience goods) and then discontinue to use the service 
before the turning point is reached is not mentioned here. However, based on 
the earlier discussion I would assume that this is a relevant issue.  
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 Operational and dynamic capabilities 
 
Development of new products with a following successful 
commercialization is important for renewal at the corporate level (Bowen et 
al., 1994; Covin and Miles, 1999; Dougherty, 1992) and thus sustains 
competitive advantage in markets with rapid changes (Cooper and Smith, 
1992; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Danneels, 2002). This theme is highly 
relevant in the strategic management literature where the fundamental 
question is how firms achieve and sustain competitive advantages through 
value creation (Schumpeter, 1934; Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984; 
Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Barney, 1991; Nelson, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). 
However, the debate regarding strategy has in recent years shifted from the 
sustainability of competitive advantage to the capacity to manage innovation 
and change (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; Tushman and O´Really, 1997; 
Christensen, 1998). This shift has been followed by a change of focus from 
the resource based view to a more “dynamic” resource based view (Teece et 
al,. 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000).  
 
 
 Toward a “dynamic” resource based view 
 
Different perspectives and theoretical streams of literature in strategic 
management are relevant for understanding how firms deploy their resources 
to create value. The activity-based perspective concentrates on what the firm 
does (Porter, 1985; 1991); the resource-based perspective concentrates on 
what the firm has (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991), while other perspectives 
concentrate on ability to achieve new valuable resource configurations in 
dynamic business environment (Teece et al., 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 
2002).  
 
The activity-based perspective is focusing on how a firm can achieve 
competitive advantages through strategic activities (Porter, 1985). The 
activity-based perspective was, for a long time, mainly concerned with 
seeing firms as a value chain, i.e. as a system where value is created by 
transforming a set of inputs into more refined outputs (Porter, 1985). Stabell 
and Fjeldstad (1998) introduced two additional value configurations: value 
shop and value network. A value shop is modelling problem-solving firms as 
hospitals, law firms and architecture firms. They create value by solving 
their client’s unique problems through core activities with a cyclical course. 
A value network is modelling network firms as telecommunication 
operators, retail banks and postal services. They create value by linking 
customer through core activities that have to be performed in parallel.   
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However, independent of value creation logic, the activity-based 
analysis framework postulates that competitive advantage is understood by 
disaggregating the value creation process of the firm into discrete activities 
that contribute differently to the valuable characteristics of the product 
(Stabell and Fjeldstad, 1998). The basic assumption is that activities are the 
building blocks with which a firm creates a product that is valuable to its 
customers. This disaggregating enables the firm to identify those activities 
that are strategically important where opportunities and improvement needs 
are present. The primary activities are characterizing the main value creation 
process of established products and services and, hence, do not involve 
innovation and commercialization processes. In addition to viewing these 
processes as a support activity to the value creation, this approach or 
framework has a disproportionately large “mesh width” for catching relevant 
characteristics in the process of commercialization.  
 
Value creation results from activities in which resources are applied 
(Penrose, 1959; Porter, 1991). The resource-based view, therefore, 
represents a perspective going beyond the levels of activities. The resource-
based view assumes that firms can be conceptualized as bundles of 
resources, that those resources are heterogeneously distributed across firms, 
and that resource differences persist over time (Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; 
Penrose, 1959; Wernefelt, 1984). These resources are, however, “sticky” or 
difficult to modify (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 
1984). Because of this stickiness, the resource-based view claims that any 
firm’s competitive advantage lies in developing strategies for effectively 
exploiting firm-based assets. However, over time, scholars have recognized 
that having a stock of assets, and to perform an old set of activities better 
than competitors, are not enough to maintain leadership or competitive 
advantage in situations of rapid or unpredictable change. When the business 
environment changes rapidly, static competitive advantages erode and firms 
unable to adapt fail (Teece et al., 1997). Both the resource-based view and 
the activity-based view appear to reach boundary conditions under these 
circumstances. The main essence of the critics is that the resource-based 
perspective has not adequately explained how and why certain firms have a 
competitive advantage in situations of rapid and unpredictable changes in the 
business environment (Henderson and Cockburn, 1994; Iansiti and Clark, 
1994; Teece et al., 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). 
 
Teece et al., (1997) introduced the concept of “dynamic capabilities” 
which, according to the authors, incorporates the recognition that 
competitive advantage in situations of rapid changes in the business 
environment requires both the exploitation of existing internal and external 
firm-specific resources, and the development of new ones.  The concept of 
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dynamic capabilities was defined as the firm’s ability to integrate, build and 
reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly changing 
environments (Teece et al., 1997). Some authors criticized the definition to 
be tautological, recursive, non-operational and lack empirical grounding 
(Mosakowski and McKelvey, 1997; Williamson, 1999). Eisenhardt and 
Martin (2000), however, utilized prior empirical findings to examine 
dynamic capabilities associated with specific activities such as product 
innovation or the formation of alliances and acquisitions. Based on their 
findings, they claimed that dynamic capabilities consist of identifiable and 
specific routines that have extensive empirical research bases and 
management applicability.  
 
Product development is, according to Eisenhardt and Martin (2000), a 
dynamic capability of the firm because this activity is one of the mechanisms 
by which firms create, integrate, recombine and shed resources. This 
resource handling is accomplished through learning from small failures and 
feedback from the external environment (e.g., customers, competitors) 
(Helfat, 2000; Helfat and Raubitschek, 2000). How product innovation 
generates organizational renewal or what the dynamic nature of capabilities 
really is, have been the subjects of a great deal of discussion (Helfat, 2000). 
Before I go deeper into this matter, I will first describe the origin of the 
notion of capability in strategic management literature.  
 
 
 Operational capability  
 
Capabilities’ constituent parts, their nature and strategic significance 
have been discussed since Selznick (1957) introduced the concept of 
distinctive competencies that were associated with organizations’ ability to 
cope with environmental demands. This concept was later defined as the 
combined technological and organizational knowledge and skills that 
together are most important in determining the ability of an organization to 
survive (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Nelson and Winter describe them as 
embedded “routines” resulting from long time practice and organizational 
learning. A variety of the concept has been used to describe these types of 
knowledge and skills.  Itamin (1987) used the concept of “invisible assets”, 
Prahalad and Hamel (1990) used “core competencies”, Pavitt (1991) “firm-
specific competence” and Leonard-Barton (1992) “core capabilities”.  More 
recently, a concept like “operational capabilities” has been used (Winter, 
2000; 2003; Helfat and Peteraf, 2003). Winter (2000; 2003) defines an 
operational capability as a high-level routine (or collection of routines) that 
together with its implementing input flows, confers upon an organizations 
management a set of decision options for producing significant outputs of a 
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particular type. In this definition the term routine refers to a “repetitive 
pattern of activity (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Similar, Helfat and Peteraf 
(2003) refer to the ability of an organization to perform a coordinated set of 
tasks, utilizing organizational resources, for the purpose of achieving a 
particular end result. 
  
Several studies have used the concept of capabilities to illuminate and 
explain why some firms succeed more than others in developing new 
products and processes (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Leonard-Barton, 1992; 
Dougherty, 1992, 1995). Leonard-Barton (1992) defines a core capability as 
the knowledge set that distinguishes and provides a competitive advantage. 
The content of the knowledge set is, according to Leonard-Barton, embodied 
in (1) employee knowledge and skills and embedded in (2) technical 
systems. The processes of knowledge creation and control are guided by (3) 
managerial systems. The fourth dimension is (4) the value and norms 
associated with the various types of embodied and embedded knowledge and 
with the processes of knowledge creation and control. The values of an 
organization can then be seen as the criteria by which decisions about 
priorities are made (Garvin, 1988). According to Garvin (1988), processes 
are the pattern of interaction, coordination, communication, and decision-
making through which they accomplish these transformations. Some 
processes are “formal”, in the sense that they are explicitly defined, visibly 
documented and consciously followed. Other processes are “informal”, in 
that they are habitual routines or ways of working that have evolved over 
time, which people follow simply because they work – or because “that’s the 
way we do thing around here”.  
 
Leonard-Barton (1992) argued that core capabilities could, under some 
circumstances, become core rigidity and thus impede product innovation.  
She found that core capabilities facilitated the development of projects 
closely aligned with the four dimensions of a firm’s core capability 
(employee knowledge and skills, technical systems, administrative systems, 
values and norms). In contrast, projects lacking alignment with those 
capabilities were inhibited. In other words, new products with a closer fit to 
firm competences tended to be more successful. Similarly, Dougherty (1995) 
found that, over time, “core incompetence’s” grow around the firm’s core 
competences. The reason for this core rigidity is, according to Leonard-
Barton (1992) that processes are, by their nature, established so that 
employees perform recurrent task in a consistent way, and to ensure 
consistency they are not meant to change. In other words, the mechanisms 
through which organizations create value are then intrinsically irreconcilable 
to change (Christensen, 2002). This implies that a process that defines a 
capability in executing a certain task concurrently defines disabilities in 
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executing other tasks. Leonard-Barton (1992) argued that firms are faced 
with the dilemma of both utilizing and maintaining their core capabilities, 
and yet avoiding the core rigidity by renewing the core capabilities.   
 
The capabilities’ “dysfunctional flip side” (Leonard-Barton, 1992) is 
a more pronounced problem in well-established firms (Burgelman et al., 
2004). The locus of the organizations’ capabilities shifts from resources 
(here people) toward process and values as a function of time (Burgelman et 
al., 2004). In the start-up stages of an organization, much of what gets done 
is attributable to its people. Hence, the location of the most powerful factors 
that define the capabilities of organizations migrates over time, from 
resources toward visible, conscious processes and values, and then toward 
culture. However, when the capabilities have come to reside in processes and 
values changes become more difficult (Leonard-Barton, 1992).  
 
Environmental changes will make previously acquired competences 
obsolete and call for new competences to be built (Danneels, 2002; 
Dougherty, 1995; Leonard-Barton, 1992). For the firm, this implies that 
competences have to be renewed continuously in the face of change. The 
challenge, then, is that operational capabilities in well-established firms may 
be rigid and, as a result difficult to change. In this connection, the dynamic 
resource based view, or dynamic capability view, calls attention to the need 
for renewal of firm’s competence and core capabilities when the business 
environment changes. Teece et al., (1997) identified dynamic capabilities as 
the main source of sustainable competitive advantage in a changing 
competitive landscape. The term “dynamic” here refers to the capacity to 
renew competence so as to achieve congruence with the changing business 
environment. 
 
    
 Dynamic capability  
 
In the wake of the “dynamic capability” introduction, many studies have 
been theorizing on the dynamic nature of capabilities on a relatively high 
abstraction level (Helfat, 2000; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Winter 2000; 
2003; Makadok 2001; Zollo and Winter, 2002; Helfat and Peteraf, 2003). 
Few studies base their discussion on direct empirical observations, and the 
empirical evidence that links these firm-based processes to market and 
technology adaptation is then at an early stage (Dosi et al., 2002; Verona and 
Ravasi, 2003).  
 
There is a broad consensus in the literature that dynamic capabilities 
contrast with “ordinary” or operational capabilities by being concerned with 
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change (Collis, 1994; Teece et al., 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Helfat 
and Peteraf, 2003; Winter, 2003). The dynamic capability view is based on 
the existence of some higher-order capabilities (Collins, 1994) that can 
deploy and re-deploy resources and “ordinary” capabilities to match market 
and/or technological change. An operational capability generally involves 
performing an activity using a collection of routines to execute and 
coordinate the variety of tasks required to perform the activity. Dynamic 
capabilities do not involve activities associated with production of goods or 
product innovation; they build, integrate or reconfigure operational 
capabilities (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003; Winter, 2003). Therefore, dynamic 
capabilities do not directly affect output for the firm in which they reside, 
but indirectly contribute to the output of the firm through an impact on 
operational capabilities. (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003). 
 
Some authors exemplify dynamic capabilities as the result of a 
combination of resources, such as entry into a new product market 
(Danneels, 2002), the development of a new technology (Helfat, 1997) or the 
successful completion of an acquisition, such that a new form of competitive 
advantage is achieved (Teece et al., 1997). Viewing dynamic capabilities as 
the result would imply that a successful commercialization manifested, 
either in the form of new products or new firms, would bring new 
competencies to the firm supporting development of dynamic capabilities. 
Others describe dynamic capabilities as the development of a new process, 
such as the development of a systems integration process (Helfat and 
Raubitschek, 2000), an acquisition process, a new product development 
process (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000), or a new manufacturing technique 
(Winter 2000).  When relating to the theme of this study, the critical issue is 
not what a new product or service brings to the company in terms of new 
competencies, but how to develop and sustain a process for 
commercialization.  
 
Dynamic capabilities are also described as mechanisms to create 
new knowledge (Henderson and Cockburn, 1994), to continuously improve 
processes (Zollo and Winter, 2002), or to ‘learn how to learn’. Zollo and 
Winter (2002) describe codifiable processes, repeatability and 
generalizability as the fundamental building blocks of developing a new 
dynamic capability.  They define the construct as “a learned and stable 
pattern of collective activity through which the organization systematically 
generates and modifies its operating routines in pursuit of improved 
effectiveness”. In these words, dynamic capabilities are process 
improvement techniques. They constitute the firm’s systematic methods for 
modifying operating routines. The generation of capabilities requires enough 
experience that “tacit production and organizational knowledge become 
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stored in new patterns of activity, in routines” (Teece et al., 1997). These 
routines help the firm integrate (Helfat and Raubitschek, 2000), reconfigure 
(Hargadon and Sutton, 1997), or develop and release new resources 
(Henderson and Cockburn, 1994). Viewed in this way, competitive 
advantage is not based on the result of successful commercialization 
processes, or on building a business process to attain successful 
commercialization’s, but, rather, in the learning efforts of reflecting on the 
commercialization process as executed in the firm as well as its objectives, 
reconfiguring it, and re-institutionalizing that process for the purpose of 
improving it, or in accordance with new objectives. Most scholars agree that 
this third element, “learn how to learn”, is required for any dynamic 
capability to provide long run competitive advantage for the company 
(Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; King and Tucci, 2002; Winter, 2003). To the 
extent that the learning mechanisms are themselves systematic, they could be 
regarded as “higher-order” or “second-order” capabilities (Collis, 1994; 
Zollo and Winter, 2002). 
 
Building on the notion of second-order capabilities, Danneels (2002) 
views a second-order capability as the ability to acquire and develop vital 
operational capabilities. He studied the reciprocal relation between a firm’s 
product innovation efforts and its competence use and development over 
time. In line with the product innovation literature, Danneels (2002) assumes 
that new product development is, in essence, about making linkages between 
technological and customer competences (e.g., Cooper, 1993; Dougherty, 
1992; Song and Parry, 1997) and that the key resources needed to 
accomplish them can be classified as market-related and technically related 
(Danneels and Kleinschmidt, 2001; Mitchell, 1992; Moorman and 
Slotegraaf, 1999). Based on his findings Danneels (2002) presents a new 
product typology which shows how technologies and customer as firm 
competences impact new product development and how competences are 
themselves impacted by new product development. Moreover, he further 
describes how these resource dynamics influence what type of product a firm 
pursues. In other words, product innovation activities not only draw on, but 
also serve to develop firm competences, and thus contribute to firm renewal 
over time.  
 
Danneels’ portrayal of renewal of firm competences draws on 
organizational learning concepts where he applies March’s (1991) 
distinction between exploitative and explorative modes of learning to the 
product innovation context. The major components of any effort to improve 
organizational performance and strengthen competitive advantage are, 
according to March (1991), learning, analysis, imitation regeneration, and 
technological change. Furthermore, each of them involves adaptation and a 
The Capability to Commercialize Network Products in Telecommunication 
 
31 
delicate trade-off between exploration and exploitation. The two types of 
competences required for product innovation in this matter constitute two 
learning dimensions along which products can be new to the firm (Danneels, 
2002). A new product may draw on existing technological competences 
(exploitation technology competence) or require new technological 
competences (exploration technology competence). A new product may 
draw on customer competences that the firm already has (exploitation 
customer competence) or require a new type of customer competence 
(exploration customer competence). In pure exploitation, a firm uses both 
existing technological and existing customer competences. Product 
development, in that case, according to Danneels (2002), involves making 
new linkages among existing competences. In pure exploration, a firm must 
build both technological and customer competence which involves making 
new linkages among new competences.  
 
However, as Danneels (2002) argues, both technologies and customers 
are firm competences that can be leveraged, which involve drawing on an 
existing competence, while using it as a stepping-stone to build a new 
competence. Leveraging technology competence implies appealing to 
additional customers through developing products based on an already 
achieved technological competence (exploiting technology 
competences/exploring customer competences). Leveraging customer 
competence involves building additional technological competences to 
appeal to a greater share of existing customers’ needs (exploiting customer 
competence/exploring technological competence). Based on this, Danneels 
suggests that rather than trapping the firm (cf., Leonard-Barton´s “core 
rigidity”), current competence may be used as a leverage point to add new 
competences, which he refers to as “competence leveraging”.  
 
The skill of the firm of combining and recombining both existing and 
new customer and technological competences could be thought of as its 
integrative capability (Henderson and Cockburn, 1994). Based on Teece et 
al.’s (1997) definition of the term “dynamic” (which relates to the “renewal 
of resources to address changing environments”), Danneels (2002) argues 
that the “dynamics” in this product innovation portrayal relates to the ability 
to learn new domains. He names this ability a second-order competence and 
defines it as the ability to identify, evaluate and incorporate new 
technological and/or customer competences into the firm. In that, second-
order competences8 enable a company to renew itself through building new 
first-order competences. As Danneels (2002: 1115) expresses it: “Some 
companies may have excellent first-order competences (e.g., they know their 
                                                 
8 Danneels (2002) uses the term competence interchangeably with capability 
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customers very well and have great relations with them, and they deeply 
master their technologies), but may falter when faced with the renewal 
challenge. The presence of second-order competences may explain the 
relative success of firms in the face of environmental change”. Product 
innovation is then not a dynamic capability per se, as Eisenhardt and Martin 
(2000) argue, but rather a potential avenue for a firm’s renewal, or a vehicle 
for the firm to learn new domains of activity. This is in line with Leonard-
Barton (1992:111) who characterizes development projects as a critical 
strategic activity because “development projects become the focal point for 
tension between innovation and status quo” in responding to environmental 
and market change, and by then act as a “microcosm of the paradoxical 
organizational struggle to maintain, yet renew or replace core capabilities”. 
Danneels’ (2002) additional point here is that a second-order competence, 
i.e. dynamic capability, is needed to fulfill a renewal. Based on this, I would 
argue that for a first-order capability, i.e. operational capability, to be vital 
and viable in a changing environment, it has to be seen in context with the 
dynamic capability to innovate and commercialize new products.  
 
The literature has used terms like resources, assets, skills, capabilities, 
and competences to express something that is valuable to the firm in order to 
cope with environmental demands and changes. These terms are often used 
interchangeably and have, to a great extent, an overlapping meaning. For the 
present analysis I will use the term capability interchangeably with 
competences (Danneels, 2002) and knowledge-set (Leonard-Barton, 1992) to 
express the ability of an organization to utilize resources for “the purpose of 
achieving a particular result” (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003) or “producing 
significant output of a particular type” (Winter, 2003).  
 
 
 The capability to commercialize network products 
 
The main concern of this thesis is capabilities fostering 
commercialization of network products. The theory of positive network 
effect has revealed that commercialization of network products can present 
difficulties that are specific for these types of products. The strong impact of 
direct network effects from inter-customer communication accentuates the 
importance of distribution rate, i.e. a rapid rollout, and reaching critical mass 
in order for customers to experience value. The question is whether these 
challenges require peculiar capabilities. Operational capabilities enabling 
product innovation in general have been identified, but the capability to 
commercialize network products and the dynamics of resources and new 
products in telecommunication contexts have not been examined.  
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Teece (1986) introduced the concept of complementary assets as being 
vital to attain a successful commercialization. These complementary assets 
could be generic or specialized (Teece, 2004), where generic assets are 
general-purpose assets not needed to be tailored to the innovation, and 
specialized assets are those where there is unilateral dependence between the 
innovation and the complementary asset, i.e. marketing, competitive 
manufacturing, and after-sales support. Teece (1986) argued that the 
ownership of complementary assets, particularly when they are specialized, 
determines who will benefit from that innovation. Mitchell and Singh (1996) 
showed that development-oriented and market-oriented collaborative 
relationships appeared to help firms acquire needed commercialization 
capabilities in order to commercialize complex goods in the software system 
industry. The dependency of several components in the telecommunication 
industry like terminals, infrastructure, applications and content for the 
product’s functionality, and the impact of indirect network effects associated 
with a multitude of complement services, imply a strong role of coordination 
with other actors in the commercialization of network products. Access to 
resources through both development and market-oriented collaborative 
relationships can then be crucial and may require a firm-specific alliance 
capability9 (equal to technological and customer capabilities). Building on 
Danneels’ (2002) framework, we argue that integration between 
technological, customer and alliance capabilities competence is important to 
innovate and commercialize new products effectively in the 
telecommunication industry. To empirically link the three proposed 
operational capabilities to commercialize network products successfully, our 
first question is: how do technological, customer and alliance capabilities 
enable commercialization of new products in telecommunication industries? 
 
One of Danneels’ (2002) key points is that for a viable new product to be 
developed and commercialized, technological and customer competences 
must have to come together. In other words, there have to be some linkages 
between them. The question is what these linkages comprise or require. Who 
knows, inside the firm, which technological, customer and alliance 
competence the firm possesses? Does linking require an in-depth 
understanding of the competences, i.e. do the competences have to be 
represented cognitively in the same mind or is an awareness of their 
existence sufficient? An additional factor is that different products will vary 
in their construction, the technical systems they comprise and commercial 
actors involved. Each new commercialization process may, in this manner, 
need different combinations of these operational capabilities. The next 
                                                 
9 We define alliance capability as the ability to handle external actors possessing 
vital resources for the network product to be commercialized 
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question is then: in which way will linkages between the three operational 
capabilities enable the commercialization process? 
 
The main topic in this study is commercialization of network products in 
telecommunication where the impact of direct network effects accentuates 
the importance of distribution rate and reaching critical mass. Network 
products in telecommunication are used for communication between various 
nodes in a network, i.e. between individuals, organizations and terminals. 
With few nodes in a network, which means few nodes to communicate with, 
it is difficult for the individual user to perceive a new network product’s 
relative advantage. The general perceptions of a new product change, from a 
view that “sees novelty” to “one that sees necessity” when a certain number 
of users are attained. The diffusion phase before this turning point, i.e. 
critical mass, is thus an unstable phase. For early users to persist in this early 
phase of diffusion, they have to experience the advantage through an inrush 
of new users. For the same reason, it is likely to assume that early users will 
lose their patience if this phase is long and drawn out and, hence, discontinue 
using the service before critical mass is reached. Operational capabilities 
enabling attainment of critical mass in users of the new network product, and 
at a high rate, will, accordingly, be a vital capability when commercializing 
network products. Our third research question is then: are some of the 
proposed operational capabilities important for reaching critical mass and a 
rapid rollout? 
 
The progress in a commercialization process may vary, not only due to 
different product construction, but also because challenges and opportunities 
related to market and technology change. Product development and the 
appurtenant commercialization process in a changing business environment 
in that case require both exploitation of existing competences and 
exploration of new competences. The capability to innovate and 
commercialize network products in a changing market has to co-evolve over 
time to match emerging opportunities. In other words, to be vital and viable 
in a changing environment the operational capabilities needed to 
successfully commercialize network products have to absorb new erudition. 
This ability to learn through exploration and adding the new competence to 
current stock are called dynamic capability (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003; 
Winter, 2003) or second-order capability (Zollo and Winter, 2002; Dannels, 
2002). The question is what kind of knowledge, organizational mechanisms 
and structures facilitate transfer and storage of knowledge learned through 
commercialization. In other words, what is the nature of a capability to add 
new competence to current stock? The fourth research question is then: how 
do dynamic capabilities enable the proposed operational capabilities to 
evolve to match the changing environment?   
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 Conceptual model 
 
The conceptual model is based on the literature review, and we will use 
the empirical data of this study to sharpen and refine this model. The 
conceptual model deals with the commercialization process and the 
operational capabilities important for reaching a large number of users; a 
critical factor for network products. The conceptual model is illustrated in 
Figure 6.  
 
100%
P e
r c
e
n
t  
o
f 
a d
o
p
ti
o
n
Time
LARGE NUMBER 
OF USERS
OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES
1. Technological capability
2. Customer capability
3. Alliance capability
COMMERCIALIZATION OF NETWORK PRODUCTS
TURNING POINTLAUNCHING
SATURATION
Linking 
mechanisms
DYNAMIC CAPABILITY
 
Figure 7. Conceptual  model 
 
 
 
This model illustrates, from left to the right, a progress during 
commercialization of a network product. At the launching point, when the 
product is introduced to the market, there might be some pilot customers 
involved but no commercially based customers. The solid line represents 
adoption to a new network product as a function of time. Network products 
in telecommunication are used in communication between individuals, 
organizations and terminals. With few nodes to communicate with, it is 
difficult for the individual user to perceive a new network product’s relative 
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advantage. The general perceptions of a new product change, from a view 
that “sees novelty” to “one that sees necessity” when a certain number of 
users is reached. The diffusion phase before this turning point, i.e. critical 
mass, is thus an unstable phase. For early users to persist in this early phase 
of diffusion, they have to experience the advantage through an inrush of new 
users. For the same reason, one may assume that early users will lose their 
patience if this phase is long and drawn out and, therefore, discontinue using 
the service before critical mass is reached. The solid line representing 
adoption as a function of time, hence has a low gradient from launching 
point towards the turning point where the gradient increases significantly 
before a saturation point in adoption is reached and further adoption levels 
off. At the turning point, enough individuals have adopted the new product 
so that the further rate of adoption becomes self-sustaining (Rogers, 2003). 
Accordingly, this turning point represents a transition from an unstable to a 
stable diffusion phase (Markus, 1990). 
 
An operational capability refers to the ability of an organization to 
perform a coordinated set of tasks, utilizing organizational resources, for the 
purpose of achieving a particular end result (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003), for 
producing significant outputs of a particular type (Winter, 2003), or as a 
knowledge set that distinguishes and provides a competitive advantage 
(Leonard-Barton, 1992).  In this thesis, “a particular end result” will mean a 
successful commercialization of a product in telecommunication industries 
in general and network products10 in particular. Handling relevant 
technology underlying the firm’s major products and handling its customers 
and markets are indicated to be vital operational capabilities in a successful 
commercialization (Danneels and Kleinschmidt, 2001; Dougherty, 1992; 
Mitchell, 1992; Moorman and Slotegraaf, 1999). We assume that this claim 
include telecommunication industries. We propose that a (1) technological 
capability and a (2) customer capability will be to important operational 
capabilities for attaining successful network products (see conceptual model 
in figure 6). A technological capability can in this context be defined as an 
in-depth know-how about the technology underlying the new network 
product and the organizational routines and structure supporting both 
acquirement of this know-how, and employment in such a way that the 
turning point11 is reached during distribution. In the same way, a customer 
                                                 
10 A network product, or more precisely a networking service, is defined as a service 
for which a mediating technology is used to link customers who are or wish to be 
interdependent, and for which there are direct networks effects (Thompson, 1967; 
Stabell and Fjeldstad, 1998).  
11 The point at which enough individuals in a system have adopted the innovation so 
that the further rate of adoption becomes self-sustaining. 
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capability can be defined as an in-depth know-how about customers’ needs 
and preferences and the organizational routines and structure supporting both 
acquirement and employment of this know-how. Mitchell and Singh (1996) 
have shown that development-oriented and market-oriented collaborative 
relationships appeared to help firms acquire needed commercialization 
capabilities in order to commercialize complex goods in the software system 
industry. For that reason, we find the concept “knowledge acquirement” 
more appropriate than the concept of “knowledge creation” used by 
Leonard-Barton (1992) when describing the content of “knowledge set that 
distinguishes and provides a competitive advantage”. For the same reason, 
we also propose a third capability (3) alliance capability as sketched in the 
conceptual model (figure 6). The dependency of several components in the 
telecommunication industry, such as terminals, infrastructure, applications 
and content for the product’s functionality, and the impact of indirect 
network effects associated with a multitude of complementary services, 
implies a strong role of coordination with other actors in the 
commercialization of network products. Access to resources through both 
development and market-oriented collaborative relationships can, therefore, 
be crucial and may require a firm-specific alliance capability equal to 
technological and customer capabilities. An alliance capability can be 
defined as the ability to handle external actors possessing vital resources for 
the network product to be commercialized.  
 
One of Danneels’ (2002) key points is that for viable new products to be 
developed and commercialized, technological and customer competences 
must come together. In other words, there have to be some linkages between 
them. Linking the three abovementioned organizational capabilities is 
proposed to be decisive in reaching the turning point. We will, at this stage, 
define “linking mechanism” (see conceptual model) as routines and 
structures supporting employment of the aforementioned important know-
how’s in a combination that enables the commercialization process.  
 
According to several authors, the capability to innovate in a changing 
market has to co-evolve over time to match emerging opportunities (Teece et 
al., 1997; Dougherty, 1992). In our context, that means the operational 
capabilities needed to successfully commercialize network products have to 
absorb new erudition in order to be vital and viable in a changing 
environment. This ability to learn through exploration and adding the new 
competence to current stock are called dynamic capability (Helfat and 
Peteraf, 2003; Winter, 2003) or second-order capability (Zollo and Winter, 
2002; Danneels, 2002). A dynamic capability can, in this situation, be 
defined as mechanisms that facilitate transfer and storage of knowledge 
learned through the commercialization process.  
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In summary, the model illustrates that the three proposed operational 
capabilities; (1) technological, (2) customer and (3) alliance capabilities, 
and the way they are linked will enable the firm to introduce and 
commercialize network products. An important point is that these 
capabilities are involved in the commercialization processes until turning 
point is reached, where enough individuals have adopted the network 
product so that the further rate of adoption becomes self-sustaining (Rogers, 
2003). The model further illustrates that a dynamic capability will enable the 
operational capabilities to evolve and, in this manner, assist the dynamic 
nature of the capability to commercialize network products in a changing 
business environment. 
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3. Research Method 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to present and discuss the research 
methodology underlying the empirical part of the study. The research design 
is the result of the requirements, which are given by the nature of the 
research question and the substance of study (Yin, 1994). The research 
design involves the choice of methods and procedures for data collection and 
analysis. The chapters is closed with a reflection upon the validity and 
reliability of the conducted research, involving a discussion of the process 
for data collection and data analysis with respect to procedures and 
challenges in gathering and analysing data.  
 
 
 Research design 
 
The research questions of this thesis deal with how commercialization 
processes take place in telecommunication industries and how various 
operational capabilities enable commercialization of new network products. 
To gain insights into these issues there were certain requirements that the 
research design had to fulfil. The following requirements were; (1) access to 
real-life successful and not successful commercialization processes in 
telecommunication which could be followed from the beginning to an end; 
(2) exploration of how routines, structures and systems restricted or 
promoted commercialization of network products and by then affect the 
outcome, i.e. successful or not.  
 
 
 Selection of cases and units of analysis 
 
Yin (1994) emphasizes the importance of clearly defining the unit of 
analysis. Among the practical reasons for defining a particular unit of 
analysis is that results can be compared with previous research literature. For 
the purpose of the present study, a commercialization process was 
considered to be the unit of analysis.  
 
Yin (1994) recommends the use of three conditions in distinguishing the 
most appropriate research strategy; the type of research questions, the degree 
of researcher control over events and the temporal focus of the research. 
Case studies can be useful when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon 
within real-life context where the researcher has no control over the events, 
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and where “how” and “why” questions are being posed in order to explain 
and better understand a set of events and process issues (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Yin 1994). The nature of these research questions require observations 
traced over time, retrospective or prospective.  
 
The objective of this thesis is to study commercialization process over 
time and to explore how operational capabilities enable or restrict processes 
and hence have an impact of the outcome for the commercialization process, 
i.e. whether it was successful or not. A case study design is then the most 
appropriate for answering the research question of interest here. Moreover, 
in order to answer our research questions we had to compare successful with 
not successful cases. Hence, we had to define on beforehand the cases as 
successful or not successful which further required that our observations 
needed to be traced retrospective. A “case” in this study is thus a 
commercialization process followed retrospective, from the initial start when 
a new potential product was identified and to an end. An end means here that 
the commercialization process was either manifested in a new service 
producing profit or in a cessation. 
 
Network products are of particular interesting in this study. In order to 
be able to comment specific on network product we have to compare 
products exhibited characteristics giving network effects, i.e. network 
products, with products without network effects. Four different cases then 
were selected, two successful and two unsuccessful commercialization 
processes. Furthermore, one successful and one unsuccessful 
commercialized product exhibited characteristics giving network effects, and 
the remaining were products which did not exhibited characteristic giving 
network effects (see table 1 below for case descriptions). The dependent 
variable is then successful/unsuccessful commercialized network products. 
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Table 1:  Case descriptions  
 
 
Case       Successful/ Network effects       Number of interviews 
  Unsuccessful 
 
 
SMS  Successful High degree       8 
 
IntraWAP Unsuccessful High degree      10 
   
VoiceMail Successful Low degree       6 
 
AlphaNumber Unsuccessful Low degree       9 
 
 
 
 
 Methods of data collection and analysis 
 
 
In order to fulfil the second requirement, exploration of how routines, 
structures and systems restricted or promoted commercialization of network 
products, we found it necessary to gather information from various key-
personnel at different levels in the organization and from other data sources 
as well. The case studies presented in this thesis involved multiple data-
collection methods and various data sources. Initial interviews where 
conducted with the various project leaders in order to get an overall 
understanding of the various commercialization processes. They were asked 
to describe the commercialization process from beginning to end and to 
describe critical situations and events along a timeline. Highlighted 
situations and events were then discussed in terms of their impact on the 
commercialization process and its progress. Later on we used semi 
structured interviews asking more specific questions to refine and elaborate 
themes that emerged from the analysis of earlier interviews, and to check 
factual data. These in-depth interviews consisted of several open-ended 
questions; concentrating on facts and events, rather than on respondent’s 
interpretations. Following the methods of inductive research, these questions 
were supplemented with ones that seemed fruitful to pursue during the 
interviews.  During all interviews, we encouraged informants to illustrate 
their statements with specific events and examples. The informants were 
here various key personnel involved in the four commercialization 
processes. All key personnel were asked, after the interview, to identify 
The Capability to Commercialize Network Products in Telecommunication 
 
42 
people who had been involved in the commercialization process.  Hence, a 
“snowball” method was used. Data collection stopped when theoretical 
saturation was reached (Strauss, 1987), i.e., when additional data resulted in 
minimal incremental understanding (Lee, 1999).  Interviews were drawn 
from multiple functional areas (e.g. R&D, marketing and operation) and 
from various organizational levels. Interviews commonly lasted from 45 to 
95 minutes and were tape-recorded and later transcribed. Secondary sources 
as published materials about the cases, internal documents and e-mail 
discussions relevant to the selected cases were also used. A list over 
interviews and documents is enclosed in appendix A.  
 
We developed a literature based conceptual model relevant for 
successful network products commercialization, in which the research 
question and empirical findings would be used to develop and concretise. By 
such we wanted to avoid that the case studies were limited to thick 
descriptions with no more than a weak link with theory, or too specific to the 
particular situation (Yin, 1994), not appropriate for theoretical 
generalization. According to Yin, the key is a greater reliance on theory. He 
thus suggests that the search for relevant theories is a vital part of the design 
phase and should therefore be conducted prior to any data collection (Yin, 
1994). Hence, our literature based conceptual model was used as a guide for 
both case reports, for the single case report analysis, across case analysis and 
discussions, and to aid the interpretation of the data. With the vast amount of 
data that had been gathered there was a necessity to organize the data, 
Eisenhartd (1989) notes that the overall idea with the within-analysis is to 
become intimately familiar with each case as a stand alone entity, which 
allows unique pattern of each case emerge before investigators generalize 
across cases.  
 
Generalization from case studies implies identification of main pattern 
and variation in the selected cases that is valid for a broader context 
(Andersen, 1997). We thoroughly read interview transcript and document 
looking for analytical themes and general patterns. Critical passages were 
highlighted and coded and initial interpretations were recorded in marginal 
notes. We performed a content analysis from the preliminary interviews in 
order to identify themes and issues, i.e. main pattern in the empirical 
material. These main pattern or key categorizes were sought to be confirmed 
in the more in depth interviews. From a list of similarities and differences 
between the selected cases, we induced tentative variables and propositions. 
This work required an inductive approach, which means an iterative 
interaction between data and predefined variables. After several iterations 
between data and propositions, we used existing literature to sharpen the 
insights yielding by the inductive process. This iterative process of 
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constantly comparing emergent theory and data led to additional often more 
qualified and refined memos.  
 
 
 Quality of research design 
 
The traditional set of criteria used to establish quality in empirical social 
research involves validity and reliability (Yin, 1994). A research design is 
assumed to be reliable if the study produces the same results and 
conclusions when repeated by another researcher (Yin, 1994; Eisenhardt, 
1989). Furthermore, the results are said to be valid when the study has 
investigated the problem that the researcher intended to investigate and when 
the categories and values derived from the collected data are in agreement 
(Dubin, 1969).  
 
 
 Validity 
 
Case studies is about capturing the complexities of the real world, and 
then making sense of it. It involves converging on constructs definitions, 
measures, and a framework for structuring the findings, which all are 
intimately tied with empirical evidence (Eisenhardt, 1989). A case study, 
involving a large amount of data collected through interviews, will contain 
personal judgments and interpretations at all stages of the research process. 
Not only will the individual interview present subjective judgments and 
interpretations of their reality, but also so will the researcher (Leonard-
Barton, 1990). This makes current the claim of objectivity. Moreover, tacit 
knowledge can be hard to communicate and that will leave out relevant 
information. A weakness will then be that researcher is only getting access 
parts of the “truth”.  
  
Using multiple cases and data sources and clearly describing each step of the 
process help reduce the threat of not detecting flaws in the validity of the 
case study (Eisenhardt, 1989). We have in this study investigated four 
commercialization cases and interviewed several subjects relevant for the 
single case, representing various organizational levels and special fields. 
Moreover, we have used several sources for data, e.g. interviews, e-mails, 
documents and reports, and thus increased the objectivity of the data 
analysis. We have described the procedure and the actual sequence of data 
collection and to test the credibility of the interpretation of the data, we 
checked the emerging insights on an ongoing basis with informants, asking 
for their feedback, sometimes in a second interview.  
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External validity is to generalize a study’s findings beyond the 
immediate case study (Yin, 1994). The current research has focused on 
commercialization processes in a particular research context, which means 
commercialization cases in one Norwegian telecommunication company.  
This limits the results relevancy for this kind of product and industry, and 
cannot unconditionally be transferred to other markets and products types, as 
they may require other types of capabilities. A limitation with regard to 
generalization outside the telecommunication industry calls for future 
additional research investigating the empirical based conceptual model 
outside the industry.  
 
 
 Reliability 
 
As regards reliability, an empirical indicator produces reliable values if 
it is independent of a particular observer and proof against haphazard 
(Dubin, 1969). To enhance the reliability of the cases we used distinct 
protocols for data collection, data handling and data analysis. The procedure 
in data collection and analysis described above enables other researchers to 
trace this study.  Reliability was promoted by using a case study protocol in 
which all informants were subjected to the same sequence of entry and exit 
procedures and structure of the interviews (Yin, 1994).  
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CASE REPORTS 
  
 
The structure of these four case reports will be as follows: The single 
case report starts out with a short presentation of the product/service. The 
subsequent description of the commercialization process is divided in two 
main activities: (1) production, meaning vital components and technology 
where technology is in main focus, and (2) packaging, marketing, and 
distribution where market is in the driver’s seat. Organizational 
characteristics, various events, knowledge and skills, technical and 
managerial systems, values and norms enabling or restraining the 
commercialization process will be presented here.  
 
Whether the technological, customer and alliance competences were 
important for the commercialization process, and thus could be considered as 
a capability, is discussed after each single case report. Further, to what extent 
linkages between the eventual capabilities enable the commercialization 
process and, by such, affect the outcome, will be discussed. Then, how 
possible dynamic capabilities enable the proposed organizational capabilities 
to evolve to match the changing environment will be elaborated on. Whether 
network effects were present in the commercialized product constitute a part 
of this discussion, and to what extent the proposed capabilities were 
important for attaining critical mass and a rapid rollout will be discussed. 
These results will be cross-case discussed further in Chapter 5 and the 
presented R&D question attempted answered.   
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4. Short Message Service (SMS) 
 
 
 
The Short Message Service (SMS) is today a communication service 
which enables the users to send and receive short text messages from their 
mobile phone12. SMS, as a person-to-person service, became available in 
1994 and was the first mobile data service to become a mass-market success 
in Europe. Only the mobile operator and the subscribers are involved in the 
production of this communication service. 
 
SMS has been followed by a successful deployment of information 
services distributed by SMS. Information SMS enables the mobile phone 
user to buy different types of information and content using text messages.  
Examples of these are downloading of logos and ring tones, news alerts, 
financial information, voting and games, etc. Information SMS is usually 
provided by a separate content provider and therefore often involves several 
commercial players. The subscribers are charged extra for receiving this 
content, and the amount is generally split with the mobile network operator 
and the content provider by dividing the income either through revenue 
sharing or a fixed transport fee. Information SMS is also increasingly being 
used for "real-world" services where the customer is sending a text message 
to a given number whereupon the cost of the item bought is added to the 
user's phone bill. 
 
 
 Production – vital components and technology  
 
Short Message Service as a bearing service was tailor-made for GSM 
and embedded in the GSM-infrastructure standard.  SMS had no parallel or 
predecessor in any other system for offering mobile service to the public. 
Two additional technical resources or equipment were necessary for offering 
SMS as a communication service. These were an SMS-platform for handling 
to-way data traffic and mobile phones supporting the SMS-function.    
 
 SMS specification in the GSM standard 
 
Development of the GSM-standard started as early as 1982 when the 
European Post and Telecommunication Conference (CEPT) established a 
                                                 
12 Is now also available on other mobile devices with Internet access 
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working group (named “Groupe Special Mobile”)13 for developing a set of 
common standards for a pan-European mobile communication system14. The 
participants in this work were representatives from different European 
mobile operators and their industrial partners. The main requirements of the 
system were to define the necessary interface specifications for an automatic 
European network with ISDN interconnection, allowing full roaming15 
capabilities in all participating networks, as well as a wide choice of non-
voice services (where SMS became one of them). Norwegian Telecom 
(Televerket) and operators in the other Nordic countries were heavy 
contributors to both the technical GSM specifications and the administrative 
procedures and interfaces between the operators. Their contribution was, for 
one thing, based on long time experience and development of the older NMT 
system (Nordic public mobile telephone systems). Just like NMT, the main 
function of the GSM switches would be to connect the mobile subscriber 
with other subscribers through the fixed network. One new feature, however, 
was that GSM was opened to several competing operators in each country, 
and the subscriber’s identity would be contained in a separate module (SIM), 
which is inserted into the mobile station.  
 
In 1987, the GSM architecture and the basic services were outlined. The 
GSM community then established several working parties with the purpose 
of specifying in detail different areas of services and technology. Working 
party 1 (WP1) was to deal with the services, WP2 with the radio aspects and 
WP3 with the core network and the signaling aspects. The responsible group 
for data and Telematic16 service in WP1 was first named “Implementation of 
Data and Telematic Services Experts Group”. This group later changed its 
name to WP4 after gaining status as their own working party. The main 
group in the GSM community was the group to survey the progress of the 
whole project, assign task to the working parties, and approve the solution 
produced.  
                                                 
13 The name of the system comes from this name (in French). However, the meaning 
of the initials has changed, and today GSM stands for Global System for Mobile 
Communication.  
14 From 1988 the standardization work was carried further at the European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) 
15 Roaming is a general term in wireless telecommunication that refers to the 
extension of connectivity service in a location that is different from the home 
location where the service was registered. Roaming occurs when a subscriber of one 
wireless service provider uses the facilities of another wireless service provider in a 
location where one’s own provider does not supply coverage (for example, another 
country) 
16 Telematic is the science of sending, receiving and storing information via 
telecommunication devices.  
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WP4 defined four areas that the group had to concentrate on, of which 
circuit switched data, fax services and short message services were some. A 
senior engineer from the Research and Development (R&D) department in 
Televerket was appointed as chairman of the draft group responsible for the 
short message handling. He had been a project manager in the mid 80s for an 
extensive study called “Mobile Networks for Special Purposes” and had long 
experience with mobile communication and message services. The intention 
of the “Mobile Networks for Special Purposes” study was to explore the 
potential of mobile communications for other services than telephony and to 
specify a mobile messaging system. An experimental digital system17 was 
set-up by Televerket and tested on pilot customers who used the network for 
fleet management of vehicles in the transport industry. The study included a 
market analysis of mobile non-voice services in general and mobile 
messaging in particular. Based on this study, the main points in the 
conclusion was that offering mobile messaging within the framework of a 
public telephony service portfolio could be a worthy business and services 
should be offered jointly to both private and corporate segments. This 
conclusion was based on the fact that the Norwegian corporate segment was 
small. Moreover, at that time, there was a rather low coverage degree rate 
and low battery capacity for mobile phones entailing that the mobile users 
would often not be available. Mobile communication and messaging service 
would then make a good match. Voice Mail notification is an example of 
this.  
 
The official guiding documents from the main group in the GSM 
community consisted of rudimentary descriptions of three short text 
messages services with different level of importance: (1) Short Message 
Point-to-Point Mobile Terminated, which was the service of carrying a text 
message through the network to the mobile terminal, was classified as one of 
the high priority services in GSM; (2) Short Message Point-to-Point Mobile 
Originated, which was the service of carrying a text message from the 
mobile terminal through the network to an entity for further conveyance. 
This service would be optional for a GSM network operator; (3) Short 
Message Cell Broadcast would allow messages like advertising and public 
information to be broadcast to mobile users in a specific geographical area 
(Trosby, 2004).  
 
                                                 
17 At this time (mid-80s) separated digital networks were needed for transferring 
data. Voice services were based on analogue signals.  
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Most people in the GSM community regarded SMS as a machine-to-
person service mainly, and the expectations related to the message services’ 
significance to the operator’s business were rather low and vague.  
 
The major part of the GSM community expected the circuit 
switched data and fax services to be the most important non-voice 
services, and regarded SMS to be more like an add-on that might 
increase the attraction of the GSM system without any commercial 
significance. In the years to come it was proven to be the other 
way around (CHAIRMAN of drafting group dealing with 
messaging services in WP4). 
 
The experience from earlier work with messaging for mobile 
communication had provided the chairman and the rest of the draft group 
with a “hunch” that messaging between mobile users might be a good idea 
and worthwhile pursuing. They, therefore,  argued strongly for these two 
services, “Mobile Terminated” and “Mobile Originated” to be equalized. 
Finally, it was decided to merge the two original point-to-point services into 
one service specification named “Technical Realization of the Short 
Message Service Point-to-Point”, with complete reciprocity for “Mobile 
Terminated” and “Mobile Originated” (Trosby, 2004). The designer crew of 
the draft group was also responsible for several important features that 
provided SMS simplicity and high functionality, both as a notification and as 
a communication service. An automatic delivery of messages to a recipient 
just after she had switched on her mobile phone and a “Messages Waiting” 
signal were viewed as useful to those who had the mobile phone turned off 
or were outside the coverage area at the time of delivery. A receipt 
confirmation when a sender was offered information concerning if and when 
the recipient actually received the message was also considered useful. A 
repeated delivery of messages until the recipient could receive the message 
required a store-and-forward capability. It was explicitly stated in the early 
requirements that none of the regular network nodes of the GSM should 
offer store-and-forward capabilities. The Draft Group for “Message 
Handling” therefore added an additional node named “Service Centre” (SC) 
to the topology of GSM and decided logically to locate the SC-node outside 
the network18. 
 
We did not have a crystal clear business idea behind all features 
we included in the specification but we had a “hunch” that they 
could be useful. The story has a slight resemblance to those of the 
                                                 
18 SMS were at that time defined as a value-added service and according to this 
definition the SMS-platform should reside outside the network.  
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Norwegian fairy tale character Askeladden, who picks up all kinds 
of items that he encounters given the presumption that they may 
come to use some day. In the adventure they always do, resulting 
in a massive success. In real life, they sometimes pay off – as with 
SMS (CHAIRMAN of drafting group dealing with messaging 
services in WP4). 
 
There was a generous culture which allowed us to be in the 
technological front. It was looked upon as nice that we (R&D 
department) struggled with difficult things, because it would come 
to use one day. “Hunch” is what you get when – in between the 
tightly scheduled tasks of today’s demands – you are allowed to 
stray into areas of terra incognita almost without any other 
purposes but to explore. The “Mobil spesialnett” endeavor was 
one such exploration of mine, and it meant a lot to my 
qualifications for carrying out the objective that we were 
confronted with. The previous telecom could afford that luxury. 
The present ones cannot, and the soil is inevitably less fertile. I am 
not sure that the SMS sketches of 1987 would have passed the 
WP1 examination if its members had possessed the mindset of the 
operator community of 2004.  (CHAIRMAN of drafting group 
dealing with messaging services in WP4). 
 
 
 Implementation 
 
The specification work of GSM standard was finished in 1991. The 
Nordic telecommunication operators cooperated in making joint 
specification for the required GSM equipment. The former Norwegian Chair 
of the text messages group was appointed leader of the Nordic group 
responsible for the SC-platform specification. This group discussed several 
features that would increase the SMS functionality, but were kindly 
requested to be more moderate.  
 
We were not bold enough in terms of exploiting future 
possibilities for MS to MS (i.e. mobile-to-mobile) conversations, 
e.g. group chatting. Both address conversion and handling of 
distribution lists within the SC were discussed, but a number of 
people clearly expressed that we had gone far enough with our 
perspectives on SMS conversations!  (LEADER of the SC-
platform specification group and formerly CHAIRMAN of draft 
group dealing with messaging services in WP4). 
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The European mobile operators the same year (1991) signed a 
commercial agreement (“memorandium understanding”) regulating, among 
other factors, roaming and interconnection. The worldwide organization 
GSM Association today administers this agreement. GSM was put into 
commercial operation in 1993 with two competing operators in Norway: 
Telenor Mobil AS and the private operator NetCom GSM AS. Telenor 
started testing SMS in their network in November 1993 and the services 
were put into ordinary operation in the beginning of 1994. At first, it was 
only possible to send text messages to mobile phones (as, for example, 
”VoiceMail” notification). In 1995, Telenor opened up for two-way traffic in 
their network and, in this way, allowed for “Mobile Originated” text 
messages. This coincided with Nokia’s launching of the first mobile phone 
that had incorporated text-editing software supporting text messages. Most 
of the Nordic operators and the leading mobile phone manufactures in the 
80s were engaged in mobile data transfer but, as earlier mentioned, in a net 
separated from telephony. Nokia was the manufacturer that had the strongest 
belief in data transferring in the GSM-network and was, therefore, first on 
the market. 
 
 
 Packaging, marketing and distribution 
 
Short Message Service was, from a marketing point of view, not looked 
at an isolated product that would give new income.  SMS was seen as a part 
of the GSM-service, i.e. telephony, where the data channel could be used to 
send voice mail notifications from the network operators to their subscribers. 
The user interface was judged to be too complicated and the functionally too 
limited for a communication service. This was the main cause for not 
appointing any product responsible person for SMS in 1995. 
 
The responsibility for the daily SMS-service operations was placed in 
the operation department of Telenor Mobile, while the technical 
responsibility for the SMS-platform was placed in the product department in 
a group working with data communication. The appointed person in this 
group had earlier worked as a technical manager for a data network system 
called MobiTex where he was responsible for building this network from 
scratch. This “packet switching”19 network was to offer mobile data services 
                                                 
19 In packet switched networks the data is split up in packets (units of information 
carriage), each labeled with the complete destination address and routed 
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for increased efficiency of mobile enterprise communication during field 
operations, i.e. fleet management by text messages between vehicle and a 
central. This service was, however, experienced by the operator as premature 
as the involved application had to be tailor-made for each company. The 
volume was small and the cost in developing the applications was high. The 
service ceased after a short period of time.   
 
In the absence of a product responsible person for SMS the technical 
responsible person for the platform was assigned to operate as responsible 
for product when necessary. The close link between system technical (i.e. 
SMS-platform) and product responsibility, was looked upon as an advantage, 
at first due to the bipartite responsibility and later due to a tight collaboration 
between the system technical and the product group,  
 
The SMS-service was very much characterized in what was 
technically possible and you could not detach the technique from 
the service. Our responsibility with SMS-platform was more 
related to development of the service than to service operation. 
Focus in the product department on both the service as such and 
the system technical issues were therefore an advantage. 
(TECHNICAL RESPONSIBLE for the SMS-platform).  
 
 
In the first year, the major part of the technical work attached to the SMS-
platform was upgrading and installing new functionalities. The marketing 
activities were confined to produce a product-sheet with SMS information 
and a price list where they adopted the European price levels. Gradually, as 
the SMS traffic increased, capacity maintenance became more and more 
important. Figure 1 below shows the growth in number of person-to person 
text messages in Telenor’s network from 1996 to 2002.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                   
individually. Packet switching is used to optimize the use of bandwidth availabe in a 
network, to minimize the transmission latency and to increase robustness of 
communication.  
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Figure 8. Number of mobile originated SMS (in Millons) in Telenor´s 
network (Q2 1996 – Q4 2002) Source Telenor 
 
 
90-95% of the SMS traffic in Telenor’s network in 1995 was attributable 
to “VoiceMail” notifications from the operator. In 1996, the person-to-
person text messages traffic started to increase gradually. At that time, SMS 
was bundled with Telenor Mobile´s ordinary GSM subscription and all GSM 
mobile phones on the market had integrated the SMS standard. For ordinary 
phone calls the subscribers could reach any other GSM subscriber in Europe 
independent of operator. This interconnect functionality was regulated by the 
European Post and Telecommunication Conference. An SMS function was, 
however, not part of this agreement, and it was up to the operators to decide 
whether their subscriber could send cross-network text messages. A debate 
persisted for a while whether Telenor Mobile should enter into an SMS 
interconnect agreement with their national competitor NetCom. Some people 
in Telenor viewed SMS interconnection with NetCom as a way of increasing 
SMS traffic and thus income, while others viewed it as a threat. However, 
they finally decided to go for an interconnect agreement. This agreement 
was implemented in the first quarter of 1997 and the number of SMSs 
increased by about 30% in Telenor’s network immediately after that 
(Andersson et al., 2006). In the subsequent period, there was also a rapid 
growth in mobile subscribers20 that contributed to further growth in the SMS 
traffic. 
                                                 
20 Telenor and NetCom reported record-breaking increases in the sale of mobile 
subscription during 1997-1999 (Andersson et. al 2006) 
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Up to this moment, the person in charge of the SMS-platform had 
carefully followed the SMS traffic development. The experience with 
MobiTex had provided him with a belief in SMS as a communication service 
and he expected the traffic to increase. He had also learned that it was 
important to be prepared for capacity expansion in the case of traffic growth. 
He estimated the growth curve, which went much further than his colleagues 
expected, and by then he was on the front edge with increasing the SMS-
nodes capacity as the SMS traffic escalated. The exception was, however, 
when Telenor Mobile in the third quarter of 1998 introduced free SMS 
function on “Pre-paid”. The traffic was then more than quadrupled in a short 
time. When the manager director and the product director saw these SMS 
traffic foresight curves they realized that text messages, as a communication 
service, could be a source of significant new income. Thereafter, SMS 
gained more attention from the marketing department and a new SMS 
product manager was appointed.  
 
In the beginning, we had, of course, a unit price per message, but 
it was only when people started to really use SMS we saw that we 
could earn money on it. When we recognized that this could mean 
business, it gained a stronger foothold in the organization and 
became an adequate product. There are few products that come to 
pass as a kind of curiosity like this did. (PRODUCT DIRECTOR, 
Telenor Mobile).  
 
In the third quarter of 1997, Telenor Mobile introduced a subscription 
type called “Pre-paid”. This subscription offered a lower fixed fee and a 
higher price per minute for mobile phone calls compared to the ordinary 
subscription type “Post-paid”. As the name “Pre-paid” indicates, the 
subscriber had to pay a certain amount up-front and could make phone calls 
until the account (stored on the chip) was empty. The SMS-function was not 
included in this type of subscription. The technical person responsible for 
SMS-platform pointed out to the new product manager that introduction of 
an SMS feature to “Pre-paid” would present some technical challenges. 
Billing text messages in real time, which was crucial if they wanted to get 
paid for the SMS-function on “Pre-paid”, required a technical solution they 
did not have at that time. There was an ongoing project working with a 
billing solution in the longer term, but the product portfolio management did 
not expect the new subscription type to be a source of a large income and 
therefore did not want to prioritize more resources to increase the “Pre-paid” 
functionality. Moreover, “Pre-paid” was judged to be in competition with 
“Post-paid” and there was a concern that the most profitable customers 
would change their subscription type if Telenor Mobile upgraded “Pre-paid” 
to include SMS function.   
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The decision to tone down the functionalities on “Pre-paid” changed 
when the market and the product director got negative sales feedback from 
distribution. In the third quarter of 1998, more than 50% of the new mobile 
subscribers had chosen “Pre-paid” and they preferred NetComs “Pre-paid” 
that included the SMS-function. Especially teenagers were attracted to this 
new type of subscription. Based on this feedback, the SMS was introduced 
immediately to “Pre-paid” even though that meant that the service would be 
for free.  
 
Our concerns were mainly that we later on had to charge for a 
service that had been free for a period and that a rapid traffic 
growth could burst the SMS-platform capacity. However, the 
conclusive factor was that we would loose market shares if we 
didn’t immediately meet Netcom in the market. During this period 
the market rose rapidly from a 6-7 % share to 70-80% over a few 
years. There was a rivalry for market shares every day. This 
involves a lot of effort to gain new market shares when the marked 
is established for network products. So you have to fight when the 
market growth there. We (market and product director) took this 
decision without conferring with the network director or top 
management. (PRODUCT DIRECTOR, Telenor Mobile).  
 
Due to the capacity concern the introduction of the SMS function to 
“Pre-paid” was not announced. After five days, however, the SMS-
platform’s capacity burst even though only 30% of the capacity was 
occupied beforehand. Increasing the capacity then became a prioritized task 
and while waiting for delivery of necessary hardware temporary solutions 
were introduced to release some capacity. Established functions like, for 
example, receipt for received messages were removed to secure the 
production of the basic SMS. Telenor Mobile received many complaints 
from established customers regarding an experienced decrease in services 
compared to what they were used to. However, the capacity problem lasted 
for a short period and was restored after a week. Parallel to the capacity 
maintenance work the technical group worked with a billing solution for 
“Pre-paid”. After approximately 3 months they were able to start invoicing 
SMS on “Pre-paid” (Christmas 1998). The solution was, however, infected 
with some weaknesses entailing that many users could send SMS for free 
during a lengthy period. It took over a year before the solution functioned 
satisfactorily.  
 
Telenor Mobile did not initially have a clear strategy for the SMS 
introduction but started with marketing campaigns after observing that new 
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customer groups such as, for example, teenagers began to use SMS as a 
communication form. In 1999, Telenor Mobile started to attract new pre-
paid customers with introduction offers whereby new customers were given 
a specific amount of messages for free or at reduced prices for a given period 
of time. Some refer to this strategy as “the heroin principle”, meaning “give 
it away for free until they become addicted”. The communication service 
SMS was followed by a successful deployment of information services 
distributed by SMS. Telenor Mobile agreed with their national competitors 
NetCom to introduce a high degree of interlinking for Information SMS. In 
April 2000, the two mobile network operators launched what was, to a large 
extent, a common Information SMS concept, Content Provider Access 
(CPA), with a very similar wholesale pricing and technical interface towards 
SMS content providers and SMS units.  
 
For Information SMS services like TV-related text-messaging where 
viewers vote and send comments, it is important that the providers offer 
common short codes (four-digit numbers) for all subscribers. A complete 
interlink through common short codes, transparency, and almost identical 
wholesale pricing was introduced long before the other European markets. 
Several other countries have now adopted the Norwegian business model for 
information SMS.  
 
 
 Organizational structure 
 
The mobile unit in the mid 1990s was distinct from the fixed line 
business in a separated company (LTD), Telenor Mobile. As early as 1990, a 
division had been established for mobile telephony with the intention of 
being a separate company. Tele-mobil, which was the name of this mobile 
division, became an Ltd. in 1993 with the name Tele-mobil Ltd. In 1994, 
they changed the name to Telenor Mobile. This was the first time that a 
network, which was Televerket´s core business, was established as a 
separate company. A year later, in 1994, Televerket became a limited 
company and changed its name to Telenor Ltd.  
 
There are several technical systems involved in the production line21 of 
a telecommunication service. Telenor was organized into several 
departments reflecting the various technical systems and profession areas 
                                                 
21 A production line can be defined as the technical systems and applications 
involved in producing a service which must interact for the service to be delivered 
properly and be judge to be valuable to the customer. Other concepts used to 
describe a production line are “technical course” and “value chain”.  
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involved in producing a telecommunication service. The control of different 
vital parts in the service production was, in this manner, placed in different 
departments. Telenor Mobile was initially organized in three divisions, 
according to the various production lines, i.e. “Mobile telephony” (90% of 
the activity), “Pager” (“Beeper”) (9%), and “Mobile data” (1%). The mobile 
data division ceased when the GSM-network, which had the embedded data 
channel, was put into operation. “Pager” ceased in 1996.  
 
Telenor Mobile operated in a business environment 
characterized by a rapidly growing demand for mobile services 
and the presence of a national competitor. Such markets require 
both rapidity and effectiveness in the organization. When a 
network service starts to take off the customer orientation must 
be better, the quality of the service must be better, and ”time to 
market” must be shorter. If the enterprise is organized across 
production lines there will be problems with rapidness. 
(MANAGER DIRECTOR, Telenor Mobile).  
 
First, all core activities decisive for the ability to provide valuable 
mobile services were held inside Telenor Mobile. This involved activities 
linked to infrastructure operation, services provision and development and 
marketing. The fundamental network infrastructure included operation of 
radio base stations, switches and various technical platforms for access and 
capacity. The product management included various customer handling 
systems, billing systems and customer support systems. In addition, the 
market outlet was involved with promotion and sales activities.  
 
There was a large degree of freedom to build and develop our 
network. We had an organizational structure that reflected our 
value chain (i.e. core activities), which gave us control of our 
core activities and a loose management structure. This was 
decisive for the success we had in the market, and also with 
SMS. Mobile and fast network is today (in 2006) much more 
integrated with a tighter control structure. Such structure gives 
cost efficiency and makes it easier to develop new products 
across network access and technology. However, it would have 
hampered the growth in the mobile network because we then 
would have to consider right and left while driving. We could 
drive on, as we wanted to. I think that was a great advantage to 
SMS.  (PRODUCT DIRECTOR, Telenor Mobile).  
 
Second, the management introduced an end-to-end responsibility 
along the production lines that involved all technical systems and courses.   
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We used a lot of time and resources to build an organization 
with an end-to-end responsibility where the technical side was 
aware of what went on the market side and reverse. A free 
weekend calls campaign would, for example, involve 
preparedness on the technical side responsible for the 
infrastructure; it would imply consequences for customer 
support and for the manager involved who had to be prepared 
for questions from customers who were not offered the service.  
(MANAGER DIRECTOR, Telenor Mobile).  
 
For Information SMS services like TV-related text-messaging where 
viewers vote and send comments, it is important that the providers offer 
common short codes (four-digit numbers) for all subscribers. The feature of 
a common industry standard has obviously been an important one for the 
success. The consumers and the non-strategic market players, such as small 
providers of information SMS, need not fear that they are choosing the 
wrong standard (the loser in the case of a standard war). A complete 
interlink through common short codes, transparency, and almost identical 
wholesale pricing was introduced in Norway long before the other European 
markets. Several other countries have now adopted the Norwegian business 
model for information SMS.  
 
 
 Single case report analysis  
 
The source of the cardinal “hunch” that laid the groundwork for SMS as 
a communication service was a combined in-depth technological know-how 
(what is technically possible?) and customer know-how (is there any 
business in it?) acquired through research work in the Research and 
Development (R&D) department at Televerket in the mid 80s.  A great part 
of the terminology used in the technical specification of text messages came 
from this research work. The question is why management, in the absence of 
market analysis and any expectations related to the message services’ 
significance to their business, allowed their research personnel to spend time 
and money on Telematic22 systems? According to Telenor´s representative in 
the “Messages handling” group there was an apparent corporate willingness 
to see business in a broad and long-term perspective. This willingness 
implied that the employees could follow a “hunch”, without any ideas on 
prospective use and businesses. Thus, a generous R&D culture existed which 
allowed the researcher to struggle with technical issues for a potential 
                                                 
22 Telematic is the science of sending, receiving and storing information via 
telecommunication devices.  
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prospective use and “to stray into areas of terra incognita almost without any 
other purpose but to explore”.  
 
The R&D activities included both basic research, where the prospective 
use was unclear, and research with a more applied character where 
technology was tested with respect to its applicability. Testing new 
developments on pilots and appurtenant market analysis gave the researchers 
a valuable marked insight.  The customer related activities in the research 
project “Mobile Networks for Special Purposes” gave the Norwegian 
delegates in the GSM standardization work confidence in SMS as a service 
with a market potential, which was the reason why they so eagerly argued 
for the “Mobile Originated” text messages in the GSM-standard. The 
original idea behind “Mobile Terminated” was, as mentioned in chapter 3.1, 
a voice mail notification from the network operators to their subscribers23. 
Few people in the GSM community believed that SMS would be used as a 
means of sending text messages from one mobile user to another. This may 
explain why “Short Message Point-to-Point Mobile Originated” initially was 
defined as optional to network operators. Before the official guiding 
documents were made a different delegation was able to produce proposals 
related to the realization of a service for Telematic application. The 
rudimentary descriptions in the official documents may have been the result 
of reaching a consensus between the different initial contributions. 
Nevertheless, these rudimentary descriptions gave the “Message Handling” 
Draft Group considerable latitude in the design of the various message 
services.  
 
The connection between technological and customer know-how thus 
seems a decisive factor in this initial phase, and there are indications that 
such a connection was an important enabling factor later on when SMS was 
distributed throughout Telenor’s network. However, before we discuss this 
issue, we would like to enhance the effect of SMS’s distinctive product 
characteristics on the adoption rate. SMS was part of the non-proprietary 
industry GSM-standard and bundled with ordinary “Post-paid” GSM 
subscription. The GSM network was rapidly distributed and by then an 
underlying growing network of potential SMS users existed. Moreover, 
mobile phones supporting SMS were rapidly increased, and after 1995 all 
mobile handset manufactures had integrated the SMS (Andersson et al., 
2006). The non-proprietary GSM-standard formed the basis for 
                                                 
23 The initial purpose could also explain the limited function and capacity of SMS, 
where an SMS message can only contain up to 160 characters.  (Andersson et al., 
2006). To overcome these problems the handset producers have included new 
features to improve the user interface.  
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interconnection in the SMS market and the network increased significantly 
when Telenor Mobil and NetCom implemented a SMS interconnect 
agreement. In addition, SMS had some characteristics where the individual 
perception of these qualities enabled the adopting process and, in this 
manner, adoption rate. These characteristics are identified through past 
research as relativity advantage, compatibility, trialibility, observability and 
low complexity (Rogers, 2003).  
 
As SMS was bundled with GSM subscription and integrated into the 
mobile handset the threshold for experimentation and learning by doing was 
low. The user did not have to make any decisions related to purchasing new 
hardware or subscription to a new service. This was an advantage for SMS 
compared to other mobile services such as WAP. At the time WAP was 
introduced to the market, it required the majority of customers to buy a new 
mobile handset. Moreover, the SMS interface was relatively simple. Hence, 
when the users first learnt about SMS, they were able to start using SMS 
themselves right away. Furthermore, a message generally required an 
answer, which lowered the threshold for the receiver to adopt the service. 
Using SMS often involve a characteristic punching posture were the user 
falls into a deep concentration ignoring the surroundings. This behavior was 
easy for others to observe and such visibility stimulates peer discussion of 
the new service. The perceived relative advantage, which is the degree to 
which an innovation is perceived as better than the idea it supersedes, can 
also be said to be high. Teenagers, for instance, realized that they could 
communicate much more cheaply by SMS than by making phone calls. 
Initially, SMS on “Pre-paid” (which teenagers preferred) was for free, due to 
the lack of  a billing solution. Moreover, when Telenor Mobile started to 
charge for SMS on “Pre-paid” the prize was relative low compared to mobile 
phone call charges. Text messaging could also be used in situations where 
the sender or receiver could not talk, i.e. meetings, concerts etc. Finally, the 
youth image and the growth of a specialized language to overcome the 
interface limitations gave SMS a cult status. These distinctive product 
characteristics, together with an enlarged network (due to an interconnect 
agreement) and low prize (for free in the beginning), were important factors 
in the rapidly growing use of SMS and reaching critical mass. The 
distribution of SMS thus occurred without marketing effort from the service 
provider.   
 
However, some events occurred that could have been critical to the 
distribution of SMS. The fear of losing market shares of GSM-subscribers 
when Telenor’s national competitor introduced SMS on “Pre-paid” 
subscriptions, was the reason why Telenor introduced SMS on “Pre-paid” 
before a billing solution was developed and capacity was secured. 
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Introduction of free SMS on “Pre-Paid” entailed that the SMS traffic was 
more than quadrupled in five days, and it seems that this growth in SMS 
users triggered an explosive growth of text messages. SMS as a 
communication service is a network product exhibiting a high degree of 
network effects, meaning that the value lies in the connection among users. 
In other words, if SMS could not be used to communicate it would not have 
any value. A service breakdown or prolonged reduced service quality could 
thus have affected both established and potential customers in their choice of 
mobile operator in a critical phase of SMS distribution. Established 
customers who had adopted SMS could discontinue using SMS as a 
communication service or change service provider. Furthermore, potential 
new GSM subscribers who valued the SMS-function could choose the 
competitor NetCom. The SMS platform’s capacity was thus vital for 
producing SMS as a stable service to established customers as well as for 
distribution of SMS to new adopters.  
 
A prolonged service breakdown was, however, avoided. The person who 
had the combined responsibility for the SMS infrastructure (i.e. SMS 
platform) and for SMS as a product had increased the platform capacity in 
accordance with his own estimated growth curves for SMS traffic. His 
earlier experience with operation of data networks had given him a faith in 
SMS as a communication service and he was therefore ahead with platform 
capacity. The effect of the unexpected significant growth was thus limited to 
a reduced SMS functionality for less than a week. Again, as with the earlier 
specification work, an in-depth technological know-how (how to maintain 
and develop the platform’s functionality and capacity) and customer 
experience (expecting a growth) seem to be a vital combination for the 
ability to commercialize SMS, in this case produce and distribute the service.   
 
SMS was “very much characterized with what was technically 
possible” to quote the technical/product manager and “detaching the 
technique from the service” was not feasible. ”The SMS-service was very 
much characterized in what was technically possible and you could not 
detach the technique from the service. Our responsibility with SMS-platform 
was more related to development of the service than to service operation. 
Focus in the product department on both the service as such and the system 
technical issues were therefore an advantage.” Developing the infrastructure 
technology opened up to new service functionalities and improved user 
interface, while introduction of new SMS functionalities required changes in 
the infrastructure and traffic growth required an increased platform capacity. 
This immediate interdependence between SMS’s infrastructure and SMS’s 
functionalities, including capacity, required a strong coordination between 
technical and more market related activities. The technical responsibility for 
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the SMS-platform was placed where the relevant knowledge was, i.e. in the 
product department, and not in accordance with the formal responsibility 
structure, which would be in the operation department. By such, a close link 
between system technical and product responsibility was established, first 
due to the bipartite responsibility and later due to a tight collaboration 
between the system technical group and the product group. This close link 
between the technical side and the market side seems to be an advantage for 
distribution of SMS in a critical phase. The attached importance to succeed 
with an end-to-end responsibility in the original organization of Telenor 
Mobile, which should secure an efficient coordination of different vital parts 
in the various services’ production lines, supported this “linking”. “We used 
a lot of time and resources to build an organization with an end-to-end 
responsibility where the technical side was aware of what went on the 
market side and reverse.” (MANAGER DIRECTOR, Telenor Mobile).  
 
It was then a shared understanding that the responsibility across the 
production line should be placed in the same sub unit or closely linked sub 
units. The sub units were formed based on business logic rather than on a 
functional logic. An end-to-end responsibility was also pointed out to be the 
reason why they could make rapid decisions regarding the product’s 
functionalities. An example of this is when the product director and market 
director at Telenor Mobile decided to upgrade the “Pre-paid” subscription 
type with the SMS function. This spontaneous decision, as a response to the 
negative sales signals from the distribution channels, was taken without 
conferring with other departments or the top manager of Telenor Mobile, 
even though the decision had consequences on the platform’s setup and its 
interplay with the customer handling system.  
 
Three operational capabilities: technological capability, customer 
capability and alliance capability are proposed in this thesis to be important 
for reaching the turning point where a critical mass of users is obtained. 
Having access to vital resources and knowledge possessed by external actors 
were not an issue in the SMS case. The required knowledge and technology 
for commercializing SMS was accessible in-house Telenor Mobile. An 
alliance capability was thus not important for a successful 
commercialization. Nevertheless, both technological know-how and 
customer know-how were vital, for the origin of SMS as well as for 
distribution. It is, however, difficult to disconnect the organizational routines 
and structures supporting acquirement and employment of technological 
know-how, and those who supported acquirement and employment of 
customer know-how. The in-depth know-how about the technology 
underlying SMS and that of customers’ needs and preferences first became 
significant to commercialization of SMS when they were combined.  
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Operational capabilities are referred to in the literature as being vital to 
“a particular end result”; in this context a successful commercialization. 
Technological know-how and customer know-how can thus not be regarded 
as independent operational capabilities in this context, but more like 
fundamental ingredients that had to be linked in order to be important to a 
successful SMS commercialization. Factors that enabled this “linking” were 
a generous R&D culture which included both basic research and applied 
research where new technology and applications were tested on pilots, a 
shared understanding for the importance of an end-to-end responsibility of a 
production line, representation of relevant technological and customer know-
how in the same mind, and an individual employment of all these.  
 
 It seems that this linking facilitated information sharing between the 
“technical” and “market side”. Such dynamics may be important when 
commercializing products where there is a direct technological dependence 
along the service’s production line.  A dynamic capability, defined as 
mechanisms facilitating transfer and storage of knowledge learned through 
the commercialization process, is in this thesis proposed to be important for 
the organizational capabilities to co-evolve over time to match emerging 
opportunities in technology and the market place.  Consequently, it seems 
natural to propose that the same factors and mechanisms enabling the link 
between technical and customer know-how important for successful 
commercialization may also result in dynamics where the technical part 
learns from the more market oriented activities and vice versa.  
 
 
 Conclusion 
 
The individual perception of SMS distinctive product characteristics or 
qualities, together with an enlarged GSM network and low prize, enabled 
distribution of SMS and the reaching of critical mass. Both technological 
and customer know-how was vital to both the origin of SMS as a 
communication service and distribution of SMS in a critical distribution 
phase.  However, it was through linking that these two seemingly separated 
skills became the decisive factor for a successful commercialization of SMS. 
Factors that enabled this “linking” were a generous R&D culture, which 
including both basic research and applied research where new technology 
and applications were tested on pilots, a shared understanding for the 
importance of an end-to-end responsibility of a production line, 
representation of relevant technological and customer know-how in the same 
mind, and an individual employment of the necessary know-how. The same 
factors and mechanisms enabling the link between technical and customer 
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know-how important successful commercialization may also result in 
dynamics where the technical part could learn from more market oriented 
activities and vice versa. The required know-how and technology for 
commercializing SMS were accessible in-house Telenor Mobile and 
handling alliances during commercialization was not an issue. 
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5. IntraWAP 
 
 
IntraWAP was a service that should give companies and their employees 
secure access to the company’s corporate intranet through wireless terminals 
with WAP24-functionality. Groupware applications like “E-mail”, 
“Calendar” and “To Do-list” could, in this manner, be employed via a 
mobile phone. A pilot solution was launched in June 2000, and after various 
upgraded versions and three re-launchings, the service IntraWAP ceased in 
2003.  
 
 Production – vital components and technology 
 
IntraWAPs production line comprised several technical systems that 
were built around a software packet from IBM25/Lotus Software26. This 
software connected groupware applications on a corporate system to a WAP-
interface. The “connector” software had to be installed at the corporate site. 
Telenor Mobile´s infrastructure included an access server, a WAP-gateway 
and several security mechanisms. This way the information could be 
encrypted securing the information from intruders. In addition, various 
systems for handling payment and customer rights were involved in 
producing the service. Last but not least, a wireless terminal (e.g. mobile 
phone) with WAP-functionality was necessary. IntraWAP was a 
combination of an IT-product (software package implemented on a corporate 
data platform) and a telecommunication product (mediating via mobile 
phone).  
 
 
 Project initiative 
 
Development of a WAP-protocol in 1999 opened up to wireless access 
from hand held terminals to Internet contents and services. An important 
driver for initiating development of IntraWAP was a joint venture agreement 
                                                 
24 WAP (Wireless Application Protocol) is a standard for mobile Internet. 
25 IBM (International Business Machines Corporation) is an international computer 
technology corporation manufacturing and selling computer hardware, software, 
infrastructure services, hosting services, and consulting services in areas ranging 
from mainframe computer to nanotechnology.  
26 The software company Lotus Software, which develops and sells the groupware 
system Lotus Notes, is a subsidiary of IBM. Lotus Notes is also called a PIM-
solution (Personal Information Manager) 
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between Telenor Mobile and IBM. The Telenor Mobile objective was to 
increase data traffic in their network. System integration was, hence, viewed 
as a critical success factor for linking the GSM-network to Internet. In order 
to gain access to this critical competence they established a unit to take 
responsibility for realizing agreements with system integration partners. As a 
result of this work Telenor Mobile and IBM in January 2000 signed a joint 
venture agreement with the intention to develop and commercialize new 
products and services.  
 
Up to this date, Telenor Mobile had worked with various solutions for 
wireless data transfer. IBM, on their part, worked with connector software 
for Lotus Notes and WAP. These two activities were viewed as a good 
“match” and were integrated in a project with the intention of developing 
and commercializing IntraWAP. The IntraWAP project thus became a joint 
venture between Telenor Mobile and IBM/Lotus Software. Telenor Mobile’s 
responsibility for delivering the service was to operate the wireless 
infrastructure for data traffic between terminals, via the Internet and the 
corporate intranet. A vital part of this infrastructure was a WAP-gateway, 
developed and delivered by Ericsson27. IBM/Lotus Software, on their part, 
were to produce, install and offer support for the connector software at the 
corporate site.  
 
 
 Project planning 
 
The IntraWAP project was established in March 2000 with Telenor 
Mobile´s Mobile Internet Division as the responsible unit. The appointed 
person who became responsible for developing and accomplishing a 
commercial launching of IntraWAP came from the Net division in Telenor 
Mobile. He had experience from the management of technological 
development projects but not with commercial launching. With strong 
signals from the management group to show some concrete results (i.e. an 
innovative service) shortly after signing the IBM-agreement he decided to 
divide the project into two steps. The first step was to result in a commercial 
launching of an early version (1.0) within 15 June 2000. This version would 
comprise a technical solution for Lotus Notes users. A later version (2.0) 
would contain a technical solution for Microsoft Outlook28 users, increased 
functionality for the corporate intranet administrator including selective 
access control based on advanced authentication, and other updated security 
mechanisms. The project teams planned to promote the updated security 
                                                 
27 Telecommunication Equipment Manufacturer 
28 Microsoft’s groupware system 
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mechanisms in September 2000. The planned date for launching the final 
version (2.0) was April 2001.  
 
IntraWAP´s launching date was not based on a detailed and 
thorough feasibility study. It was based on a strong wish from 
the management group to be the first on the market with this 
kind of service. It viewed it important to show the market that 
Telenor Mobile was an innovative company and that they could 
handle partnership (IntraWAP´s PROJECT LEADER).  
 
Step one was planned as a progress in three phases. Concept-, 
implementing- and launching-phase with concluding decision points 
between the phases. The latter contained a planned delivery of the product to 
the market division for further sale. The estimated need for human resources 
was four persons full-time (core team) and a handful of part-time specialists. 
The core team divided the project responsibility into project management 
and management of technical, integration and marketing activities. Lotus 
Software participated with a technical person with competence in the 
connector software. IntraWAP´s technical manager came from the Internet 
division and was to oversee that the technical cooperation with the involved 
actors went without problems. The person in charge of system integration 
would coordinate the total service delivery together with IBM/Lotus 
Software and the affected internal units (e.g. customer support). The person 
in charge of market and sales activities, which included the product concept, 
came from the market division. The intention was that he would be 
IntraWAP´s product chief after launching. The two latter persons were tied 
up with other projects and, hence, were limited to a 50% employment in the 
IntraWAP-project. The core team secured the participation of about ten 
specialists in a 20% employment to support the activities connected with 
technical architecture, safety issues and sales. A resource agreement was 
signed between the project leader, the involved person and his/her superior 
in the organization in order to dedicate the human resources to the project. 
Several external consultants were engaged mainly to work with technical 
challenges related to implementation as the project progressed. At its 
highest, over 20 people was involved in the project. 
 
 
 Human resources 
 
As early as the beginning of May 2000, the project leader experienced 
problems with access to the contracted resources. Some project participants 
changed jobs implying that their project engagement ceased. They had to be 
replaced. Other project participants, both core members and part-time 
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specialist, were “over-booked”. In other words, their total engagement in 
various projects exceeded 100%. This meant that they had to prioritize 
between projects and tasks in the organizations when unforeseen challenges 
turned up. The resource scarcity was seen as a threat to the planned progress.  
The project’s steering committee made it clear that no delay was accepted. 
The project leader’s dilemma and a source of frustration was that the same 
members of the steering committee, who were to secure resource access, did 
not prioritize the project when resource scarcity occurred in the organization. 
 
There was no clear and evident product portfolio strategy or 
thinking behind the development of IntraWAP beyond the 
importance of collaboration with system integrators. That gave the 
project vagueness and a loss of belonging in the organization. The 
steering committee did not prioritize the project when other 
important tasks arose in the organization. Tasks and activities were 
what their performance was measured or judged by (IntraWAP´s 
PROJECT LEADER).  
 
 
 Technical solutions 
 
The connector software making Lotus Notes compatible with the WAP-
protocol had been tested. Moreover, the WAP-gateway worked to 
satisfaction according to Ericsson, even though the security mechanisms had 
to be updated parallel to the technological development in that area. 
Although the project teams did not expect any particularly large challenges 
in connection with the IntraWAP´s infrastructure, they knew that offering 
security mechanisms that matched corporate requirement for security could 
involve some technical challenges. To prevent intruders’ access to classified 
information, the security mechanisms were installed on the WAP-gateway. 
The “WAP-gateway” main function was to convert the information to an 
appropriate format (encrypt/de-crypt) and to forward the information 
according to setup.  Two different protocols or encryption technologies were 
used: one technology (WTLS) for the first transport segment between the 
wireless terminal and the WAP-gateway, and a corresponding technology 
(SSL) in the second transport segment, securing the transfer between the 
WAP-gateway and corporate Intranet, via Internet (see figure 5 below). 
These security mechanisms were critical parts for providing employees 
secure access to the corporate intranet. 
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Figure 9. A principle drawing of IntraWAP´s technical solution   
 
 
The security mechanisms were, at that time, an immature technology and 
the mechanisms needed to be improved parallel to the technological 
development. Ericsson, the provider of the WAP-gateway, had appointed a 
technology group working with technology upgrading in this area. The 
project team was informed by Ericsson in May 2000 that they could not 
update the planned security upgrading until August 2000. This entailed that 
the security would not function to satisfaction at the planned launching date. 
A dilemma was that the management group in Mobile Internet considered it 
very important to uphold the deadline for commercial launching. Both 
Telenor Mobile and IBM/Lotus Software had loudly declared through press 
releases and other promotion activities that IntraWAP would be launched 15 
June 2000.  Not being able to commercialize new innovative products 
according to planned schedule would then be a negative signal to the market 
and competitors. The solution to this dilemma was sticking to the launching 
date as a gimmick to show that the service worked for the pilot customers. 
The commercial part, where the service was available for purchase, would be 
postponed until the security mechanism was properly updated. This way, 
they introduced the concept of version 1.5 which would be finished within 
October the same year. Version 2 would be launched as planned within April 
2001.  
 
Telenor Mobile Internet Corporate Intranet
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The IntraWAP´s project team experienced that it was difficult to get 
access to Eriksson’s competence. By the end of June, they still had no date 
for when the security mechanisms would be updated. 
 
Our main technical challenge was the WAP-technology where we 
were dependent on Ericsson for upgrading this technology. There 
were few people in Ericsson with relevant and adequate 
knowledge and they were quite busy with several projects. We had 
a broad contact surface with Ericsson, but there was no decision 
maker involved (PROJECT PARTICIPANT from Lotus 
Software).  
 
The project team tried to establish a development project with Ericsson in 
order to improve communication with them and to secure delivery of the 
security mechanism. The project team got around to a planned workshop to 
discuss development of IntraWAP components and a written contract 
proposal for collaboration. Telenor Mobile, however, never succeeded in 
establishing collaboration with Ericsson. A contributory factor to that was, 
according to several project members, that Ericsson lacked relevant 
resources.   
 
 
 Pilot customers 
 
The project team started testing IntraWAP on two test pilots in May 
2000, with the intention of potential improvements in technology and user 
interface. The next planned step after this pilot test was to establish ten new 
corporate customers through a limited launching when the security 
mechanism was updated in October 2000.  
 
The test pilots were quite enthusiastic about IntraWAP and wanted to 
use the service actively in connection with their work. These pilots 
experienced several technical weaknesses and failures when using 
IntraWAP, mainly from problems with the connector adjustment and 
problems with firewalls and other security mechanisms in the WAP-
gateway. A third weakness was the poor terminal interface. At this point, no 
systematic customer support was established where the test pilots could 
inquire in case of a service failure, neither for the corporate system 
administrator nor the employees using IntraWAP.  Telenor Mobile and 
IBM/Lotus Software had at that time not made any Service Level Agreement 
that regulated the operational co-operation. What should be done in case of a 
failure; where should the customer inquire; what should the time of response 
be; costs?  Later on, when customer support was finally established some 
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ambiguity arose related to cause, to whom the failure should be reported and 
who where responsible for repairing it.  
 
 
 Packaging, marketing and distribution 
 
 
 Packaging 
 
A previously performed market survey was used as basis for IntraWAP´s 
product concept. This survey had explored the need for telecommunication 
products in the so-called “nomad” segment or “People-on-the Road” 
segment.  The “nomad” concept categorized people relocating their 
residence or work place implying they were seldom accessible on a 
stationary PC. This segment was further divided into customers who were 
affiliated with a corporate intranet (corporate customers) and customers who 
were not (private customers).  
 
The employees’ needs for having access to office functions while 
traveling or working outside the corporate site had been revealed through the 
market survey. The corporate market was then appointed as a target for 
IntraWAP. The project team performed a detailed follow-up market survey 
towards the corporate decision makers responsible for data and telephone 
solutions. A majority of the respondents appraised IntraWAP as an 
interesting service and technically credible. Access to E-mail systems, 
employee’s task calendar and databases were the most current services. 
There were some skepticism connected to limitations in WAP, mainly to 
small displays and the fact that only text and no graphics could be shown, 
and that the system was slow. Moreover, there was also some skepticism to 
placing the security mechanism at Telenor Mobile, mainly because they 
regarded Telenor Mobile as a more attractive target for hackers than their 
own corporate intranet. There was also the recurring concern whether 
implementing IntraWAP would imply upgrading, converting and changing 
established solutions, and whether Telenor Mobile could support and follow 
up technical implications. There was a noticeable “wait and see” attitude 
with an expectation connected to a further technological development and 
price reduction. Convincing the potential customers that the solutions were 
secure enough was evaluated as a critical success factor in the sales process.  
 
The project team decided that the first version should provide access to 
e-mail, personal calendars and telephone lists to enterprises using Lotus 
Notes. The intention was to extend the service to other, both Lotus Notes and 
Microsoft office based, groupware applications at a time when the security 
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mechanisms were updated. The sales activities were to be organized both 
through Telenor Mobile’s established sales system and through software and 
integration partner IBM/Lotus Software. At a later time, Telenor Mobile 
wanted to open up to other integration partners in the sales process.   
 
Our distribution strategy was to provide IntraWAP through several 
sales channels; through Telenor´s sales systems and through our 
integration partners. We did not appraise the sale process to be 
challenging. We thought that distribution of IntraWAP would be 
more or less a self-generating process, which means that the 
demand for IntraWAP would grow as the service was distributed. 
That does not necessarily mean a network effect, but it is clear that 
if I knew that all my colleges could read IntraWAP when they 
were traveling or in meetings, I would send e-mail about things 
that I wouldn’t do ordinarily, and vice a versa which would 
encourage me to use IntraWAP (IntraWAP´s PROJECT 
LEADER).  
 
Telenor Mobile responsibility in the delivery was to provide a secure 
access to the corporate intranet. IBM/Lotus Software was responsible for 
installing the connector software at the customer site and offer customer 
support for the connector software during operation. The project teams had 
several discussions in connection with the business model and how 
IntraWAP should be priced. Initially, Telenor Mobile would invoice for data 
traffic in their network (i.e. air time) and IMB/Lotus Notes would invoice a 
current software license, which included support. The installation costs 
would be a one-time charge. The project team later changed on this price 
model in such a way that the customer only needed to have one permanent 
economic relationship.   
 
 
We thought that the product concept would be much clearer for the 
potential customers if they only needed one current economic relation-
ship. IntraWAP would be the project as a Telenor Mobile product and 
we saw that as an advantage in the sales promotion. (SUB-PROJECT 
LEADER, Market) 
 
The customers would then be charged from Telenor Mobile for data 
traffic and a subscription fee which would include the connector software 
license. The two partners were to settle an account afterwards. The single 
charge for the integration cost should still be a settlement between the 
customer and the integrator.  The project team had to establish several new 
procedures and routines for handling a joint venture for commercialization 
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and operation of IntraWAP. In addition to new routines and processes for 
selling and invoicing the service, they needed to establish new installation 
routines, operation routines, and failure handling routines    
 
We hadn’t tracked the route with partnership for commercializing 
data services, so we had to develop many new routines. There 
were many new things that were needed to arrange for joint 
venture services, among other things an agreement with our 
collaboration partner. (IntraWAP´s PRODUCT MANAGER) 
 
The driver behind the project was not economy, and financial 
results were not an issue. The whole organization was driven by 
technology. We wanted to enter into a new business area where we 
lacked competences and our main strategy was that we had to do 
something with our partners. At that time we had little experience 
with partners and the organization had many different ways to 
industrialize it. This was before we developed the CPA-model 
(Content Provider Access) for handling third parties29. The CPA-
model may have been the largest success in Telenor’s history on 
how to handle third parties. We have now hundreds of partners 
selling content with billing on the phone. (SUB-PROJECT 
LEADER, Sale and Distribution). 
 
 
 dJuice 
 
In March 2000, the Mobile Internet division launched a new Internet 
portal for wireless WAP terminals (mobile phones and PDA’s), dJuice. The 
dJuice-project had an ambiguous vision of being a “branded” mobile Internet 
portal in 25 countries within three years. In June 2000, they realized that 
they needed a concrete functionality attaching the user to the portal. The 
dJuice team contacted IntraWAP´s project manager in mid June 2000 
suggesting that they merge the two concepts. IntraWAP was viewed as the 
first “killer” application on WAP, representing a real value for a company 
which they were willing to pay for.  
 
dJuice.com is already on its way internationally, but lacks the 
ultimate loyalty-promoting functionality that makes it the 
preferred wireless portal. This is where the access to corporate 
                                                 
29 A third party is used by Telenor to describe a commercial actor that has a 
freestanding product accessible through Telenor’s infrastructure. Examples are ring 
tones, financial news, movies or groupware applications.  
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intranet solutions comes in. This is exactly what dJuice needs. The 
merger of dJuice and IntraWAP will provide attachment to dJuice 
and the possibility of earning real money from customers who are 
willing to pay for secure access to their corporate intranets (Mail 
from dJuice PROJECT LEADER to IntraWAP´s PROJECT 
LEADER).  
 
The IntraWAP´s project team was quite enthusiastic about what 
possibilities this could bring. First, dJuice engagement in an international 
rollout could help IntraWAP become an international service. Second, dJuice 
was an appropriate platform for enabling web-based administration of the 
company's IntraWAP account. A web-based administration would enable 
small and medium sized companies to use IntraWAP solutions without 
having to deal with any system integration or acquiring new hardware.  At 
the end of June 2000, it was decided to merge these two projects and have a 
joint international commercial launching. For IntraWAP’s part this entailed 
several new technical tasks connected to system architecture and required 
international partners on infrastructure, technology, test pilots and 
distribution. These tasks required a lot of resources at a time when an 
adequate IntraWAP solution for the home market still remained to be 
developed. This merge changed the IntraWAP project’s direction and focus. 
 
We still lacked a complete technical solution at that time. The 
administrator’s interface and internal routines and IT-systems 
connected to billing and failure handling were not commissioned. 
Training and developing the bundling packaging with selected 
retailers remained and the sales links were not trained. We lost our 
focus when they tried to integrate IntraWAP into the international 
dJuice profile (PARTICIPANT in the IntraWAP´s project team).  
 
The amount of tasks that had to be performed in a relatively short time 
entailed that the IntraWAP’s project leader asked for assistance. His main 
argument was that the apparently complex situation with many new tasks, 
where some had to be performed in a high tempo, implied that they could not 
follow the established project manager tools to support the product 
development and commercialization process. He proposed sharing his 
project leader responsibility with one of the project team members and thus 
write a report with recommendation on how to perform prospective 
corresponding projects.  
 
We were confronted with huge challenges, especially on the 
technical part. In addition came all the challenges linked to 
marketing and bundling with dJuice. Both dJuice and IntraWAP 
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can be categorized as activities marked by new technology, new 
market, new business models, high speed, scarcity of human 
resources, young people and involvement of many professions and 
organizational departments. Both projects were living in their own 
world in spite of a link to the Mobile Internet division. The 
management was less visible than before and the project leaders, 
pro forma, had a larger responsibility. We had to manage the 
project on a higher degree of a strategic level.  (IntraWAP´s 
project leader). 
 
During autumn 2001, Telenor Mobile reduced its mobile Internet focus 
in coherence with the general market development. Telenor Mobile realized 
increased economic demand on dJuice and its delays in technology that 
would improve the WAP-mobiles interface. Approximately one year later, in 
October 2002, Telenor Mobile resolved to phase out dJuice.  
     
 
 Marketing and distribution 
 
IntraWAP was promoted on several occasions from both Telenor Mobile 
and IBM/Lotus Software. The first time was as early as March 2000 and 
later on in connection with the various launching activities and at different 
technical arrangements. An incomplete IntraWAP was launched in June 
2000 as a market gimmick. The rationale behind this promotion gimmick 
was to send a signal to the market that this innovative service was in the 
“pipeline” and soon on the market. Two test pilots, who were looked upon as 
prospective users of the complete IntraWAP service, had tested the service 
for potential improvements in technology and user interface. The next 
planned step after the security mechanisms were updated in October 2000 
was to establish ten new corporate customers through a limited launching.   
 
As already mentioned, these pilots experienced several technical 
weaknesses and failures with IntraWAP. At that time, there was no 
systematic customer support where the test pilots could inquire in case of a 
service failure, neither for the corporate system administrator nor the 
employees using IntraWAP. Moreover, it took some time before an effective 
customer support was established. One of the pilots ceased using IntraWAP 
and acquired a corresponding solution.  
 
The effort getting new customers did not go as expected and much of the 
focus in the project was directed towards the dJuice-integration. According 
to planned schedule, version 2.0 of IntraWAP should be launched in April 
2001 as “an even greater IntraWAP”. A complete IntraWAP, with all the 
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promoted functions and technical and procedure documents, would then be 
handed over to the product manager in the Market division of Telenor 
Mobile. This division was responsible for the ordinary sales activities. 
However, several shortcomings were revealed a couple of weeks before this 
handover. The internal systems for handling customer data were missing and 
the administration interface was poor.  
 
The project team had discussed a system sketch with the IT-department 
as early as January, 2001 and they therefore expected that the IT-department 
had developed the customer data system. The IT-division, on their part, felt 
that the project team did not follow the established procedures for getting IT-
support and had to adapt a priority line to get this fixed.                               
 
IntraWAP was incomplete when I took over the responsibility. 
Much of my time was used on technical issues and there was less 
time left for sales activities. At this point the project team was 
dissolved and all technical resources available in the project were 
now spread in the organization busy with new tasks. It was a long 
and demanding task to get everything in place (IntraWAP´s 
PRODUCT MANANGER in Market division).  
 
A person was later that year engaged to be responsible for making 
IntraWAP a complete and a stabile service. IntraWAP was this way re-
launched for the third time. Telenor Mobile had at that time established a 
department responsible for handling third parties. This department strived to 
find more installation partners who could sell IntraWAP. There were some 
sales where the technical delivery and installation worked, but the sale did 
not “take off”.   
 
Retrospectively, we saw that the system integrators’ incentives 
and profit in the IntraWAP concept were low. It was, therefore, 
not so interesting for them to put so much effort into selling 
IntraWAP. Our internal sales channels, where some had been quite 
enthusiastic about IntraWAP, were at this time critical to the 
service due to all the technical difficulties. The user interface on 
WAP-phones was still too poor and after the burst of the so-called 
“dot.com” bubble, there was a large distrust of WAP-phones in the 
market (PROJECT MANAGER for the third launching).  
 
Several alternative solutions with lower expenses and standardized 
software were introduced on the market. These were viewed as better 
alternatives. In 2003, Telenor Mobile went through a re-organization where 
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the new regime focused on downsizing and a large profit. IntraWAP was 
shut down in March 2003.  
 
It has been a clear objective in other projects that before we launch 
a product all qualities should be settled with price models and a 
“package”. This is the traditional model. Regarding IntraWAP, 
there were no clear crossovers where development stopped and 
launching started. We exploited the branding effect first to show 
that here was a new possibility (IntraWAP´s MARKET 
RESPONSIBLE). 
 
 
 Organizational structure 
 
Telenor Mobile structured their international establishment in 2000 and 
organized the activity in three companies: mNorway, mHorizon and 
mFuture. mNorway was to concentrate on the Norwegian market and 
mHorizon on the international market. One of the reasons for this grouping 
was that the technologically new developments would first be tested in the 
home marked and then rolled out internationally. mFuture would work with 
prospective business areas. Mobile Internet, first established as a strategic 
activity in 1999, became a division of mNorway in 2000. At end of the year, 
there were 50-60 people involved in different projects, IntraWAP and Djuice 
being two of them.  
 
Mobile Internet division was, however, demobilized when dJuice 
became a large international establishment. dJuice and rest of the Mobile 
Internet project portfolio were then placed in mFuture where parts of the 
IntraWAP project were organized under dJuice.  
 
 
We were hanging in mid-air when we followed dJucie to mFuture. 
That implied that we as a project were poorly anchored in the 
organization, because dJuice had enough with their grandiose 
ambitions and we lacked a formal anchoring in Telenor Mobile. 
That entailed that we went without a steering committee for a long 
period and we became very dependent on individuals for progress. 
The strategy that mNorway should be a test bed before an possible 
international roll-out in mHorizon shattered when we were pulled 
into a international strategy in a early phase. That implied that we 
did not have time for a sequential product development phase. We 
had to do many things in parallel (IntraWAP´s PROJECT 
MANAGER).  
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 Single case report analysis 
 
 
 
Commercialization and operation of IntraWAP was a joint venture 
between Telenor Mobile and IBM/Lotus Software requiring a coordination 
of several technologies and systems. A broad technological insight into 
several fields was in this case vital to understand the manner of operation for 
the single component and system, and to understand how they worked as a 
unit. Furthermore, a technological insight was necessary to identify and 
solve technical challenges. Moreover, a market insight and knowledge about 
potential corporate customer’s data system, needs and demands were 
necessary to both develop an appropriate product concept and to adapt the 
various technical systems.   
 
IntraWAP represented a new type of service with a duplicate 
responsibility of providing service. Telenor Mobil was responsible for 
securing access to the corporate intranet via handheld terminals, while 
IBM/Lotus Software was responsible for implementation and operation of 
the central connector software at the customer’s site. Telenor Mobile had 
relevant technical know-how for parts of IntraWAP infrastructure, which 
was based on long experience with ordinary network operation, but they 
needed access to both technological and customer know-how from 
IBM/Lotus Notes. Moreover, Telenor Mobile was dependent on Ericsson in 
updating the immature security technology installed on the WAP-gateway. 
Telenor Mobile was in this manner both technologically and operationally 
dependent on external actors possessing critical technical and customer 
related know-how. There were no established routines and clarified 
guidelines for joint venture in commercialization projects, vital technologies 
were immature, time limits were short and the project focus changed during 
progress when merging with dJuice. The main challenges were, however, 
getting access to this vital technology and know-how and to coordinate the 
various activities involving external know-how and technology.    
 
IntraWAP was an access service where the corporate customer could 
use groupware applications on corporate Intranet from a mobile phone. The 
employees using IntraWAP thus had access to an established network of e-
mail users. In this case, IntraWAP had an intrinsic value, i.e. the service had 
a value for the single user independent of other users. The service would, 
however, increase in value if there were several others using IntraWAP to 
get access to their e-mail. The more people that used IntraWAP when 
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travelling or out of office, the more colleges and business connections a 
single user could communicate with. By definition network effect takes 
place when the benefits to any individual consumer of a product or a system 
increase with the number of other users. In this matter, IntraWAP exhibited 
characteristics that gave network effects.  
 
The original plan was to commercialize IntraWAP in two steps; first by 
introducing a limited version to Lotus Notes users and then, in a second step, 
as a complete version with updated security mechanisms. IntraWAP was, 
however, a project where nothing went as planned, and the many delays 
deteriorated the pilot service, causing the commercial launching to be 
postponed several times.  The repeated promotions where service quality and 
launching dates were announced ended in breach of promises. An 
association we make here is the tale of the shepherd boy, as a practical joke, 
cried “Wolf!”, whereupon the whole village came running to help him 
protect the flock of sheep. After repeating this practical joke several times, it 
ended in catastrophe when a wolf pack really appeared. The village 
mistrusted the shepherd boy after been put upon several times and did not 
assist him when he really needed it. Although the “cry” about IntraWAP was 
a positive message, there is a parallel here. The pilot customers, the sales 
corps (both internal sales channels and integration partner), the market and 
potential customers built a gradual mistrust of IntraWAP and finally, when 
the service was complete, the confidence was lost.    
 
Users of network products in an early phase of distribution can be 
viewed as users “on trial”, meaning that they need some time to adapt to the 
service and to experience value while using the service to communicate and 
interact with other people or systems. Users “on trial” are vulnerable to 
malfunctions. If the communication service is unstable, it will be unstable 
for all users who may discontinue using the service and then find other 
communication methods. Although pilot customers are informed that the 
service concept is not technically and commercially commissioned and that 
their role in this respect is to give feedback that contributes to improvements, 
they will have expectation regarding the service’s functionality. Moreover, 
they are also expected to be ordinary customers after testing and 
commissioning.  
 
The IntraWAP’s project team decided to promote and launch IntraWAP 
to pilot customers when they realized that there would be delays in 
commissioning the first version. Their intention was by such to “exploit a 
branding effect” by creating expectations and, hopefully, a demand for 
IntraWAP. IntraWAP at that time had a lot of failures and an absent 
customer support, which may indicate that the service was more at the 
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“proof-of-concept” than the pilot stage. An additional point that might have 
contributed to the pilot customer expectation of IntraWAP´s grade of 
completeness is that there was no clear crossover point where the developing 
phase and testing were finished and commercialization started. “It has been 
a clear objective in other projects that before we launch a product all 
qualities should be settled with price models and a “package”. This is the 
traditional model. Regarding IntraWAP, there were no clear crossovers 
where development stopped and launching started. We exploited the 
branding effect first to show that here was a new possibility” (IntraWAP´s 
market responsible). If the pilot customers, i.e. users “on trial”, were not able 
to use the communication service in a tolerably good way, it is likely that 
they discontinued using the service and, thus, did not affect other potential 
users in adapting to the service. Using IntraWAP in a “tolerably” good way 
means sending or reading e-mail on their WAP-phones.   
 
Telenor Mobile had no established relationship with Ericsson beyond the 
ordinary customer/supplier kind. Nevertheless, they had a formal 
relationship with IBM/Lotus Software anchored in a joint venture 
agreement. “The driver behind the project was not economy, and financial 
results were not an issue. The whole organization was driven by technology. 
We wanted to enter into a new business area where we lacked competences 
and our main strategy was that we had to do something with our partners” 
(Sub-project leader, Sale and Distribution). Commercialization and service 
operation in a joint venture with third parties30 was thus not an everyday 
phenomenon at Telenor Mobil and joint venture commercialization can be 
characterized as newly cleared ground. “We hadn’t tracked the route with 
partnership for commercializing data services, so we had to develop many 
new routines. There were many new things that were needed to arrange for 
joint venture services, among other things an agreement with our 
collaboration partner” (IntraWAP´s Product manager).  
 
The main challenges were, consequently, getting access to technology 
and know-how possessed by Ericsson and IBM/Lotus Software, and to 
coordinate the various activities concerning external know-how and 
technology. There was a lack of appropriate agreements and established 
routines and guidelines for how to work together, how to secure that critical 
tasks involving external know-how’s and technology, were performed at the 
right times. The roles and responsibilities were not fully clarified and the 
business models and collaboration incentives were unclear. Knowing how to 
                                                 
30 A third party is used by Telenor to describe a commercial actor that has a 
freestanding product accessible through Telenor’s infrastructure. Examples may be 
ring tones, financial news, movies or groupware applications.  
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handle external actors you depend on, technological and/or operational, 
seems to be an important capability.  
 
 
 Conclusion 
 
An in-depth technological and customer know-how was important for 
commercializing of IntraWAP.  Seeing the association between these know-
how’s was considered important for developing an appropriate product 
concept and adapting the various technical systems in IntraWAP’s 
production line. The project team, accordingly, consisted of both technical 
and market resources and the project organization, and their weekly 
meetings and discussions would see to it that these resources and know-
how’s were linked. Hence, the factor that enabled this linking was the project 
organization, and the necessary in-house knowledge was available. This is a 
truth with modification, as the allocated resources were quite busy with other 
projects and, for that reason were not always accessible. Another restricting 
factor for the commercialization process of IntraWAP was that time limits 
were short and the project focus changed during progress when merging with 
dJuice. Moreover, the vital technology was immature and the user interface 
on WAP-phones perceived as poor. The largest challenge for the project 
team was, however, getting access to technology and know-how possessed 
by Ericsson and IBM/Lotus Software, coordinating the various activities 
regarding external know-how and technology.  Knowing how to handle 
external actors you depend on, technologically and/or operationally, seem to 
be an important capability. An appropriate alliance capability could secure 
access to the vital know-how when needed and secure that critical tasks were 
performed at times. In this case, an alliance capability would comprise 
routines and/or guidelines for joint venture in commercialization project with 
clarified roles and responsibility, collaboration incentives and business 
models. 
The Capability to Commercialize Network Products in Telecommunication 
 
83 
 
6. VoiceMail 
 
 
 
VoiceMail is an answering service connected to a centralized 
computerized network system that handles incoming voice messages in 
personalized mailboxes linked to the user’s phone number. This service has 
more sophisticated functions than the previous answering machines 
connected to the individual telephone. VoiceMail enables the users to play 
different message greetings to different callers, to forward received 
messages to another voice mailbox, add a voice introduction to forwarded 
messages and store voice messages for future delivery, etc. VoiceMail has 
since introduction into the NMT-network (1993) and GSM-network (1994) 
been upgraded continuously with new functionalities. VoiceMail was 
bundled with Telenor Mobile´s GSM-subscription in 1994 and was in 2001 
rated as the most value-adding service in a user inquiry.  
 
 
 Production – vital components and technology 
 
 
Vital components in VoiceMail are a switch forwarding calls to the 
VoiceMail platform after certain ring signals, a centralized computerized 
system handling the various functionalities, a standard phone for the user 
interface, and various customer support functions (e.g. handling customer 
rights and billing).  
 
 
 Project initiative and establishment 
 
The coverage range and battery capacity for mobile phones were low in 
the beginning of 1990s compared to today (2006). A mobile user would then 
frequently not be available. An answering service was in this connection 
seen as a value-adding service to the mobile phone subscription. An 
important economic driver for development of this service was that it could 
generate income in two “directions”: when the message was recorded, and at 
play-back. Moreover, messages could also generate several new calls.   
 
 
The VoiceMail project started up in December 1991. Two people were 
employed full time (100%): the project leader and another person to have 
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combined responsibility for technology and market. The project leader and 
subproject leader for technical and market issues came from a technical unit 
at Tele-Mobile and had know-how and experience in developing a 
corresponding system for a “pager”-service31 in the NMT-network. The 
technical/market subproject leader was responsible for specification of the 
VoiceMail platform’s functionalities and qualities and development of the 
user interface. Additional project resources were a handful of people in 20% 
employments supporting legal, market and operation activities.  
 
  No formal steering committee connected to the project was appointed. 
However, the department manager and product-group manager at Tele-
Mobile represented the employer and the resource owners and in this manner 
functioned as a kind of steering committee. Their involvement was restricted 
to contract closing and to periods when extra technical resources were 
needed, as when repairing and upgrading the VoiceMail platform.   
 
 
 Specification and implementation 
 
The platform specification involved a detailed description of all 
functionalities, the user interface, and the interplay with the various 
components in the service’s production line in both NMT and GSM-
network.  The VoiceMail-platform was to be built on a precursor system that 
had been developed for a radio based “pager”- service for the NMT-network. 
The platform then had to adapt to this old system and required a solution that 
was not “standard” on the market.   
 
The specification made the basis for a tender request that was sent to 
several network component suppliers. One important requirement in the 
tender request was that the technical/market sub-project leader wanted to be 
involved in developing the platform and in the implementation process.  
 
As we wanted to have a solution that was not “standard” on the 
market, we assessed it as very important to have the know-how 
in-house for handling possible failure and system upgrading. We 
therefore wanted to participate in developing the platform and 
the succeeding implication process (SUB-PROJECT LEADER, 
Technical/Market). 
                                                 
31 Pager is an electronic device used to contact people via a paging network. It pre-
dates mobile phone technology, being most popular during the 1980s and 1990s, but 
similarly uses radio transmissions to communicate between a control/call centre and 
the recipient. This service or device was also called “beeper”. 
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The network component supplier was selected based on a combination 
of their technical sketches and their attitude towards performing the platform 
development and implementation work in collaboration with the technical 
sub-project leader. In this tender grant an agreement for prospective platform 
upgrading was embedded.  The implementation work mainly consisted of 
developing specially adapted software securing the specified functionality in 
the service, developing and installing software for adjustment of the 
VoiceMail-platform to the other service components.  
 
 
 Packaging, marketing and distribution 
 
VoiceMail was meant to be an add-on service where the users had to 
subscribe separately to the NMT/GSM-subscription and the VoiceMail-
service. The user would then pay a registration fee and airtime after ordinary 
taxes. This product and price concept was used when VoiceMail was 
introduced in the NMT-network in 1993 but was changed in 1994 when 
VoiceMail became bundled with the GSM-subscription. The registration fee 
was therefore removed and the users paid only for using the VoiceMail 
service, i.e. airtime.  
 
The VoiceMail service was launched in February 1993. The platform 
and software had been tested thoroughly to see if the system and production 
line were stabile enough to put into operation and the service user interface 
had been tested on pilots. The service was, however, not formally handed 
over to the product department. The reason for this was that the project team 
wanted to test and verify the service during operation. This activity would 
require a tight follow-up on the technical systems and would be best ensured 
in the project organization according to the technical/market leader. 
Moreover, he felt it would require a relevant technical insight to introduce 
VoiceMail onto the market. In order to prepare the operations department 
and customer service for ordinary operation of VoiceMail service he handed 
over a user instruction and a list comprising platform weaknesses and when 
these weaknesses would be repaired.   
 
VoiceMail had new types of functionalities that needed new 
concepts and definitions. Selling VoiceMail required a technical 
understanding and use of a concept appliance which were new. 
The sales channels and other involved units therefore needed to 
be trained before they could take over the responsibility for 
selling VoiceMail. Moreover, even though the system was “de-
loused” of most failures through testing we wanted to test and 
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verify the service during operation and, at the same time, 
accomplish the necessary teaching (SUB-PROJECT LEADER, 
Technical/Market). 
 
Shortly after launching, however,  it turned out that setup in the system 
for handling customer and billing data had not been completed. The reason 
for this delay was ascribed to a large proceeding re-organization with 
ensuing changes in various responsibilities in the unit. The consequences 
were, however, that the interplay between the platform and the 
administration system did not work. The technical/market sub-project leader 
completed the lacking set-up himself and after a couple of days the 
VoiceMail service was in function.  
 
I think it is very important to have resources in pioneer work 
that are “burning” for the result, i.e. to have an ownership of the 
new product. The technical/market sub-project leader was such a 
resource.  In innovative work, where you are building a new 
type of service, you cannot only decide how the service should 
work functionally; you also have to explain it to others and then 
you have to develop new concepts (PROJECT LEADER).  
 
The VoiceMail-service was marketed in a series of campaigns on 
television during the first half of 1993. During this campaign, VoiceMail 
was offered without a subscription fee.  As the campaign continued for a 
rather long period and VoiceMail became bundled with the GSM-
subscription later on, the subscription fee was not actively used. During the 
summer of 1993, a product manager for VoiceMail was employed. At that 
point there were approximately 23.000 subscribers.  
 
We did not go out in the market and actively sell VoiceMail as a 
service. Distribution of VoiceMail rather took place by making 
established customers aware of this new service through various 
advertising campaigns (SUB-PROJECT LEADER, Technical/ 
Market). 
 
During the same period, the VoiceMail project team also worked with 
adjustment of the platform for the coming GSM-network. By the end of 
1993, a pilot test in the GSM-network was commissioned testing the 
interplay between the VoiceMail-platform, the administrative systems and 
the NMT and GSM-network. The VoiceMail service had a new functionality 
in the GSM-network called “Message Waiting” and comprised a message 
sent through the appurtenant data channel in the GSM-network to the 
subscribers telling them that they had received a new VoiceMail. 
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Correspondingly, they introduced a call-up signal instead of a text message 
to the subscribers of the NMT-network. An SMS notification was considered 
a very important function as there at that time were low coverage range and 
low battery capacity for mobile phones. The VoiceMail service was bundled 
with the “GSM-package” soon after the initial introduction of the GSM-
network in 1994; this bundling resulted in an increased use of the service.   
 
Introduction of VoiceMail to the GSM-network required a separate 
subscription system for the platform; the main reason being that the SMS-
function needed a tailor- made system. The customer handling systems for 
GSM-subscribers, therefore, became more complicated than for the NMT-
subscribers. When a new GSM-subscriber was to be registered, several other 
registrations needed to be done which had to be forwarded to other systems 
for getting the various functionalities processed. The new subscriber system 
consequently had to be connected to other subscribers system within Telenor 
Mobile. Initially, this was performed manually but became automated later 
on, and in this connection some quality failures with the platform were later 
revealed. 
 
The VoiceMail-service was formally handed over to the product 
portfolio department for ordinary operation autumn 1995, and the project 
team was demobilized. The former technical/market sub-project leader, 
however, continued to have the technical responsibility for the VoiceMail-
platform as a technical manager for the VoiceMail-service in operation, a 
position he had possessed earlier as a stand-in while working on the 
VoiceMail project.  
 
At the end of 1995, some serious quality failures arose with the platform 
which triggered several activities. According to the agreement with platform 
supplier, they were responsible for potential repairs and future upgrading. 
However, they did not have time to repair the failure, and the technical 
person responsible for VoiceMail at Telenor Mobile had to do the job. 
Fixing the failures also required the involvement of resources from many 
other implicated units and entailed a general upgrading for simplifying the 
user interface and interplay between several administrative systems. The 
upgrading also necessitated more attention to testing procedures and 
verification ahead of the upgrading. A so-called “roll-back” procedures was 
introduced which secured the possibilities of going back to the original 
version should there be a failure after the upgrading.  
 
The earlier technical/market sub-project leader was appointed as the 
project leader for several following upgrading projects. In 1998, “Mobile 
Fax”, the “Call-back” function and UMS (universal message central on net) 
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were introduced. The latter implied that the customers could receive 
VoiceMail on e-mail and introduce their own personal welcome message on 
their VoiceMail number. A consequence of the introduction of a personal 
voice on VoiceMail was a significant increase in the number of users. The 
latest upgrading came in 2005, which implied a coordination of the traffic 
across the borders in Scandinavian, where the plan was to simplify the 
interface further and to introduce new English-speaking voices. 
 
There was a continuous need for upgrading the VoiceMail-
service, either as a consequence of newly identified customer 
needs, or as a result of technological opportunities, or qualitative 
upgrading that would give more income (SUB-PROJECT 
LEADER, Technical/Market). 
 
 
 Organizational structure 
 
A comprehensive re-organization process started in 1991 and was 
completed in 1994. As already mentioned in 2.1.3, the mobile division Tele-
Mobile in Televerket (Norwegian Telecom) became a separate company in 
1993 with the name Tele-mobil.   In 1994, they changed the name to Telenor 
Mobile and Televerket changed their name to Telenor Ltd. Telenor Mobile 
organized their business in areas based upon earlier technical groups in the 
divisions Tele-Mobile, “Mobile telephony”, “Pager” and “Mobile data”. The 
latter division ceased in 1994 when the GSM-network was put into 
operation. This lengthy reorganization process resulted in several areas of 
responsibilities being relocated up to several times.   
 
 
 Single case report analysis 
 
The specially adapted VoiceMail platform needed to be adjusted to 
several established technical systems. The VoiceMail-service was thus, as 
with the other presented telecommunication products, dependent on interplay 
between several components. Development, implementation and 
commercialization of VoiceMail required a thorough know-how about 
technology underlying the VoiceMail platform and how this platform would 
interplay with the other components in the VoiceMail production line. 
Know-how and experience in developing a corresponding system for a 
“pager”-service in the NMT-network were the bases for specification of the 
VoiceMail-service. This know-how was built on further through 
collaboration with the platform supplier through development and 
implementation activities. Having the relevant technical know-how in-house 
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later became decisive when they needed to repair and upgrade the 
VoiceMail-platform.  
 
The point of departure for VoiceMail was an expected need for an 
answering service connected to mobile subscription. This expected need was 
based on the fact that mobile users in the mid ‘90s would not always be 
available as the coverage range and battery capacity for mobile phones was 
low. The VoiceMail-service contained various functionalities considered 
new to the users. The project team’s experience in developing and 
distributing a very popular electronic device used to contact people via a 
paging network was useful when defining new market related concepts to 
VoiceMail functionalities. Hence, both technical and customer know-how 
were important for developing and commercializing VoiceMail. Technical 
know-how was important for developing the VoiceMail platform and 
repairing it during distribution, while a combined technical and customer 
know-how was important for developing VoiceMail as a customer-oriented 
service.  
 
Distribution of VoiceMail was promoted by making established mobile 
phone users aware of VoiceMail through various advertising campaigns and 
the user-friendly VoiceMail was easily adopted by mobile phone users. 
When VoiceMail was bundled with GSM-subscription in 1994 the result was 
an additional increase in the number of VoiceMail users. A characteristic 
that is particular to network products is that relative advantage with a 
network product is difficult to obtain in the beginning of the distribution 
period. VoiceMail was not a communication service per se, but an advanced 
answering machine. VoiceMail thus has an intrinsic value independent of the 
number of other users. It would, however, be correct to say that the 
individual VoiceMail service would increase in value for the user when 
people in his/her network spoke in messages. Nevertheless, the main point 
here is that a network effect was not strong at that time and that the early 
users of VoiceMail were not as dependent on other users in appraising the 
utility value of the new service.    
 
The cross-representation in technical and market related activities seem 
to have enabled the commercialization of VoiceMail. The technical/market 
sub-project leader was responsible for both specification of the platform’s 
functionalities and qualities, and development of the service’s user interface. 
He was well experienced in developing and commercializing an earlier 
popular pager service and assessed the importance of transition from 
technical functionalities to customer friendly functionalities. Moreover, he 
also trained the sales organization in how to use and communicate these new 
concepts. “VoiceMail had new types of functionalities that needed new 
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concepts and definitions. Selling VoiceMail required a technical 
understanding and use of a concept appliance which were new. The sales 
channels and other involved units therefore needed to be trained before they 
could take over the responsibility for selling VoiceMail” (Subproject leader, 
Technical/Market). This implied that when VoiceMail was introduced the 
new functionalities were relatively intuitive for the users which enabled 
adoption of VoiceMail as a service.  
 
Representation of relevant combined technological and customer know-
how and an individual employment of this know-how enabled a link between 
the vital technical and customer know-how, i.e. linking technical 
infrastructure and the service’s user interface. This linking was supported by 
a feeling of a strong personal ownership to VoiceMail held by the 
technical/market sub-project leader. He wanted to secure that VoiceMail 
would function both technically and in the market place. “I think it is very 
important to have resources in pioneer work that are “burning” for the 
result, i.e. to have an ownership of the new product. The technical/market 
sub-project leader was such a resource.  In innovative work, where you are 
building a new type of service, you cannot only decide how the service 
should work functionally; you also have to explain it to others and then you 
have to develop new concepts” (Project leader).  Moreover, this strong 
ownership entailed that the project team continued to have the technical 
responsibility for a period after VoiceMail had been launched since they 
wanted to secure the platform’s functionalities and integration with various 
components or systems in VoiceMail’s production line.  
 
The relevant technical know-how and resources were thus accessible 
during development, as well as during the distribution phase when the 
platform needed to be repaired or upgraded. An important reason for this 
“accessibility” was the project team’s independence of the platform supplier 
when repairing the platform. The technical/market sub-project leader secured 
access to vital knowledge by adding a collaboration clause in the contract 
with the platform developer. The VoiceMail-platform was custom-made and 
not a standard product and, by such, the project leader and technical sub-
project leader decided they wanted to have this knowledge in-house. Their 
strong ownership to the VoiceMail-service can therefore be said to be the 
motivation behind this decision. This ownership did not only lead to an 
independence of the supplier’s know-how; it also triggered a strong link 
between the infrastructure and the service, since the sub-project leader 
wanted to be responsible for both technical and market related issues and 
taught relevant units of Telenor Mobile how to use the new concepts for 
VoiceMail´s technical functionalities. Finally, he extended the project in 
time to secure that the vital technical resources were accessible when Voice 
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Mail was tested and verified during operation. This individual empowerment 
can be said to have enabled commercialization of the VoiceMail service.  
 
There were no clear directives in the beginning of the ‘90s for 
collaboration with external actors possessing vital knowledge for 
developing, commercializing and operating telecommunication services. 
Nevertheless, the VoiceMail’s project team acted adequately when securing 
access to this vital knowledge by acquiring it through collaboration with the 
platform supplier. An alliance capability was earlier defined as the ability to 
handle external actors possessing vital resources for the service to be 
commercialized. By such, it would be natural to claim that alliance handling 
was an enabling factor in the commercialization of VoiceMail.  
 
 
 Conclusion 
 
Both technical and customer know-how were important for developing 
and commercializing VoiceMail. Technical know-how was important for 
developing VoiceMail as a service and repairing the platform during 
distribution, while customer know-how was particularly important for 
developing customer-oriented user interface.  A user-friendly interface 
resulted in a relatively low threshold for adoption of VoiceMail. This was 
enabled by linking technical and customer know-how where the 
technical/market sub-project leader was responsible for both specification of 
the platform’s functionalities and qualities, and development of the service’s 
user interface. 
 
This vital link between technical infrastructure and the service’s user 
interface was thus supported by a cross-representation of technical and 
market related activities. The VoiceMail’s project team secured access to 
critical, technical know-how through close collaboration with the platform 
supplier in developing and implementing activities. In this way, they had the 
critical knowledge in-house and accessible when they needed to repair or 
upgrade the VoiceMail-platform. An alliance capability was earlier defined 
as the ability to handle external actors possessing vital resources for the 
service to be commercialized. It is thereby natural to claim that alliance 
handling was an enabling factor in the commercialization of VoiceMail. As 
the early users of VoiceMail were not as dependent on other users in 
appraising the utility value of the new service, they were not as vulnerable to 
malfunction in the early distribution phase.     
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7. AlphaNumber 
 
 
 
Universal Personal Telecommunication (UPT), named AlphaNumber 
when launched in 1995, was an advanced call-forwarding service entailing 
that the subscriber could be available on any telephone in the fixed and 
wireless network. Subscribers of AlphaNumber were allocated a single, 
personal telephone number and connections were set up automatically based 
on the programmed instructions. Furthermore, subscribers could call from 
any telephone where the call was automatically charged to a UPT account. 
AlphaNumber was closed down autumn 2000.  
 
 
 Production – vital components and technology 
 
Vital components of the UPT-service were Intelligent Network, an UPT-
platform and various customer support functions.  
 
 
 Project initiative 
 
Norwegian Telecom (Televerket), in 1988, started working with 
specifications for Intelligent Network (IN). Their motivation for doing so 
was that the functionality in Intelligent Network opened up for the telecom 
operators themselves to develop new services in a couple of months. This 
was in contrast to traditional service development in the telephone switches, 
which could take four to five years. The most important advancement in this 
new architecture was the possibility to build new services by building 
blocks, referred to as SIBB (Service Independent Building Blocks) in 
international standardization work. Norwegian Telecom was well versed in 
SIBB’s technology from their work in standardization bodies. 
Representatives of the Network division and Research and Development 
department had participated in ETSI (European Telecommunication 
Standardization Institute) during the period 1989 to 1995, with the mission 
to arrange ISDN as a European Standard. 
 
The Network division sent a general tender request to their network 
suppliers and Ericsson was appointed to deliver the IN-platform. In 1991, 
Ericsson launched Intelligent Network in Norway. In 1992, a new updated 
IN-platform with building blocks came that enabled user-controlled changes 
of data. This functionality opened up for the UPT-concept where subscribers 
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themselves could control their accessibility, independent of terminals and 
net.    
 
A clear drive to develop the UPT-service was the imminent competition 
between fixed and mobile net. In 1991, division Private was responsible for 
fixed lines in the private market, while division Tele-Mobil was building up 
the wireless network. Private wanted to compete with Tele-Mobile by 
launching a service where phone numbers could be associated with people 
rather than network and terminals. Ericsson, on their part, were eager to 
show the functionality of the IN-platform and to sell their platform on the 
global market.  
 
It was a very technically driven project. We wanted to 
implement what we could obtain with the UPT concept. 
Televerket was at that time in the leading front internationally 
on Intelligent Network and the background for the project was 
that we wanted to demonstrate how excellent our technology 
was. It was also important for us to have some tempo in the 
technology and product development connected to the wired 
network when we saw the increasing enthusiasm around the 
mobile phone concept. We wanted to show that we could 
develop new and prospective products (PRODUCT 
MANAGER).  
 
 
 Project establishment 
 
In the autumn of 1992, Ericsson and Televerket agreed to establish a 
joint project for development and implementation of a UPT service. The 
appointed project leader came from a department in division Network 
responsible for service development on the new IN-platform. He had earlier 
held a central position in the IN-specification work. This project leader 
would manage the project through the specification and development phase; 
the market division would take over the project leader responsibility later on 
when the UPT service approached launching.  
 
The market side took over the role as a project leader when 
market resources were getting more crucial for the project’s 
proceeding. We therefore had various project leaders depending 
on which phase the project was in. I was the project leader in the 
development phase because I was responsible for the technical 
resources. We started to discuss marketing when UPT was 
The Capability to Commercialize Network Products in Telecommunication 
 
94 
technically complete and the market side took over the project 
baton (PROJECT LEADER during development phase).  
 
The project organization was kept to a minimum with one technician 
from Televerket and one from Ericsson. One person from the product group 
in the market division participated later on in order to prepare the market 
activities. The project was to report frequently to a steering committee with 
representatives from both Televerket and Ericsson. The members of the 
steering committee represented the resource owners, i.e. the company, 
division or department the resources came from. A technical advisor at 
Televerket, who participated in European Standardization group (ITU) 
responsible for the UPT-concept standard, was also a member of the steering 
committee.  
  
 Specification and implementation 
 
The project team started by conducting a joint specification and 
feasibility study where specified functionalities, required resources, cost, etc. 
formed a framework for the ensuing development, implementation and 
testing activities. Televerket and Ericsson jointly conducting tests gave spin-
off effects. As Televerket had full insight during the development phase, the 
need for them to double-test functionality during implementation was 
avoided. Lead-times for testing were therefore cut by one half, and it took 
less than nine months from the specification work was commissioned to the 
commercial implementation was done.  
 
 
 Packaging, marketing and distribution 
 
The UPT subscribers were supposed to be able to decide exactly how 
accessible they wanted to be, in addition to being able to forward calls to the 
phone selected by them. By calling a voice-guidance system, they would 
program telephone numbers and times indicating where and when they 
wanted to be reached. When the subscriber UPT number was called 
connections would be set up automatically based on the programmed 
instructions. The call would automatically be charged to the subscriber’s 
UPT account. The idea was that UPT to begin with was to open up for voice 
communication, but in the near future the UPT service would include fax 
and data communication. The project team also felt that integrated video and 
multimedia could well be a reality in the future. 
 
The market division took over the project leader role in the autumn of 
1994, approximately ½ year before UPT was launched. At this time, it was 
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still not definitively decided whether the UPT should be launched as a 
service. The discussion concerned whether there would be a market for UPT 
when the mobile phone was widespread. They performed a market survey up 
front before deciding if UPT should be commercialised or not. This market 
survey revealed a certain interest in such a service, and based on this they 
estimated the market potential and identified potential early users. During 
this period, a person responsible for UPT’s product was appointed and 
became responsible for the commercialization of UPT. He came from the 
Network division where he had worked with net infrastructure and started to 
work with developing price models and adapting the UPT service to the 
administration systems to handle billing and customer rights. A pilot service 
was introduced in November 1994 under the name “TelePersonal” 
(TelePersonlig) and tested out in six months on 350 pilot customers. These 
pilots were employees in Norwegian Telecom and Ericsson.  
 
The decision to launch UPT as a service was taken during a steering 
committee meeting in April 1995. The service was named “AlphaNumber”, 
a name the project team felt was more market friendly than UPT or 
“TelePersonal”.  
 
The word Alpha means “the first” or “number one”. The idea 
was that the service would be so widespread that when people, 
some years ahead, searched for the word ”AlphaNumber” in a 
dictionary, they would find “portable number independent of 
locations and net”. Alpha was also written as the Greek letter A 
(@), because we saw the coming, issuant Internet (PRODUCT 
MANAGER). 
 
At this time, a new functionality was added to the AlphaNumber-service, 
which allowed for duty-free calls to Norway when travelling abroad. The 
intention was to make AlphaNumber so advantageous and attractive that it 
could compete with the expanding mobile-phone which international calls 
were very expensive. When the AlphaNumber subscriber dialled a certain 
number when he/she was abroad, and keyed a pin-code and the number they 
wanted to be connected to, the call would be arranged from the Telenor’s 
operation centre. The final cost depended on the destination and whether the 
receiver was in the fixed or wireless net, but it was significantly lower 
compared to ordinary cost of international calls. These duty-free numbers 
were originally meant for operators at Norwegian Telecom and not to be 
used for commercial purposes. The pilot customers tested this service when 
travelling abroad and were very positive to this functionality.  On May 18, 
1995, AlphaNumber was launched as the first UPT service in the world.  
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Relatively high product know-how was required for selling 
AlphaNumber and customer support, normally an ordinary sales-channel, 
did not possess this know-how. The sales responsible person, therefore, took 
direct contact with people and organizations regarded as advanced users (i.e. 
early adopters) to market the new service. The user interface was advanced 
and the users had to call an “800 number” and key different numbers many 
times in order to use and control the service. The product responsible person 
tried to find a solution that could reduce the amount of keystrokes, e.g. 
making electronic units for saving access numbers and account numbers that 
could automatically be transferred to the UPT-system.  
 
AlphaNumber was an engineered product and technically 
complicated for end users.  I had earlier worked with net 
infrastructure and I think I had too much of a quantitative 
approach to the whole project. I did my job when it comes to 
advertising agency and focus groups etc., but I was too 
indifferent to how important simplicity and user friendliness are 
for market acceptance and, hence, for success (PRODUCT 
MANAGER).     
 
The AlphaNumber service received considerable international attention, 
for one thing aided by Ericsson who marketed the service actively with their 
IN-node. Televerket obtained a world-wide reputation as being among the 
best in the world on UPT-services and hosted many delegations from 
operators in Australia, Europe and America who wanted to learn about the 
UPT-concept.  
 
The competition on home ground, however, between fixed and wireless 
priority areas, now organized in two separate companies, Telenor Private 
Ltd. and Telenor Mobile Ltd., had become critical. Telenor Privat marketed 
AlphaNumber as an umbrella covering the home phone, office phone, 
mobile phone and the fax-machine. Telenor Mobile, on their part, marketed 
the mobile phone by saying that nobody needed a fixed line phone anymore. 
At that time, Telenor Mobile sold mobiles for one Norwegian krone (about 
1/7 of one Euro). The project manager realized that it would be difficult to 
sell AlphaNumber at a price that would exceed the mobile phone’s total 
amount. He and the market director of Telenor Private, therefore, 
approached Telenor Mobile´s leader team with a collaboration inquiry. The 
mobile phone number was at that time encoded in the mobile phone, which 
entailed that the customers had to change their phone number when they 
wanted to change and upgrade their mobile phones. The AlphaNumber 
service could give the mobile phone subscribers a number regardless of type 
of mobile and that could, according the AlpaNumber product manager, 
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prevent a potentially large customer turnover when the mobile phones were 
so inexpensive.  
 
There was some interest in collaboration at Telenor Mobile, but 
there was also a large resistance. Telenor Mobile assessed 
AlphaNumber as a direct competitor to the mobile phone.  At 
that time it was unusual to think that the mobile phone would be 
the preferred product. AlphaNumber had very low prices on 
calls from abroad. Moreover, Telenor Mobile saw that the fixed 
network earned money, even if the conversation went over the 
wireless network. The reason for this was that AlphaNumber 
was connected to the fixed network (PRODUCT MANAGER).   
 
Telenor Mobile offered Alpha Number’s product manager a job at 
Telenor Mobile. This offer was not of interest. Telenor Mobile developed a 
“personal number” through a subscriber identity module card32 (SIM-card) 
where the phone numbers were stored. The mobile phone number thus 
became independent of a specific mobile phone and could easily be 
transferred from one mobile phone to another. Furthermore, Telenor Mobile 
made an attempt to block calls in the wireless network when the calls came 
from an AlphaNumber, and to increase the price for termination of an 
“AlphaNumber-call”.  
 
I tried to have a dialogue with Telenor Mobile in order to stop 
this aggressive competition. I gained an overview over Telenor 
Mobile´s real costs for receiving a call from the fixed net to the 
mobile net and for termination of such a call. When I addressed 
this question to Telenor Mobile, they presented costs four times 
higher than the actual costs.  After that, there was a kind of 
strained relationship between Telenor Mobile and Telenor 
Private (PRODUCT MANAGER).  
 
AlphaNumber product advantages were gradually impaired when mobile 
phones were widespread, their coverage range became better, the prices for 
international calls were reduced and the SIM-card was introduced. The 
phone number was encoded in the SIM-card, which easily could be removed 
and inserted into a new phone. In 1998, the product manager decided to up-
grade AlphaNumber and to simplify the user interface in order to meet the 
                                                 
32 A Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) is a smart card roughly the size of a postage 
stamp that stores the key identifying a mobile phone service subscriber, as well as 
subscription information, saved telephone numbers, preferences, text messages and 
other information.  
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mobile phone competition. The whole concept was evaluated with new 
market and volume analyses. Some simplifications were made, the user 
interface was up-graded and AlphaNumber was re-launched.  In 2000, the 
IN-node was to be upgraded, involving a required change in the 
AlphaNumber platforms. The estimated cost of doing this change was high. 
According the economical estimates the break-even point for AlphaNumber 
would be reached at 8000 customers. There were a total of 6500 customers 
in 2000, and Telenor Private decided, in the autumn of 2000, to close down 
the AlphaNumber service.  
 
 
 Organizational structure 
 
In 1995, Televerket converted from a governmental department to an 
enterprise named Telenor ASA. In this organizational transformation the 
Private, Enterprise and Net divisions became established as independent 
companies. Tele-Mobile had been separated one year earlier. The 
responsibility for development of the various IN-functionalities was placed 
in the new network company Network Ltd., while Private division and 
Enterprise division were responsible for marketing and selling AlphaNumber 
to each of their customer segments.  
 
There had, however, been some disagreement in the 
organization where the market responsibility should be placed 
for the IN based services. The earning based on the IN 
functionality was expected to be high, therefore all divisions 
wanted to be the “lucky one”.  (PROJECT LEADER during 
development phase).  
 
During autumn 1995, however, the company decided to release the 
issuant new services from the traditional telecom operations in order to have 
enough focus on the new businesses.  A new company with the name Link 
was established with the aim to provide the value adding services based in 
IN, while Nextra was established to be responsible for providing Internet. 
The product manager was then relocated from Private to Link. These two 
companies merged later on and became Telenor Plus. At this time, 
AlphaNumber was moved back to Private as a result of a long discussion 
about which company possessed the best competence on UPT, and by then 
could perform the best service.   
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 Single case report analysis 
 
Development of the UPT-platform was driven by the latest development 
in Intelligent Network (IN) technology. Telenor’s position as the leading 
front internationally on IN-technology was acquired through participation in 
standardization activities. Technical staff involved in developing the UPT-
platform was well versed in the new underlying technology through their 
work in the respective standardization bodies. “Intelligent Network” (IN) 
and “SIBS”-technology33 opened up for UPT34-services, a new type of 
service where subscribers could control their accessibility independent of 
terminals and net. Technical know-how underlying IN technology was thus 
vital for developing the UPT-platform and, thus, for commercializing the 
AlphaNumber-service. 
 
Ericsson contributed with valuable IN technology knowledge and was, 
accordingly, an important collaboration partner in developing the UPT 
platform. Both Ericsson and Telenor had great interests in launching a UPT-
service. Ericsson wanted to demonstrate the functionality of the IN-platform 
for marketing purposes, and the “Private” division of Telenor wanted to 
compete with division “Tele-Mobile” by launching a service where phone 
numbers could be associated with people rather than network location and 
terminals. Commercializing and providing AlphaNumber as service were, 
however, Telenor Private’s own business. The underlying IN technology and 
UPT platform were complete when Telenor Private decided to 
commercialize AlphaNumber as a service. Telenor Private possessed the 
necessary technical know-how in-house to commercialize AlphaNumber and 
was therefore independent of Ericsson.  
 
The main focus in this project was technical functionalities. Market 
resources were involved only a short time before launching. “We started to 
discuss marketing when UPT was technically complete and the market side 
took over the project baton” (Project leader during development phase). The 
project leader role for developing AlphaNumber was first placed in the net 
division and later handed over to the market division when the time for a 
potential launching approached. The person in charge of launching and 
distribution of AlphaNumber in the market division was an engineer who 
had worked with infrastructure in the net division. He had rather little 
experience with marketing and, as he said, “I was too indifferent to how 
important simplicity and user friendliness are for market acceptance and, for 
that reason, for success”. The result was a service with a user interface 
                                                 
33 Service Independent Building Blocks 
34 Universal Personal Telecommunication 
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perceived as technically complex, which increased the threshold for potential 
users to adapt to the service. Furthermore, AlphaNumber product advantages 
were gradually impaired when mobile phones were widespread, their 
coverage range became better, the prices for international calls were reduced 
and the SIM-card was introduced. A collaborating factor was that there was 
an internal power struggle between fixed and wireless priority areas, now 
organized in two separate companies, Telenor Private Ltd. and Telenor 
Mobile Ltd. Moreover, the ambiguity of where at Telenor Private 
responsibility, and thus income, for AlphaNumber belonged, may have been 
a restraining factor in commercializing AlphaNumber.  
 
 
 Conclusion  
 
A technical know-how underlying IN technology was vital for 
developing the UPT-platform, and thus for commercializing the 
AlphaNumber service. Relevant customer know-how, like how to lower the 
adaptation threshold for technically complex services, was considered late in 
the project. This was caused by an insufficient acknowledgement of the 
transition of technical functionalities to customer friendly functionalities.  
Thereby, there was a weak link between technical and customer know-how 
which would have contributed to service being perceived as technically 
complex by users, i.e. low user friendly interface. Telenor collaborated with 
external actors, in this case Ericsson, in developing the basic technology 
behind AlphaNumber. Ericsson thus contributed with valuable technical 
know-how. However, the underlying IN technology and UPT platform were 
complete when Telenor Private decided to commercialize AlphaNumber as a 
service. Nevertheless, being independent of external actors during 
commercialization was perhaps a conscious action from Telenor’s side, and, 
in that way, considered an appropriate alliance handling. This is, of course, 
only speculation as it was not possible to confirm.  
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8. Analysis and discussion 
 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse and discuss the results of the 
four cases presented in Chapters 4 to 7. The main question of interest is 
whether it would require specific operational capabilities to commercialize 
network products in telecommunication industries. To accomplish this 
question, four sub-questions were developed. First, how do technological, 
customer and alliance capabilities enable commercialization of new products 
in telecommunication industries? Second, in which way will linkages 
between the three operational capabilities enable the commercialization 
process? Third, are some of the proposed operational capabilities important 
for reaching critical mass and a rapid rollout, i.e. rapid distribution of the 
service? Finally, how do dynamic capabilities enable the operational 
capabilities to evolve to match the changing environment?   
 
The following discussion is organized such that, first, shared properties 
and the potential common factors enabling commercialization in all four 
cases will be presented. Then, common denominators for the two successful 
cases (SMS and VoiceMail) will be presented and analyzed. Likewise, the 
common denominators for the two unsuccessful cases (IntraWAP and 
AlphaNumber) will be dealt with. Further, the shared properties and the 
factors enabling or restraining commercialization processes for the two 
network products (SMS and IntraWAP) will be presented and analyzed. In 
the same way, the two cases that present commercialization of the 
telecommunication products not exhibiting characteristics giving network 
effects (VoiceMail and AlphaNumber) will be dealt with. Any potential 
factors enabling the commercialization processes that have not been 
addressed in the conceptual model will also be emphasized. The four sub-
research questions will then be discussed and attempted answered. A natural 
outcome of this discussion will be an answer to the main research question. 
A summarized conclusion and a revised conceptual model based on the 
empery of this thesis will be presented in Chapter 9, which closes with 
theoretical and practical implications, together with suggestions for future 
research.  
 
 
 SMS, IntraWAP, VoiceMail and AlphaNumber 
 
SMS, IntraWAP, VoiceMail and AlphaNumber are all tele-
communication services. A telecommunication service comprises a specific 
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set of user-information transfer capabilities provided to a group of users by a 
telecommunications system35. Users require a telephone and a network of 
telephone users, in order to employ the service. Operation of a 
telecommunication service includes operation of radio base stations, 
switches and various technical platforms for access and capacity, i.e. 
infrastructure, and more customer related activities like operation of various 
customer handling systems, billing, and customer support systems. There are 
in this manner several technical systems involved in the production line36 of 
a telecommunication service which have to function or operate in 
synchrony37. Characteristic to telecommunication services is, thus, 
simultaneously technical interdependency between the network 
infrastructure and the service’s functionalities. Furthermore, technological 
development of the infrastructure opens up for new service functionalities, 
while introduction of new functionalities requires changes in the 
infrastructure. These above-mentioned characteristics are common 
dominators for the various services presented in the four cases. The product 
characteristics responsible for network effects during distribution were, 
however, different. This variation will be dealt with in chapter 8.4 and 8.5.  
 
Linking technical infrastructure know-how and customer know-how 
seems to have been important for success in all four cases. A link between 
technical and customer know-how laid the foundation for SMS, as the 
“Message group” employed both technical and customer know-how when 
they opened up for “Mobile Originated” messages in the standard. 
Moreover, technical and customer know-how were a vital combination in 
foreseeing the need for increased capacity during SMS distribution. By such 
Telenor Mobile avoided a service breakdown during a critical phase of SMS 
distribution. In the IntraWAP case, a broad technical know-how in several 
fields and customer know-how were vital, both to adapt the various technical 
components and systems in the service production line, and to develop an 
appropriate product concept. A close link between technical know-how and 
customer know-how, represented in one person, resulted in VoiceMail’s 
                                                 
35 A telecommunication service is provided by a telecommunication provider. The 
telecommunication service user is responsible for the information contents of the 
message. The telecommunication service provider has the responsibility for 
acceptance, transmission, and delivery of the message (Federal Standard 1037C, 
Telecommunication: Glossary of Telecommunication Terms).  
36 A production line can be defined as the technical systems and applications 
involved in producing a service which must interact for the service to be delivered 
properly and be appraised as valuable to the customer.  
37 Synchronization means the coordination of simultaneous threads or processes to 
complete a task in order to get correct runtime order and avoid unexpected race 
conditions.  
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customer-oriented user interface which further enabled distribution of this 
service. The opposite was the case with AlphaNumber, where the lack of a 
link between technical and customer know-how was a contributing factor to 
a low user friendly user interface for the AlphaNumber service. To what 
extent the various project teams or responsible persons for 
commercialization had full access to both technical and customer know-how 
varied between the cases. The above- mentioned findings will be discussed 
in the sub-chapters below.  
 
 
 Successful commercialization, SMS and VoiceMail  
 
Short Message Service (SMS) is a communication service enabling users 
to send and receive short text messages by using their mobile phones. SMS 
has, since it came on the market in 1995, had a significant growth in the 
number of sent text messages every year. Moreover, this success has been 
followed by a successful deployment of information services distributed by 
SMS. VoiceMail is an answering service that handles incoming voice 
messages in personalized mailboxes linked to users’ phone numbers. 
VoiceMail has since it was introduced in the GSM-network in 1994 been 
upgraded continuously with new functionalities and was rated the most 
value-added service by GSM subscribers in 2001. Both SMS and VoiceMail 
service were bundled with the GSM subscription a short time after they were 
launched. A bundling lowered the users’ threshold to adapt to the new 
services since they did not have to make any decision related to purchasing 
new hardware or subscription to a new service.  
 
Employment of technical and customer know-how in a combination was 
important for commercializing SMS and VoiceMail and gave the 
incorporation of “Mobile originated” messages function in the GSM 
standard equal status with the “Mobile Terminated” function, classified as 
one of the high priority services in GSM. The possibility to send text 
messages from a mobile phone, and not only receive text messages, was a 
vital function for communication via SMS. During distribution of SMS, 
employment of both technical and customer know-how involved that 
Telenor Mobile was ahead with platform capacity at a time when there was a 
significant growth in SMS traffic. A prolonged service breakdown was thus 
avoided in a critical phase of SMS distribution. Likewise, employment of a 
combined technical and customer know-how enabled the distribution of 
VoiceMail, as translating technically advanced functionalities to user-
friendly market related concepts resulted in a relatively low threshold for 
adoption of VoiceMail. 
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Knowledge vital to the origin of SMS as a communication service was 
acquired through research work in the Research and Development (R&D) 
department in Televerket in the mid-80s.  The R&D activities included both 
basic research and research with a more applied character where technology 
was tested on pilots with respect to its applicability. A great part of the 
terminology used in the technical specification of text messages came from 
the basic research work. Testing new developments on pilots and 
appurtenant market analysis gave the researchers valuable market insight, 
which was the reason why they argued so eagerly for the “Mobile 
Originated” text messages in the GSM-standard. Likewise, the person who 
later got the responsibility for the SMS platform during service operation 
had a corresponding experience. Earlier, he had built and tested a data 
network system for mobile data services for enterprise communication. This 
experience had given him a belief in SMS as a communication service, 
resulting in estimated growth curves indicating a rapid expansion. Therefore, 
he increased the platform’s capacity up front, causing a significant growth in 
text messages traffic.  
 
Both technical and customer know-how were here represented by the 
same person in situations were individual employment of both was 
important. Factors supporting acquirement and employment of both 
expertise’s were a generous R&D culture, including both basic and applied 
research, and participation in standardization activities. Here, it seems that 
by accepting individual empowerment in this respect the organization 
enabled commercialization of SMS. Another factors enabling employment of 
both proficiencies was a shared understanding of the importance of an end-
to-end responsibility for a production line for securing efficient coordination 
of different vital parts of the service. This understanding resulted in technical 
responsibility for the SMS-platform being placed where the relevant 
knowledge was, i.e. in the market department, and not in accordance with 
the formal responsibility structure, in the operations department. This way, a 
close link was established between system technical and product 
responsibility, first due to the bipartite responsibility and later due to a tight 
collaboration between the system technical and the product groups.  
 
There was also a close link between system technical and product 
responsibility in the VoiceMail case through a cross-representation in 
technical and market related activities. The technical/market sub-project 
leader of the VoiceMail project was responsible for specification of the 
platform’s functionalities and qualities and development of the service’s user 
interface. Moreover, he was technically responsible for the VoiceMail 
platform for a period of time after launching. He had acquired valuable 
know-how through an earlier project where he was responsible for 
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developing and commercializing a popular electronic device used to contact 
people via a paging network. In this project they emphasized the importance 
of the transition of technical functionalities to customer friendly 
functionalities, i.e. user interface.  This experience was useful when defining 
new market related concepts to VoiceMail functionalities. Moreover, the 
technical/market sub-project leader trained the sales organization in how to 
use and communicate these new concepts. This implied that when VoiceMail 
was introduced, the new functionalities were relatively intuitive to the users 
enabling adoption of VoiceMail as a service. The link between system 
technical and product responsibility was supported by a strong feeling of 
personal ownership to VoiceMail held by the technical/market sub-project 
leader. He wanted to ensure that VoiceMail would function both technically 
and in the market place. Moreover, this strong ownership entailed that the 
project team continued to have the technical responsibility for a period after 
VoiceMail had been launched, as they wanted to ensure the platform’s 
functionalities and integration with various components and systems in 
VoiceMail’s production line.  
 
Not all necessary know-how for commercializing VoiceMail was 
originally represented in-house Telenor Mobile, like it was in the SMS case. 
The project leader and the technical sub-project leader made the VoiceMail 
requirement, but there was an external supplier who developed the 
VoiceMail platform. The platform was custom-made in order to match other 
components in the service’s production line. The VoiceMail platform was, in 
this manner, not a standard product on the market. The project team 
considered it important to have relevant know-how for repairing the platform 
in-house and added a collaboration clause in the contract with the platform 
developer, demanding participation in developing and implementation 
activities. This way, the VoiceMail’s project team acquired the technical 
know-how necessary for repairing and up-grading the platform and, thus, 
became independent of the platform supplier in upgrading/repairing the 
platform, which, later, on appeared to be an advantage. 
 
The cross-representation in technical and market related activities 
created a vital link between technical infrastructure and the service’s user 
interface which enabled commercialization of VoiceMail. Furthermore, 
securing relevant platform know-how in-house for upgrading and repairing 
the VoiceMail platform was advantageous. Relevant technical and customer 
know-how were then, as in the SMS case, represented by one and the same 
person in situations where an individual employment of both expertises was 
critical. One factor supporting employment of both know-how’s was an 
organizational structure or culture accepting individual employment driven 
by a strong personal ownership to the service.  
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Characteristic to SMS and VocieMail is user friendly interface lowering 
the threshold for new users to adapt to the service. Furthermore, a bundling 
with the main service, i.e. GSM-subscription, in an early phase of 
distribution involved that new users did not have to make any decisions 
related to purchasing new hardware or subscription to a new service. These 
product characteristics enabled distribution of SMS and VoiceMail. Another 
common denominator enabling the commercialization process was 
employment of technical and customer know-how’s based on an earlier 
individual experience with both technical and customer’s issues. A cross-
representation of technical and market related activities during “packaging” 
and distribution made a strong link between the technical infrastructure and 
the service’s user interface, and this enabled distribution. This cross 
representation combined with a strong ownership to these two services 
arranged for an individual empowerment was also an enabling factor during 
distribution.   
 
 
 Unsuccessful commercialization, IntraWAP and 
AlphaNumber 
 
IntraWAP was a service that was to give companies and their employees 
secure access to groupware applications on corporate Intranet from a mobile 
phone. A pilot solution was launched in June 2000 and after various 
upgraded versions and three re-launchings IntraWAP ceased in 2003. 
AlphaNumber was an advanced call-forward service entailing that 
subscribers could be available on any telephone in the fixed and wireless 
network. AlphaNumber was launched in 1995 and closed down autumn 
2000.  
 
Technical know-how in several fields, combined with customer know-
how, was in the IntraWAP case vital for both adapting the various technical 
components and systems in IntraWAP’s production line, and to develop a 
customer directed product concept. Telenor Mobile had relevant technical 
know-how for parts of the IntraWAP infrastructure, which was based on 
long experience with ordinary network operation. The project team consisted 
of both technical and market resources with relevant know-how for 
commercializing IntraWAP. Some of the allocated human resources were, 
however, busy with several other projects and for that reason not always 
accessible. Nevertheless, a larger challenge for the project team was getting 
access to technology and know-how possessed by external actors, as well as 
coordinating the various activities involving external know-how and 
technology. This challenge was partly a result of the double responsibility of 
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providing IntraWAP as a service. Telenor Mobil was responsible for 
securing access to the corporate intranet via hand-held terminals, while 
IBM/Lotus Software was responsible for implementation and operation of 
the central connector software at the customer’s site. Moreover, Telenor 
Mobile was dependent on Ericsson in updating the immature security 
technology installed on the WAP-gateway. Telenor Mobile was, in this 
manner, both technologically and operationally dependent on external actors 
having critical technical and customer related know-how. A limited access to 
vital know-how possessed by external actors resulted in an incomplete 
product concept and delays in security mechanisms at a time when 
IntraWAP was considered more or less complete.  IntraWAP was also 
marketed by the providers as being complete.  
 
A weak link between technical and customer know-how was also the 
case with AlphaNumber resulting in a service with a user interface perceived 
as technically complex by the users. Telenor Private in this case had the 
necessary technical know-how in-house and was thus independent of 
external actors, in contrast to the IntraWAP-case where there was a 
dependence on external know-how for commercializing the service. In the 
AlphaNumber instance Ericsson contributed with valuable technical 
expertise and was an important collaboration partner in developing the UPT 
platform. However, the underlying IN technology and UPT platform were 
complete when Telenor Private decided to commercialize AlphaNumber as a 
service. The main focus in the AlphaNumber project was, as already 
mentioned, technical functionalities. Development of the UPT-platform was 
driven by the latest development in Intelligent Network (IN) technology 
where Telenor had acquired an in-depth know-how through participation in 
standardization activities. Market resources were involved only a short time 
before launching AlphaNumber as a service. The person in charge of 
launching and distribution AlphaNumber had rather little experience with 
marketing and acknowledged too late how important simplicity and user 
friendliness were for market acceptance of AlphaNumber and, thus, for 
success. Another factor that hampered commercialization of AlphaNumber 
was the internal power struggle between fixed (Telenor Private) and wireless 
(Telenor Mobile) priority areas. Telenor Mobile marketed the mobile phone 
as a competitor to AlphaNumber, which product advantages gradually were 
impaired when mobile phones were widespread, their coverage range 
became better, the prices for international calls were reduced and the SIM-
card was introduced. Moreover, the indistinctness of Telenor Private, who 
had responsibility for AlphaNumber, as well as income, may have been a 
restraining factor in commercializing AlphaNumber. In the case of 
IntraWAP, short time limits, changed project focus during commerciali-
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zation progress, immature technology and poor user interface were 
restricting factors. 
   
The common denominator, however, for the IntraWAP and 
AlphaNumber case was a weak link between vital technical and customer 
know-how resulting in several delays in commissioning IntraWAP during a 
critical phase of service distribution. Joint venture commercialization with 
third parties38 was newly cleared ground in the ‘90s, which may also partly 
explain this weak link. There was an absence of established routines and 
clarified guidelines for joint venture in commercialization project and for 
handling external actors on whom one depends technologically. Telenor 
Mobil had a formal relationship with IBM/Lotus Software anchored in a 
joint venture agreement, and they were represented in the project team. 
Therefore, it can not be said that limited access to their knowledge was the 
bottleneck. Rather, it was lack of appropriate agreements and established 
routines and guidelines for how to work together, as well as how to ensure 
that critical tasks, where external know-how and technology were involved, 
were performed at the right times. The roles and responsibilities were not 
fully clarified and the business models and collaboration incentives were 
unclear. A weak link between vital technical and customer know-how in the 
AlphaNumber case resulted in a complex user interface which increased the 
threshold for users to adapt to the service. Insufficient acknowledgement of 
the significance of transforming technical functionalities to customer 
functionalities, i.e. user interface, may be the reason for this weak link. The 
necessary expertise for commercializing AlphaNumber was represented in-
house, but the ability to link these vital know-how’s failed. 
 
 
 Strong network effects, SMS and IntraWAP 
 
SMS is a communication service meaning that it is used to 
communicate. The value of SMS lies in the connection among users in a 
network, and, hence, has no intrinsic value. SMS increases in value to a 
single user as the number of other users increases. IntraWAP was both an 
access service and a communication service. Employees using IntraWAP 
had access to an established network of e-mail users. IntraWAP, thus, had an 
intrinsic value, i.e. a value to the single user independent of other users. The 
service would, however, increase in value if there were several others using 
IntraWAP to get access to their e-mail system. The more people that used 
                                                 
38 A third party is used by Telenor to describe a commercial actor that has a 
freestanding product accessible through Telenor’s infrastructure. Examples can be 
ring tones, financial news, movies or groupware applications.  
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IntraWAP when travelling or out of office, the more colleagues and business 
connections a single user could communicate with. By definition network 
effects take place when the benefits to any individual consumer of a product 
or a system increase with the number of other users. In this matter both SMS 
and IntraWAP exhibited characteristics giving network effects during 
distribution, and can, as such, be characterized as network products. They 
differ, however, in that SMS became a large success, while IntraWAP was 
closed down after various upgraded versions and re-launchings. 
 
Distribution of SMS occurred without mentioning marketing efforts by 
Telenor Mobile. The relative advantage of SMS, which is the degree to 
which SMS was perceived as being better than the idea it superseded (in this 
case telephony), was evaluated early by the users. Teenagers’ comprehended 
that they could communicate much more cheaply by SMS than by making 
phone calls. Text messaging could also be used in situations where the 
sender or receiver could not talk, i.e. meetings, concerts etc. Finally, the 
youth image and the development of a specialized language to overcome the 
interface limitations gave SMS a cult status. SMS was bundled with GSM 
subscription and integrated in the mobile handset and the user did not have 
to make any decisions related to purchasing new hardware or subscription to 
a new service. Moreover, the SMS interface was relatively simple. Hence, 
when the users first learnt about SMS, they were able to start using SMS by 
themselves right away. The threshold for experimentation and learning by 
doing were thus low and was an advantage to SMS compared to other 
mobile services such as WAP. By the time IntraWAP was introduced to the 
market it required the majority of customers to buy a new mobile handset 
supporting WAP-functionality. These mobile phones were in their “early 
childhood” and the user interface was perceived by many as poor. The 
threshold for adopting IntraWAP was thus higher than for adopting SMS.  
 
Early users of SMS on the whole experienced a stabile service. There 
was, however, an incident that could have been critical for the distribution of 
SMS. Introduction of free SMS on “Pre-Paid” entailed that the SMS traffic 
was more than quadrupled in five days and it seems this growth in SMS 
users triggered an explosive growth of text messages. A service breakdown 
or prolonged reduced service quality could thus have affected both 
established and potential customers in their choice of mobile operator during 
a critical phase in SMS distribution. A prolonged service breakdown was, 
however, avoided. The person who was responsible for both the SMS 
platform and SMS as a product had increased the platform capacity in 
accordance with his own estimated growth curves for SMS traffic. The effect 
of the unexpected significant growth was hence limited to a reduced SMS 
functionality for less than a week.  
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Early users of IntraWAP experienced, in contrast to early users of SMS, 
a high threshold for adopting the service and a prolonged reduced service 
quality. Potential users of IntraWAP had to buy a new mobile handset that 
supported WAP-functionality, which had a user interface perceived by many 
as poor. Furthermore, IntraWAP was launched before the service was 
commissioned. When the project team realized that there would be delays in 
commissioning the first version, they decided to promote and launch 
IntraWAP to pilot customers in order to “exploit a branding effect”. By such, 
they wanted to create expectation and, hopefully, a demand for IntraWAP. 
IntraWAP had at that time no customer support and comprised an immature 
technology. Although pilot customers are informed that the service concept 
is not technically and commercially commissioned and that the customers’ 
role is to give feedback that contributes to improvements, they will have 
expectations connected to the service’s functionality. IntraWAP was also 
marketed at that time as a commercial service, which contributed to pilot 
customers’ expectations of IntraWAP´s grade of completeness.   
 
Early users of a network product have to experience the relative 
advantage of the service through an influx of new users. This did not occur 
in the IntraWAP case. The pilot project lasted for a relatively long period of 
time and there were several repeated promotions where service quality and 
launching dates were announced but ended in breach of promises. The pilot 
customers did not experience advantages big enough to persist in an early 
phase of distribution; they lost their patience and some pilots discontinued 
using the service. Hence, they did not affect new potential users in adopting 
the service. Furthermore, the sales corps and potential customers built a 
gradual mistrust to IntraWAP and, finally, when the service was complete 
the confidence was lost. Some of the main reasons for delays in the long 
drawn out pilot period were (1) reduced access to vital know-how and 
technology and (2) lack of established routines for sharing rights, roles and 
responsibilities implying weak links between vital know-how’s in a critical 
phase of distribution. In the SMS case, however, a strong link, represented 
by a cross-representation in technical and market related activities, enabled 
distribution of SMS by avoiding a service breakdown or prolonged reduced 
service quality.  
 
 
 
 Weak network effects, VoiceMail and AlphaNumber  
 
VoiceMail is an answering service handling incoming voice messages in 
personalized mailboxes linked to users’ phone numbers. VoiceMail has an 
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intrinsic value and will not increase in value for the individual user when 
others use their own VoiceMail service. AlphaNumber had a corresponding 
intrinsic value. This service was an advanced call-forward service entailing 
that the subscriber could be available on any telephone in the fixed and 
wireless network. AlphaNumber did not increase in value for the single user 
when other people gained their own personal AlphaNumber. VocieMail’s 
and AlphaNumber’s common product characteristics, in addition to being a 
telecommunication service, are that these services did not exhibit 
characteristics giving strong network effects during distribution.  
 
A visible difference, however, between these two services was that 
VoiceMail had a user friendly interface, while AlpahNumber’s user interface 
was perceive as technically complex by users. The project team in the 
VoiceMail case emphasized the importance of transforming technical 
functionalities to customer friendly functionalities, i.e. user interface. The 
technical/market subproject leader had acquired valuable know-how through 
an earlier project where he was responsible for developing and 
commercializing a popular electronic device used to contact people via a 
paging network. In this project they emphasized the importance of customer 
friendly user interface. This experience was useful when defining new 
market related concepts to VoiceMail functionalities. Moreover, the 
technical/market subproject leader trained the sales organization in how to 
use and communicate these new concepts. This implied that when VoiceMail 
was introduced, the new functionalities were relatively intuitive for the users 
which enabled adoption of VoiceMail as a service. The link between system 
technical and product responsibility was supported by a strong personal 
ownership to VoiceMail held by the technical/market sub-project leader. He 
wanted to ensure that VoiceMail would function both technically and in the 
market place. Moreover, this strong ownership entailed that the project team 
continued to have the technical responsibility for a period after VoiceMail 
had been launched, since it wanted to ensure the platform’s functionalities 
and integration with various components and systems in VoiceMail’s 
production line.  
 
In the AlphaNumber case there was a weak link between technical and 
customer know-how, which resulted in a service with a user interface 
perceived as technically complex by the users. The main focus in the 
AlphaNumber project was, as already mentioned, technical functionalities. 
Development of the UPT-platform was driven by the latest development in 
Intelligent Network (IN) technology where Telenor had acquired an in-depth 
know-how through participation in standardization activities. Market 
resources were involved only a short time before launching AlphaNumber as 
a service. The person in charge of launching and distributing AlphaNumber 
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had very limited experience with marketing and acknowledged too late how 
important simplicity and user friendliness was for market acceptance of 
AlphaNumber and, hence, for success.  
 
 
 Discussion  
 
In the four preceding sub-chapters, we have called attention to likenesses 
and differences between successful and not successful commercialization of 
telecommunication services exhibiting characteristics giving either strong or 
weak network effects during distribution. Now we will make an effort to 
answer the research questions proposed in Chapter 2.  
 
 
 Technological, customer and alliance 
capabilities 
 
Handling relevant technology and handling customers and markets are 
indicated to be vital operational capabilities in a successful 
commercialization (Danneels and Kleinschmidt, 2001; Dougherty, 1992; 
Mitchell, 1992; Moorman and Slotegraaf, 1999). Furthermore, development-
oriented and market-oriented collaborative relationships appear to help firms 
acquire needed commercialization capabilities in order to commercialize 
complex goods in the software system industry (Mitchell and Singh; 1996). 
We have, therefore, proposed three operational capabilities as being 
important for attainment of successful network products. These capabilities 
are (1) technological capability, (2) customer capability and (3) alliance 
capability. A technological capability was in the context of this thesis 
defined in Chapter 2 as an in-depth know-how about the technology 
underlying the new network product and the organizational routines and 
structure supporting both acquirement of this know-how and employment in 
such a way that turning point39 is reached during distribution. In the same 
way, a customer capability was defined as an in-depth know-how about 
customers’ needs and preferences and the organizational routines and 
structure supporting both acquirement and employment of this know-how. 
Moreover, an alliance capability was defined as the ability to handle external 
actors possessing vital resources for network products to be commercialized. 
To empirically link the three proposed operational capabilities to 
successfully commercialized network products, our first sub-question was: 
                                                 
39 The point at which enough individuals in a system have adopted the innovation so 
that the further rate of adoption becomes self-sustaining. 
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how do technological, customer and alliance capabilities enable 
commercialization of new products in telecommunication industries? 
 
Operational capabilities are in the literature referred to the ability of an 
organization to perform a coordinated set of tasks, utilizing organizational 
resources, for the purpose of achieving a particular end result (Helfat and 
Peteraf, 2003) or producing significant output of a particular type (Winter, 
2003). Leonard-Barton (1992) defines a core capability as a knowledge set 
that distinguishes and provides a competitive advantage. In this thesis, “a 
particular end result” or “a competitive advantage” involves a successful 
commercialization. According to Leonard-Barton (1992), excellence in the 
technical and professional skills and knowledge base underlying major 
products is one of the most necessary elements in a core capability. It seems 
obvious from the results in this study that an in-depth know-how about the 
technology underlying the four services presented in this thesis enabled the 
commercializing processes. The origin of SMS as a communication service 
was based on an in-depth technical know-how acquired through earlier basic 
research. The same know-how was crucial to capacity maintenance for the 
SMS-platform during SMS distribution. IntraWAP consisted of many 
different technical components and systems which had to interact 
synchronously to have value to the customers. In this case, it was necessary 
with a broad technological insight into several fields in order to understand 
the manner of operation for the single component and system, and to 
understand how they worked as a unit. In the VoiceMail case technical 
know-how of a corresponding system was the basis for a thorough 
specification of the VoiceMail platform and, later on, crucial for both 
repairing and updating the service during operation. Development of 
AlphaNumber service was technically driven and technical know-how was 
the starting point for development of the UPT-platform and AlphaNumber 
service.  
 
There seems to be some evidence in the present material, however, that 
technical know-how had to be combined with customer know-how in order 
to have significance to the commercialization result. With customer know-
how we mean customers’ needs, preferences, technological insight, 
experience, etc. The combination of technical know-how and customer 
experience, acquired through testing new technology on pilots, was the 
reason why the researchers in the SMS case argued for the “Mobile 
Originated” text messages in the GSM-standard. Likewise, the person who 
later had responsibility for the SMS platform during service operation had a 
corresponding experience, giving him confidence in SMS as a 
communication service. The result was estimated growth curves indicating a 
rapid escalation and, thus, an increased platform’s capacity to face a 
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significant growth in text messages traffic. In the IntraWAP case market 
insight and knowledge about potential corporate customers’ data system, 
needs and demands were necessary to both develop an appropriate product 
concept and to adapt the various technical systems.  The combination of 
technical know-how and customer know-how was important in the 
VoiceMail case for developing a user friendly interface, something the 
project team indicated as being one of the reasons why VocieMail 
distributed so easily. On the other hand, in the AlphaNumber case a poor 
user interface was explained by late involvement of customer know-how in 
the commercialization process. A poor user interface was further explained 
to be one of the main reasons for AlphaNumber not being profitable.  
 
Based on these results, it seems unnatural to view technical and 
customer know-how separately and to disassociate the organizational 
routines and structures supporting acquirement and employment of technical 
know-how from those who supported acquirement and employment of 
customer know-how. Technical know-how and customer know-how can, 
rather, be viewed as fundamental “ingredients” that have to be connected in 
order to have significance to the commercialization result. The results of this 
study indicate that it is more the ability to connect and integrate these 
“ingredients” that can be viewed as an important operational capability for 
commercializing telecommunication products. Which routines and structures 
would support integration of technical and customer know-how are 
discussed in the following sub-chapter 8.6.2.    
 
The fundamental “ingredients” necessary for commercializing the 
services presented in this thesis were not always represented in-house. 
Know-how and technology crucial for commercializing SMS were both 
presented and accessible in-house. Moreover, the mobile phones necessary 
for sending and receiving SMS were rapidly distributed when SMS was 
available to GSM-subscribers in 1996. Some of the vital know-how and 
technology in the IntraWAP case were, however, not presented in-house, and 
not always accessible. There was a dual responsibility for providing 
IntraWAP as a service, and the service comprised immature technology 
possessed by an external supplier. This involved that Telenor Mobile was 
both technologically and operationally dependent on external actors. Telenor 
Mobil was responsible for securing access to the corporate intranet via 
handheld terminals, while IBM/Lotus Software was responsible for 
implementation and operation of the central connector software at the 
customer’s site. Moreover, Telenor Mobile was dependent on Ericsson in 
updating the immature security technology installed on the WAP-gateway. 
Telenor Mobile had not established any formal relationship with Ericsson 
beyond the ordinary customer/supplier relationship, and Ericsson’s technical 
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know-how was not always accessible when required. Telenor Mobile 
apparently had access to IBM’s know-how. IBM participated in the project 
team and their joint venture was formalized in an agreement. Nevertheless, 
commercialization and service operation in joint venture with third parties 
was not an everyday phenomenon in Telenor Mobil in the ‘90s. No routines 
and guidelines were established for how to work together, the roles and 
responsibility where not fully clarified and the business models and 
collaboration incentives were unclear. A limited access to vital know-how 
and technology and a lack of appropriate agreement for join venture 
commercialization resulted in an incomplete product concept and delays in 
security mechanisms at a time when IntraWAP was considered more or less 
complete.  
 
Neither was all necessary know-how for commercializing VoiceMail 
originally represented in-house. Nevertheless, the project team in this case 
secured access to critical technical know-how through close collaboration 
with the platform supplier in developing and implementing activities. In this 
way, they had the critical knowledge in-house and accessible when they 
needed to repair or upgrade the VoiceMail platform. In the AlphaNumber 
case, Ericsson contributed with valuable technical know-how and was an 
important collaboration partner in developing the UPT platform. However, 
Telenor Private had the necessary knowledge in-house when they decided to 
commercialize AlphaNumber. Handling external actors one depends on to 
secure access to vital know-how and technology when needed, can for that 
reason be viewed as an important issue in the IntraWAP and VoiceMail case. 
These results indicate that not only is it important to integrate technical and 
customer know-how to commercialize telecommunication products 
successfully, but also to secure access to vital know-how and technology 
possessed by external actors. In conclusion, the findings of this study 
indicate that the ability to link technical and customer know-how was 
significant to the result in the presented commercialization processes. 
Moreover, in the case where vital know-how and technology for 
commercializing the product were delivered by external actors, the ability to 
handle external actors to secure access to these resources was crucial.  
 
We initially asked how three operational capabilities, (1) technological, 
(2) customer and (3) alliance, would enable commercialization of new 
products in telecommunication industries. An operational capability refers to 
the ability of an organization to utilize organizational resources for the 
purpose of achieving a particular end result (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003) or 
producing significant outputs of a particular type (Winter, 2003). An 
interpretation of this definition might be that an operational capability could 
merely be responsible for a successful commercialization. Based on the 
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results in this study we would argue that it would be more appropriate to 
view the ability to integrate technical and customer know-how as an 
important operational capability than viewing the ability to handle 
technology and customers as two separate capabilities important for 
developing and commercializing new products (Danneels and Kleinschmidt, 
2001; Dougherty, 1992; Mitchell, 1992; Moorman and Slotegraaf, 1999). 
Instead of viewing technical and customer know-how with accompanying 
knowledge-set (Leonard-Barton, 1992) as operational capabilities in a 
successful commercialization, it is more useful to view these know-how’s as 
necessary ingredients in an integration capability. Our results indicate that it 
is employment of these two know-how’s together that enable the 
commercialization process toward a “particular end result”, in this context a 
successful commercialization. It would then be the ability to integrate these 
two know-how’s that will be the success factor. We must, however, point out 
that several authors have emphasized that there must be a link between the 
previously suggested capabilities in order to develop and commercialize 
viable products (Danneels, 2002; Cooper, 1993; Dougherty, 1992; Song and 
Parry, 1997). Our main point is that technical and customer capabilities are 
not independent operational capabilities for commercializing new products 
successfully in telecommunication industries.  
 
We propose that the ability to integrate technical and customer know-
how will be an important operational capability to commercialize 
telecommunication products successfully. Characteristic to telecommuni-
cation services is technical interdependency between the network 
infrastructure and the services’ functionalities. An integration capability 
would enable the commercialization process by linking vital technical and 
customer know-how in such a way that the various resources and activities 
relevant for building and operating technical infrastructure and for 
developing the product concept, user interface and customer handling, are 
operated concurrently.  
 
Moreover, a telecommunication product involves several systems, 
components, and applications, delivered by several actors in some cases, 
which have to interact or operate in synchrony in order to be considered 
valuable. In the cases where vital know-how and technology are delivered or 
provided by external actors, the ability to handle these relationships to secure 
access to vital resources will be decisive. An alliance capability would thus 
enable the commercialization process by securing access to vital know-how 
and technology when required. Mitchell and Singh (1996) argued that 
collaborative relationships, either development- or market-oriented, appear 
to help firms in the software system industry to acquire needed 
commercialization capabilities in order to commercialize complex goods. 
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We would argue that the presented cases in this thesis were more about 
acquiring know-how and technology than acquiring capabilities.  Acquiring 
capabilities would, besides adding know-how, involve adding routines, 
systems for using the know-how, which is a much more comprehensive and 
long-term task.  
 
 
 Linkages  
 
The second research question in this study was in which way linkages 
between the three operational capabilities will enable the commercialization 
process. Our findings showed that a strong link between technical and 
customer know-how enabled the commercialization processes in such a way 
that the various resources and activities relevant for building and operating 
technical infrastructure and for developing the product concept, user 
interface and customer handling, are operated concurrently. In the previous 
chapter we then concluded that technical and customer know-how can be 
viewed as necessary “ingredients” that have to be linked and integrated in 
order to achieve successful telecommunication products. Hence, an 
integration capability would “replace” the initially proposed technological 
and customer capabilities in Chapter 2. To our knowledge, it has not been 
investigated what these linkages comprise or require in the form of routines 
and systems, although it has been pointed out that there must be a link 
between technical and customer know-how in order to develop and 
commercialize viable products (Danneels, 2002; Cooper, 1993; Dougherty, 
1992; Song and Parry, 1997). Who knows, inside the firm, which technical 
and customer know-how the firm has? Does linking require an in-depth 
understanding of technical and customer know-how, i.e. do they have to be 
represented cognitively in the same mind or is it sufficient with an awareness 
of their existence?  
 
The question is then which organizational routines and structure will 
support linkages and employment of technical and customer know-how, the 
necessary “ingredients” of an integration capability. Furthermore, which way 
will linkages between alliance capability and integration capability enable 
the commercialization process, or, in other words, how does an integration 
capability act in accordance with an alliance capability?  
 
Vital know-how was represented in the same mind in several of the 
presented cases. Representation of both technical and customer know-how 
by one person participating in the early standardization activities opened up 
for “Mobile Originated” messages in the standard, and, hence, was decisive 
for the origin of SMS. Furthermore, representation of both know-how’s by 
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the same person responsible for the SMS-platform avoided a platform 
breakdown in a critical phase of SMS distribution. The researcher from 
Televerket who participated in the text messages group for standardization, 
had acquired the necessary technical and customer know-how through 
experience with both technical and customer related issues. He had been 
involved in both basic research in telematics where the potential use was 
unclear, and applied research where new technology and applications were 
tested on pilots. From this work, he gained both an in-depth technical know-
how which made him capable of assessing what was technically possible, 
and a customer know-how which gave him an insight into how this might be 
received by customers, enabling him to assess the potential for business. The 
person responsible for the SMS-platform during the early distribution phase 
had a corresponding experience. 
 
In the VoiceMail case, representation of both know-how’s by one person 
was advantageous when the technical subproject leader made the 
specification of the platform’s functionalities and developed VocieMail’s 
user friendly interface. The project leader and technical sub-project leader in 
the VoiceMail case both had experience with developing and 
commercializing an earlier popular pager service. In this project, they had 
experienced the significance of transferring technical functionalities to 
customer friendly functionalities. We did not, however, find any indications 
in the unsuccessful cases that representation of both technical and customer 
know-how by one and the same person enabled commercialization of 
IntraWAP and AlphaNumber. In the AlphaNumber case, the various project 
leaders had a lack of experience with customer related issues; their focus 
was technical possibilities. A poor user interface perceived as technically 
complex by users has been mentioned as the main factor why it was not a 
success. Developing and commercializing IntraWAP required know-how in 
several fields and the project team lacked parts of the necessary experience. 
Ericsson possessed vital security mechanisms technology and know-how, 
while IBM/Lotus Software had both technical and customer know-how 
relevant to the product concept. It was a challenge to the project team to 
obtain access to vital technology and know-how and to coordinate the 
various activities involving external know-how and technology. A limited 
access to vital know-how possessed by external actors and lack of 
experience and routines in working with third parties resulted in an 
incomplete product concept and delays in security mechanisms at a time 
when IntraWAP was considered and marketed as more or less complete. 
 
A personal motivation and ownership of the new services seem to have 
been a strong drive in the successful cases. In the VoiceMail case, 
employment of relevant technical and customer know-how, represented by 
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one and the same person, was supported by a strong personal ownership felt 
by the technical/market subproject leader. He wanted to ensure that 
VoiceMail would function both technically and in the market place. His 
ownership to VoiceMail resulted in a cross-representation of technical and 
market related activities; he was responsible both for specification of the 
platform’s functionalities and qualities and for development of the service’s 
user interface where he emphasized the importance of transferring 
technically advanced functionalities to customer friendly functionalities. The 
new functionalities became relatively (intuitive to the users) user friendly, 
enabling adoption of VoiceMail as a service. Moreover, his strong 
ownership entailed that he trained the sales organization in how to use and 
communicate these new concepts and he continued to have the technical 
responsibility for a period after VoiceMail had been launched to verify the 
platform during operation.  
 
There was a corresponding personal ownership to SMS which had a 
positive effect on SMS distribution. The person responsible for the SMS 
platform operated as a product responsible when necessary. SMS was, at that 
time, not viewed as an isolated product that would give new income, but 
more as a part of the GSM-service. This was the reason why the market 
department did not appoint a product leader for SMS. The person 
responsible for the SMS-platform anticipated that SMS, as a communication 
service, would distribute to a great extent; an anticipation he held quite by 
himself. His belief in, and feeling of ownership to, SMS resulted in his 
estimating a growth curve that was much bigger than what his colleagues 
had expected. By then, he was on the front edge by increasing the SMS 
nodes’ capacity as the SMS traffic escalated and, thus, avoided a service 
breakdown during a critical phase of SMS distribution. The leader of the 
IntraWAP-project was initially very enthusiastic about the service, indicating 
that he felt a personal ownership to IntraWAP. However, various challenges 
and delays, changes in focus etc. reduced this enthusiasm over time.  We did 
not find a cross-representation in the AlpahNumber case. Several project 
leaders were involved, depending on the different phases of the 
commercialization course.  
 
Developing and upgrading a telecommunication service imply changes 
in the infrastructure, and the development of infrastructure opens up for new 
service functionalities. It would, thus, be unnatural “to detach the technique 
from the service” as the service is “very much characterized in what was 
technically possible”, to quote the combined technical/product manager in 
the SMS case. Telecommunication services are functionally dependent on 
the network’s infrastructure, whether or not they are network products. That 
means that telecommunication services will not function when the network 
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is not functioning. A cross-representation in technical and customer related 
activities gave room for an individual empowerment to have an impact on 
both the infrastructure and the service. In the VoiceMail case, this resulted in 
a favourable transition from technically advanced functionalities to customer 
friendly functionalities, while in the SMS case the result was a platform 
capacity continuously adjusted to growth in SMS traffic.  
 
An advantageous cross-representation was not only supported by a 
feeling of personal ownership to the service in question, but also by a shared 
organizational understanding for the importance of an end-to-end 
responsibility for a service’s production line on growth and development. 
The management team in the new daughter company, Telenor Mobile, 
wanted to ensure that “the technical side was aware of what went on the 
market side and vice versa”. The team introduced an end-to-end 
responsibility along the various services’ production lines, and a stronger 
coordination between the various professional areas, in contrast to the 
organizational form in the mother company, Televerket. Here, the 
departments reflected various technical systems and professional areas 
involved in producing a telecommunication service. The control of different 
vital parts in the service’s production line was, hence, placed in different 
departments. A shared understanding for the significance of end-to-end 
responsibility might increase the acceptance of an individual employment, 
driven by a feeling of strong personal ownership to the service and the 
acceptance of a rapid progress without the need “to look right and left while 
driving”, which could hinder growth and development.  
 
It seems that it was more the feeling of a personal ownership to the 
service than established routines and management structures that enabled the 
successful cases. An explanatory factor might be the large technological and 
business changes the telecommunication industry had gone through 
previously. Digitalization of the telecommunication infrastructure in the ‘80s 
and ‘90s had opened up for new types of services which could be developed 
in a relatively short time period (a couple of months), and for new types of 
actors (Tilson and Lyytinen, 2004). This was in contrast to earlier when the 
operators had monopoly in the telecommunication services and it could take 
several years to develop a new service. The established routines and 
structures for developing new services were seen as old-fashioned which 
could hinder growth and development in the new technological regime.  
 
Establishing a close link between technical and customer know-how was 
a challenge in the cases where external actors had the vital know-how and 
technology. The project team in the IntraWAP case had reduced access to 
this know-how. Ericsson possessed vital security mechanisms technology 
The Capability to Commercialize Network Products in Telecommunication 
 
121 
and know-how, while IBM/Lotus Software had important market insight and 
knowledge about potential corporate customer data systems, their needs and 
demands. Telenor Mobile had not established any formal relationship with 
Ericsson beyond the ordinary customer/supplier relationship and Ericsson’s 
technical know-how was not always accessible when required. Telenor 
Mobile apparently had access to IBM’s know-how; IBM participated in the 
project team, and their joint venture was formalized in an agreement. 
Nevertheless, commercialization and service operation in joint venture with 
third parties were not an everyday phenomenon at Telenor Mobil in the ‘90s. 
Accordingly, there were no established routines and guidelines for how to 
work together, the roles and responsibility where not fully clarified and the 
business models and collaboration incentives were unclear. A limited access 
to vital know-how and technology and a lack of appropriate agreement for 
join venture commercialization resulted in an incomplete product concept 
and delays in security mechanisms at a time when IntraWAP was considered 
more or less complete. In the VoiceMail case, we saw that the project team 
initially was dependent on an external supplier for assistance in repairing the 
platform. The project team decided, however, that they wanted to have this 
knowledge in-house and added a collaboration clause in the development 
contract, requiring participation in development and implementation 
activities. The VoiceMail’s project team, in this manner, acquired technical 
know-how necessary for repairing and up-grading the platform and, hence, 
became independent of the platform supplier, which later on appeared to be 
an advantage. In the beginning of the ‘90s, there were no clear directives for 
how to collaborate with external actors possessing know-how and 
technology vital for commercializing telecommunication products. Their 
strong feeling of ownership to the VoiceMail service might have been the 
motivation behind the project team’s decision to acquire vital know-how in-
house.   
 
We initially asked which organizational routines and structures would 
support linkages and employment of technical and customer know-how. Our 
results showed that representation of technical and customer know-how by 
one and the same person, a feeling of personal ownership to the service in 
question, a cross-representation and individual empowerment in technical 
and market related activities enabled the commercialization processes in this 
study. This was further supported by a shared organizational understanding 
of the importance of an end-to-end responsibility in the service’s production 
line and acceptance for a rapid progress without the need “to look right and 
left while driving”. Furthermore, our results showed that a lack of 
agreements and routines for securing access to vital know-how and 
technology possessed by external actors, and/or lack of established routines 
and guidelines for how to share rights, roles and responsibilities in joint 
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commercialization hindered integration of vital know-how. The ability to 
handle relationships with external actors possessing know-how and 
technology vital for the commercialization process is a prerequisite to 
integrate all necessary know-how.  
 
 
 Network products  
 
The main topic in this study is commercialization of network products in 
telecommunication. The theory of positive network effect has revealed that 
commercialization of network products can present difficulties that are 
specific to these types of products. The strong impact of direct network 
effects from inter-customer communication accentuates the importance of 
distribution rate, i.e. a rapid rollout, and reaching critical mass in order for 
customers to experience value. The question is whether these challenges 
require particular operational capabilities. We have proposed, based on 
previous discussions, that the ability to integrate technical and customer 
know-how is an important qualification to be able to commercialize 
telecommunication products successfully. Moreover, in the cases where vital 
know-how and technology are provided by external actors, the ability to 
handle these relationships to secure access to vital resources will be decisive. 
The question is then whether these capabilities are important for a rapid 
rollout and reaching critical mass for network products.   
 
By definition, network effects take place when the benefits to any 
individual consumer of a product or a system increase with the number of 
other users. Both SMS and IntraWAP exhibited characteristics giving 
network effects during distribution, and may by such be characterized as 
network products. They differ, however, in that SMS became a large 
success, while IntraWAP was closed down after various upgraded versions 
and re-launchings. Network product in telecommunication is used for 
communication between various nodes in a network, i.e. between 
individuals, organizations and terminals. With few nodes in a network, 
which means few nodes to communicate with, it is difficult for the individual 
user to perceive a new network product’s relative advantage. Network 
effects create utility for an individual user of a network product as other 
users adopt the product (Katz and Shapiro, 1984). Hence, there exists 
interdependency between the users in valuing a network product as its 
relative advantage increases for both past and future adopters when new 
users are participated in the network (Markus, 1987, Thompson, 1967). 
Users of network products in an early phase of distribution can thus be 
viewed as users “on trial”, meaning that they need time to experience value. 
Nelson (1970) introduced the concept of “experienced” goods when he made 
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a distinction between qualities that are not determined prior to purchase, i.e. 
“experience qualities” and qualities of a brand that the consumer can 
determine by inspection prior to purchase of the brand, i.e. “search 
qualities”. An example of the former is purchasing a cake that has to be 
tasted, i.e. experienced, in order to determine the quality. Wieber (1995) 
used the same concept “experienced goods” on network products because of 
the interdependency between the users when valuing the product and that 
early users, before critical mass is attained, need time to experience value. 
The distribution phase before turning point, i.e. attainment of critical mass, is 
thus an unstable phase.  
 
The relative advantage with SMS, which is the degree to which SMS 
was perceived as better than the idea it superseded (in this case telephony), 
was evaluated by the users early. Teenagers comprehended that they could 
communicate much more cheaply by SMS than by making phone calls. Text 
messaging could also be used in situations where the sender or receiver 
could not talk, i.e. meetings, concerts etc. Finally, the youth image and the 
development of a specialized language to overcome the interface limitations 
gave SMS a cult status. SMS was bundled with GSM subscription and 
integrated in the mobile handset and the user did not have to make any 
decisions related to purchasing new hardware or subscription to a new 
service. Moreover, the SMS interface was relatively simple. Hence, when 
the users first learnt about SMS, they were able to start using it themselves 
right away. The threshold for experimentation and learning by doing was 
thus low and this was an advantage to SMS compared to other mobile 
services such as WAP. When IntraWAP was introduced to the market it 
required the majority of customers to buy a new mobile handset supporting 
WAP-functionality. These mobile phones were in their “early childhood” 
and the user interface was perceived by many as poor and, hence, the 
threshold for adopting IntraWAP higher than for that of SMS. Early users of 
SMS on the whole experienced a stabile service. There was, however, an 
incident that could have been critical for distribution of SMS. Introduction of 
free SMS on “Pre-Paid” entailed that the SMS traffic was more than 
quadrupled in five days and it seems this growth in SMS users triggered an 
explosive increase of text messages. A service breakdown or prolonged 
reduced service quality could thus have affected both established and 
potential customers in their choice of mobile operator in a critical phase of 
SMS distribution. A prolonged service breakdown was, however, avoided. 
The person who was responsible for both the SMS platform and SMS as a 
product had increased the platform capacity in accordance with his own 
estimated growth curves for SMS traffic. The effect of the unexpected 
significant growth was therefore limited to a reduced SMS functionality for 
less than a week only.  
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Early users of IntraWAP experienced, in contrast to early users of SMS, 
a high threshold for adopting the service and a prolonged reduced service 
quality. Potential users of IntraWAP had to buy a new mobile handset that 
supported WAP-functionality, but had a user interface perceived by many as 
poor. Furthermore, IntraWAP was launched before the service was 
commissioned. When the project team realized that there would be delays in 
commissioning the first version, they decided to promote and launch 
IntraWAP to pilot customers in order to “exploit a branding effect”. This 
way they wanted to create expectations and, hopefully, a demand for 
IntraWAP which, at that time, had no customer support and comprised an 
immature technology. Although pilot customers were informed that the 
service concept was not technically and commercially commissioned, and 
that their role in this respect was to give feedback that contributed to 
improvements, they would have had expectations connected to the service’s 
functionality. IntraWAP was also marketed, at the time, as a commercial 
service, which contributed to pilot customers’ expectations of IntraWAP´s 
grade of completeness.   
 
Early users of a network product have to experience the relative 
advantage of the service through an influx of new users. This did not occur 
in the IntraWAP case. The pilots’ period lasted for a relatively long period of 
time and there were several repeated promotions where service quality and 
launching dates were announced but ended in breach of promise. The pilot 
customers did not experience advantages high enough to persist in an early 
phase of distribution; they lost their patience and some discontinued using 
the service. Hence, they did not affect new potential users in adopting the 
service. Furthermore, the sales corps and potential customers built a gradual 
mistrust of IntraWAP and, finally, when the service was complete the 
confidence was lost. Some of the main reasons for delays in the long, drawn 
out pilot period were (1) reduced access to vital know-how and technology 
and (2) lack of established routines for sharing rights, roles and 
responsibilities, implying weak links between vital know-how’s in a critical 
phase of distribution. In the SMS case, however, a strong link, represented 
by a cross-representation in technical and market related activities, enabled 
distribution of SMS by avoiding a service breakdown or prolonged reduced 
service quality.  
 
A simultaneous, technical interdependency exists between the network 
infrastructure and the service’s functionalities in telecommunication 
products. The ability to integrate vital technical and customer know-how and 
to secure access to these resources when provided by external actors is 
important to commercialize telecommunication products successfully. 
The Capability to Commercialize Network Products in Telecommunication 
 
125 
Telecommunication products without characteristics giving network effects 
during distribution are valuable to the single user when they are launched. 
VoiceMail and AlphaNumber had an intrinsic value but did not increase in 
value for the individual user when other individuals started using their own 
VoiceMail or personal AlphaNumber. Securing access to and integrating 
vital know-how are therefore important until completion, ideally before 
launching, of these products.  
 
Telecommunication products exhibiting characteristics giving network 
effects during distribution, i.e. network products are of no value to the single 
user when introduced to the market, but increase in value as the number of 
other users’ increases. Our results indicate that for network products know-
how and technology must be accessible and integrated until turning point is 
reached, where enough individuals have adopted the network product so that 
the further rate of adoption becomes self-sustaining (Rogers, 2003). Hence, 
network products are not completely commercialized until turning point is 
reached, a point where diffusion is going from an unstable to a stable phase. 
At turning point, the general perceptions of the new service change from a 
view that “sees novelty” to “one that sees necessity” (Allan, 1998). These 
results support the view that integration capability and alliance capability, in 
the cases where vital know-how and technology are provided by external 
actors, will be important capabilities for commercializing network products.  
 
 
 Dynamic capabilities 
 
The progress in a commercialization process may vary, not only due to 
different product construction, but also because challenges and opportunities 
related to market and technology change. Product development and the 
appurtenant commercialization process in a changing business environment 
therefore require both exploitation of existing competences and exploration 
of new ones. The capability to innovate and commercialize network products 
in a changing market, hence, has to co-evolve over time to match emerging 
opportunities (Teece et al., 1997; Dougherty, 1992). In other words, to be 
vital and viable in a changing environment the operational capabilities 
needed to commercialize network products successfully have to absorb new 
erudition. This ability to learn through exploration and add the new 
competence to current stock is called dynamic capability (Helfat and Peteraf, 
2003; Winter, 2003) or second-order capability (Zollo and Winter, 2002; 
Danneels, 2002). A dynamic capability may, in this situation, be defined as 
mechanisms that facilitate transfer and storage of knowledge learned through 
the commercialization process. The question is: what kind of knowledge, 
organizational mechanisms and structures facilitate transfer and storage of 
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knowledge learned through commercialization? In other words, what is the 
nature of a capability to add new competence to current stock? Our fourth 
research question was then: how do dynamic capabilities enable the 
operational capabilities to evolve to match the changing environment?   
 
We have showed that the ability to integrate technical and customer 
know-how is important when commercializing telecommunication products, 
whereupon there is interdependency between the network infrastructure and 
the service’s functionalities. An integration capability enables the 
commercialization process by linking vital technical and customer know-
how in such a way that the various resources and activities relevant for 
building and operating technical infrastructure and for developing the 
product concept, user interface and customer handling, are operated in 
coherence. Danneels (2002) argued that technical and customer know-how 
constitute two learning dimensions along which products may be new to the 
firm. A new product may draw on existing technological know-how or on 
technological know-how that is new to the firm. In the same way, a new 
product may draw on customer know-how that the firm already has or it may 
require a new type of customer know-how. Hence, both technologies and 
customers are firm competences that can be leveraged, which involve 
drawing on an existing competence while using it as a stepping-stone to 
build a new competence. Leveraging technology competence implies 
appealing to additional customers through developing products based on an 
already achieved technological competence. Leveraging customer 
competence involves building additional technological competences to 
appeal to a greater share of existing customers’ needs.  
 
SMS, IntraWAP, VoiceMail and AlphaNumber were 
commercialized during a time period characterized by large changes in 
telecommunication industries. Digitalization of the telecommunication 
infrastructure in the ‘80s and ‘90s had opened up for new types of services, 
new types of actors and business models (Tilson and Lyytinen, 2004).  These 
changes implied new technological and market related challenges and 
opportunities. Development of the services presented in this study was 
driven by the latest development in technology and some of the services 
applied to new customer segments. Parts of the technical and customer 
know-how necessary for commercializing these services were new to the 
firm. Vital parts of the SMS infrastructure were based on new technology, 
meaning that it had not been in commercial operation before (e.g. data 
channel in the GSM-network). The SMS service applied to established 
customers, but it was a new customer segment that adopted the service first: 
teenagers. The technology behind IntraWAP was both new and immature 
(e.g. security mechanisms, user interface on terminals) and parts of the 
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required customer know-how were new to Telenor Mobile. They needed 
both information about the potential corporate customer to develop new 
pricing and sales strategies as well as information about the companies’ 
intranet system in order to adjust the rest of the components in the service’s 
production line. Both VoiceMail and AlpahNumber were based on new 
technology, but these services applied to established customer segments.  
 
Henderson and Cockburn (1994) have proposed that the skill of the firm 
to combine and recombine both existing and new customer and 
technological competences could be thought of as its integrative capability. 
The integration capability discussed in this study is proposed to be decisive 
to the specific service in question. Using people with experience from both 
technical and customer related activities in research and development 
projects, in commercialization projects where they are cross-represented in 
technical and customer activities, seems to have facilitated transfer of vital 
know-how which enabled the commercial process. Transfer of knowledge 
acquired from earlier work and transfer of customer related know-how to 
infrastructure work and vice versa occurred in both the SMS and the 
VoiceMail case. The person responsible for operating the SMS-platform had 
experience with development and operation of data networks. His cross-
representation in technical and customer related activities meant that 
platform capacity continuously corresponded with the increasing text 
messages traffic and this way avoided a service breakdown. The 
technical/market sub-project leader in the VoiceMail case had relevant 
experience from developing and distributing a very popular electronic device 
used to contact people via a paging network, which was useful when 
defining new market related concepts to VoiceMail functionalities. He was 
also, as his title indicates, cross-represented in technical and market 
activities during commercializing VoiceMail. The technically focused 
project leaders in the AlphaNumber case had no experience with 
commercialization activities or testing new developments with pilot 
customers. Moreover, they did not use relevant customer know-how until a 
short time before launching, resulting in a poor user interface and high 
threshold for adopting the service.  
 
Transferring new know-how from customer related activities to 
technically related issues and vice versa, gave dynamics that were 
advantageous in a short term perspective. In other words, it had a positive 
effect on the specific commercialization process. A dynamic capability 
modifying operational capabilities vital for commercialization to match 
environmental change has earlier been defined as mechanisms that facilitate 
transfer and storage of knowledge learned through the commercialization 
process. If the capability to integrate technical and customer know-how 
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facilitates transfer of vital know-how, the question is what mechanisms are 
responsible for storing or incorporating the newly acquired knowledge into 
the firm.  
 
The focal point of this study was the commercialization process per 
se. We have thus not observed mechanisms facilitating storage of knowledge 
that was employed favorably in a subsequent commercialization project. 
However, we question whether it is adequate to look for more or less rigid 
routines and structures supporting storing of knowledge when technology 
underlying telecommunication infrastructure is continuously developing, 
resulting in new business models and market possibilities. Eisenhardt and 
Martin (2002) distinguished between fast-changing and moderately dynamic 
markets and provide evidence that dynamic capabilities consist of less 
structured and less complex routines in a high-velocity market. Teece et al. 
(1997) refer to the capacity to renew competence so as to achieve 
congruence with the changing business environment in their definition of the 
term “dynamic” in dynamic capabilities. Danneels (2002) argues that the 
“dynamics” is the ability to identify, evaluate and incorporate new 
technological and/or customer competences into the firm. We did not find 
any indications in our data on independent dynamic capabilities (Helfat and 
Peteraf, 2003; Winter, 2003) or second order capabilities (Danneels, 2002) 
enabling the operational capabilities to co-evolve, or to build new 
operational capabilities to match a changing business environment. We do 
propose, however, that a firm’s capability to integrate technical and 
customer know-how, a prerequisite to commercialize network products 
successfully, is the mechanism by which firms integrate and recombine and 
shed resources, and, hence, keep an intrinsic dynamic nature. The dynamic 
nature important for the operational capabilities to co-evolve with a 
changing environment is thus a part of the integration capabilities.  
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9. Conclusion, implications and future 
research 
 
 
 
The main question in this research is whether it would require specific 
operational capabilities to commercialize network products in tele-
communication industries. Our results showed that integration of technical 
and customer know-how enabled the commercialization processes. 
Integration of vital technical and customer know-how implied that the 
various resources and activities relevant for building and operating technical 
infrastructure and for developing the product concept, user interface and 
customer handling, were operated in coherence. An important consequence 
was a user friendly interface that enabled distribution of the successful 
services. Representation of technical and customer know-how by one and the 
same person, a feeling of personal ownership to the service in question, a 
cross-representation and individual empowerment of technical and market 
related activities supported integration of vital technical and customer know-
how. A shared organizational understanding of the importance of both an 
end-to-end responsibility in the service’s production line and of a rapid 
progress without the need “to look right and left while driving” implied an 
acceptance of individual empowerment across organizational structures. 
Furthermore, our results showed that in the cases where vital know-how and 
technology were delivered or provided by external actors, the ability to 
handle these relationships to secure access to vital resources was decisive. 
Lack of agreements and routines for securing access to vital resources, as 
well as lack of established routines and guidelines for how to share rights, 
roles and responsibilities in joint commercialization, hindered integration of 
vital know-how. The ability to handle relationships with external actors 
possessing know-how and technology vital for the commercialization 
process is a prerequisite to integrate all necessary know-how.  
 
Based on these results we propose that the firm’s capability to integrate 
technical and customer know-how is crucial to be able to commercialize 
telecommunication products successfully. In those cases where necessary 
know-how and technology are possessed by external actors, the capability to 
integrate external technology and know-how into the commercialization 
project will also be decisive. To separate these capabilities and to emphasize 
that the former has an internal focus and the latter an external focus, we 
denote these capabilities INTERNAL INTEGRATION CAPABILITY and 
EXTERNAL INTEGRATION CAPABILITY, respectively. The dynamic 
nature important for the operational capabilities to co-evolve with a 
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changing environment is an intrinsic part of the integration capabilities. 
Table 2 and 3 below summarizes the results, cause and effect, and restrictive 
and promotional factors.  
 
 
Table 2:  Internal integration capability, its cause and effect together 
with restrictive and promotional factors 
 
INTERNAL INTEGRATION CAPABILITY 
CAUSE EFFECT RESTRICTIVE 
FACTORS 
PROMOTIONAL 
FACTORS 
Representation of 
technical and 
customer know-
how by one and 
the same person 
Personal 
ownership to the 
service in question 
Cross-
representation in  
technical and 
market related 
activities  
Individual 
empowerment of 
technical and 
market related 
activities  
 
Close link between 
system technical and 
product responsibility 
Technical 
infrastructure and 
product concept  
operated in coherence 
User friendly interface 
enabling distribution 
Rapid progress in the 
commercialization 
process  
Stabile service during 
distribution  
Organizational 
boundaries  
Shared 
organizational 
understanding of 
the importance 
of an end-to-end 
responsibility in 
the service’s 
production line  
Organizational 
acceptance of 
individual 
empowerment 
across 
organizational 
structures 
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Table 3:  External integration capability, its cause and effect together 
with restrictive and promotional factors 
 
EXTERNAL  INTEGRATION CAPABILITY 
CAUSE EFFECT RESTRICTIVE 
FACTORS 
PROMOTIONAL 
FACTORS 
Agreements, 
guidelines  
and/or routines 
for sharing 
rights, roles and 
responsibilities 
in joint 
commerciali-
zation 
 
Access to vital 
external resources  
Incentive business 
models for 
involved parties 
Lack of experience 
with joint 
commercialization 
Immature technology 
External project 
participation 
 
 
Furthermore, our results showed that for the network products where 
value increased as the number of other users increased, it was advantageous 
that vital technical and customer know-how were accessible, and integrated, 
until turning point was reached. At this point, enough individuals have 
adopted the network product so that the further rate of adoption becomes 
self-sustaining. Hence, network products are not completely commercialized 
until turning point is reached. Based on these results, we propose that both 
internal and external integration capabilities are necessary to reach a large 
number of users; a critical factor for network products.  
 
 
 Empirical based conceptual model 
 
In Chapter 2, we sketched out a literature based conceptual model (see 
figure 6 on page 35) proposing three operational capabilities important for 
commercializing network products successfully. These were (1) 
technological, (2) customer and (3) alliance capabilities. Together with 
linking mechanisms these capabilities would enable the firm to introduce 
and commercialize network products. However, the empirical data of this 
study have shown us that it is not appropriate to view these proposed 
capabilities as independent capabilities for commercializing network 
products. It is more about the capability to integrate technical and customer 
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know-how and the capability to integrate necessary external know-how in 
the commercialization project that will be decisive for the firm to 
commercialize network products successfully. The empirical based model 
(see figure 9) is reflecting our results and illustrates that for network 
products, where it is important to reach a large number of users for the 
customer to experience an enduring service value, an INTERNAL and 
EXTERNAL INTEGRATION CAPABILITY will be decisive to commercialize 
a network product successfully. The conceptual model illustrates that these 
two capabilities must be involved in the commercialization process until 
turning point is reached, where enough individuals have adopted the network 
product so that the further rate of adoption becomes self-sustaining. 
Successfully commercialized network products are thus the dependent 
variable in this conceptual model, while the firm’s capability to integrate 
technical know-how with commercial know-how, and the capability to 
integrate external know-how in the commercial process are independent 
variables.  
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Figure 10. Conceptual model based on empirical data in this study 
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Both INTERNAL and EXTERNAL INTEGRATION CAPABILITIES 
deals with the firm’s ability to integrate know-how and technology vital for 
the commercialization result. Integration of technical and customer know-
how is vital because they represent two important disciplines having impact 
on the product’s infrastructure and interface, which have a mutual influence. 
However, these two specialized fields are usually practised by various 
specialists and often organized in various units. The INTERNAL 
INTEGRATION CAPABILITY is therefore a question about managing 
internal barriers as organizational structure and/or managerial attitudes, 
while EXTERNAL INTEGRATION CAPABILITIES are more about 
managing external barriers, i.e. getting access to vital know-how and 
technology across firm’s borderline. They are, however, connected in the 
way that they may involve each other, e.g. EXTERNAL INTEGRATION 
CAPABILITIES involves both getting access to the necessary know-how and 
technology and to integrate this into the project. 
 
Both INTERNAL and EXTERNAL INTEGRATION CAPABILITIES are 
important for commercializing successfully both those products having 
characteristic giving network effects during distribution, i.e. network 
products, and those without these characteristics. However, as the conceptual 
model visualize, for the network product is it important that these 
capabilities are active until turning point is reached. Being active means that 
systems and routines supporting integration of vital know-how, as for 
example a project structure, must be present.  
 
Dynamic capabilities, which were proposed in the theoretical based 
conceptual model to be important for the operational capabilities to co-
evolve with a changing environment, is not visualized in the empirical based 
model (see figure 8). The reason for this is that the results from this study 
indicate that the dynamic nature important for the operational capabilities to 
co-evolve with a changing environment is an intrinsic part of the integration 
capabilities. Hence, the dynamic nature is embedded in the integration 
capabilities.  
 
 
 Managerial implications 
 
Telecommunication services are characterized by a technical 
interdependency between network infrastructure and the service’s 
functionalities. This interdependency means that telecommunication services 
will not function when the network is not functioning. Furthermore, 
technological development of the infrastructure opens up for new service 
functionalities, while introduction of new functionalities requires changes in 
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the infrastructure. The conclusion from this work is that the firm’s capability 
to successfully commercialize telecommunication services is closely 
connected to the firm’s capability to integrate technical and customer know-
how and the capability to integrate external technology and know-how in 
those cases where necessary resources are possessed by external actors. 
Representation of technical and customer know-how by one and the same 
person, a feeling of personal ownership to the service in question, a cross-
representation and individual empowerment of technical and market related 
activities supported integration of vital technical and customer know-how. It 
was thus advantageous to view and treat all components and system in the 
service’s production lines as a whole. Then, a shared organizational 
understanding of the importance of an end-to-end responsibility in the 
service’s production line implied an acceptance of individual empowerment 
across organizational structures. Hence, activities involving development of 
product concept and user interface in telecommunication services must be 
seen in close context with the activities involving development and 
adjustment of components and system in the underlying network structure. 
Managerial implications would be to arrange for a close co-operation and co-
ordination between relevant technical and customer know-how, through a 
contentious responsibility and authority across the service’s production line.  
 
Moreover, our results showed that in the cases where vital know-how 
and technology were delivered or provided by external actors, the ability to 
handle these relationships to secure access to vital resources was decisive. 
Lack of agreements and routines for securing access to vital resources, as 
well as lack of established routines and guidelines for how to share rights, 
roles and responsibilities in joint commercialization, hindered integration of 
vital know-how. The ability to handle relationships with external actors 
possessing know-how and technology vital for the commercialization 
process is prerequisite to integrate all necessary know-how. Hence, 
managerial implications would be to secure access to knowledge and 
technology through written co-operation agreements/contracts and to 
establish routines and structures supporting integration of these vital 
resources in the commercialization project.  
 
Those telecommunication services categorized as a networking service, 
i.e. network products, have an additionally quality making them of little 
value to the first individual who acquire them and more valuable as the 
number of other users’ increases. The value of a network product exhibiting 
direct network effects lies thus in the connection among users. Our results 
showed that for the network products it was advantageous that vital technical 
and customer know-how were accessible, and integrated, until turning point 
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was reached. At this point, where diffusion is going from an unstable to 
stable phase, have enough individuals adopted the network product so that 
the further rate of adoption becomes self-sustaining. Reaching a large 
number of users, i.e. a critical mass, is then a critical factor for network 
products. Hence, network products are not completely commercialized until 
turning point is reached. The managerial implication would be securing 
access to vital resources in a critical phase of distribution by upholding the 
project organization until critical mass in users has been attained.  
 
 
 Theoretical implications 
 
An operational capability has been defined to be the ability of an 
organization to utilize organizational resources for the purpose of achieving 
a particular end result (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003) or producing significant 
outputs of a particular type (Winter, 2003). In our context “a particular end 
result” means a successful commercialization. Handling relevant technology 
underlying the firm’s major products and handling its customers and markets 
are indicated by several authors to be vital operational capabilities in a 
successful commercialization (Danneels and Kleinschmidt, 2001; 
Dougherty, 1992; Mitchell, 1992; Moorman and Slotegraaf, 1999). Hence, 
an interpretation of the abovementioned definition into the context of 
commercialization would be that these two capabilities, i.e. technological 
capability and customer capability, are two separated capabilities important 
for developing and commercializing new products. With other words, that 
either a technological or a customer capability could merely be responsible 
for a successful commercialization. The empirical findings presented in this 
thesis illustrate how employment of technical and customer know-how’s 
together enable the commercialization process toward a “particular end 
result”, in this context a successful commercialization. Hence, the empirical 
findings suggests that it would be more appropriate to view the ability to 
integrate technical and customer know-how as an important operational 
capability for developing and commercializing new products. Future studies 
should with benefit focus more on the ability to integrate necessary know-
how for various tasks than focusing on acquirement and employment of 
either technical or customer know-how.   
 
Moreover, our empirical findings indicate that a firm’s capability to 
integrate technical and customer know-how is also the mechanism by which 
firms integrate and recombine and shed resources, and, hence, keep an 
intrinsic dynamic nature. The dynamic nature important for the operational 
capabilities to co-evolve with a changing environment is thus a part of the 
integration capabilities. Instead of searching for independent or superior 
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dynamic capabilities (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003; Winter, 2003, Danneels, 
2002) enabling the operational capabilities to co-evolve with changing 
business environments, research should focus on the intrinsic dynamic 
nature of various integration mechanisms.  
 
Last but not least, for network products the empirical findings 
illustrate the importance of securing access to vital know-how and techno-
logy until critical mass is attained. The implications of these findings would 
be to categories products and services, based on various characteristics, 
when studying the firm’s operational capabilities to successfully commercial 
their products and services.    
 
 
 Limitations and future research  
 
The empirical findings in this current study have some limitations. 
The dependent variable in this study was network products successfully 
commercialized. The independent variables were at the outset the firm’s 
technical, customer and alliance capabilities, while the results indicate that 
the firm’s capability to integrate technical know-how with commercial 
know-how, and the capability to integrate external know-how in the 
commercial process are the independent variables. An experiment possesses 
internal validity if the observed changes in the dependent variable are caused 
by manipulation of the independent variable. A shortcoming of case studies, 
however, is the inability to test cause-and-effect relationships due to lack of 
experimental control. Nevertheless, we have provided valuable insight 
through rich detail cases. Future research should then carry further the new 
insight by using more rigorous methods to test the proposed relationships in 
the empirical based conceptual model. 
 
External validity threats arise when the researchers draw incorrect 
inferences from the sample data/results to other settings and context than the 
observed data and cases. The qualitative approach involving a small set of 
cases have limits as regards generalization to a wider and more diverse 
population. The current research has focused on commercialization 
processes in a particular research context, which means commercialization 
cases in one Norwegian telecommunication company. This limits the results 
relevancy for this kind of product and industry, and cannot unconditionally 
be transferred to other markets and products types, as they may require other 
types of capabilities. A limitation with regard to generalization outside the 
telecommunication industry calls for future additional research investigating 
the empirical based conceptual model outside the industry.  
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Appendix  
 
 
Interviews  
 
Telecommunication products in general 
  
Interviewee’s position in Telenor/Involved in:  Interview 
Date 
Research Director Telenor 14.06.05 
Managing Director - Telenor Mobile 03.11.05 
Market Manager - 3G products  08.02.05 
Product Development Processes 08.08.05 
Mobile Business Development  29.07.05 
Researcher 28.04.05 
  
SMS 
  
Interviewee’s position in Telenor/Involved in:  Interview 
Date 
Senior Researcher  16.11.05 
Product Manager (I) 08.08.05 
15.11.05 
Technical/Product Manager  10.08.05 
14.11.05 
Product Manager (II) 10.08.05 
Product Manager - Telenor Mobile  18.08.05 
06.06.06 
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IntraWAP 
  
Interviewee’s position in Telenor/Involved in:  Interview 
Date 
Project Manager  17.08.05 
19.09.05 
Project participant  29.09.05 
Project participant - Sale and distribution 21.09.05 
Project participant - Market  23.09.05 
Project participant - Product Manager after launching 29.09.05 
Project participant - Market  22.09.05 
Project participant - from Lotus 09.12.05 
Project participant 16.06.05 
Project participant - Technical 04.10.05 
  
VoiceMail 
  
Interviewee’s position in Telenor/Involved in:  Interview 
Date 
Project Manager  17.11.05 
Project participant - Technical  14.11.05 
Marketing 28.07.05 
Product Manager (I) 16.11.05 
Product Manager (II) 05.08.05 
Product Manager (Nordic) 02.08.05 
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AlphaNumber 
  
Interviewee’s position in Telenor/Involved in:  Interview 
Date 
Managing Director - Telenor Private 18.11.05 
Project Manager (I) 02.11.05 
Project participant - Technical  05.08.05 
02.11.05 
Marketing  21.09.05 
Project Manager (II) 03.10.05 
13.11.05 
Steering Committee  11.11.05 
Business Development  16.06.05 
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Telenor documents 
 
Type and Title Produced Relevant for: 
R&D Magazine - “Vision of the 
future” 
01.1999 Telecommunication 
products in general 
Internal evaluation report - 
“Evaluation of innovation initiative 
in Telenor 2000-2003” 
Q1/2003 Telecommunication 
products in general 
Project report - “Extended access 
to Intranet” 
2003 IntraWAP 
Market survey - “Expectations to 
3G” 
2003 Telecommunication 
products in general 
Scientific Document - 
“Communication need in a 3G 
perspective” 
2004 Telecommunication 
products in general 
Scientific Document - “Digital 
content distribution” 
2004 Telecommunication 
products in general 
Presentation - “3G from Telenor 
Mobile” 
2007 IntraWAP and SMS 
Telenor Magazine 
“Telelektronikk” - “The history of 
mobile communications in 
Norway” 
1995 SMS 
Reports from Project Meetings   2000/2001 IntraWAP 
Telenor Magazine 
“Telelektronikk” - “SMS, The 
Strange duckling of GSM” 
2004 SMS 
Presentation - “The Concept of 
Universal Personal 
Telecommunication” 
1998 Alpha Number  
Reports from Project Meetings   1994 AlphaNumber 
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